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
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Ethiopia's Revised Constitution  
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THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, in conformity with the objectives of its publisher, The Middle East Institute, takes no editorial stand on the problems of the Middle East. Its sole criterion is that material published be sound and informative, and presented without emotional bias. All opinions expressed, therefore, are those of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the JOURNAL or the Institute.

AS this issue of The Middle East Journal goes to press news has just been received of the untimely death of George Camp Keiser, founder of the Middle East Institute, Chairman of its Board, and a staunch supporter of its activities since its establishment ten years ago.

Those of us who have known George Keiser during this period, and who have had the privilege of association with him in the labors of the Institute, have some realization of the extent of his devotion. Keenly interested in everything which might lead to a better understanding between the people of his own country and those of the Middle East, he gave of his time and energies without stint in this cause. It is ironic that his last illness should have followed so soon after an extended journey to the lands he loved so well.

In the death of George Camp Keiser the Middle East Institute loses an outstanding leader and the countries of the Middle East an understanding and active friend. He will be long remembered by both.

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS



# THE MIDDLE EAST *Journal*

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## THE MIDDLE EASTERN REACTION TO SOVIET PRESSURES

*Bernard Lewis*

ONE of the more significant and disturbing events of 1955 was the reappearance of Russia as an active factor in the Middle East. This was not in itself surprising. The rulers of Russia since Peter the Great have been interested in the Middle East, and have step by step pushed their way southwards, first to the Black Sea, which was once a Turkish lake, and then down both shores towards Turkey and Persia. Since the war, the Middle East has been the only area in which the frontier of the Soviet Union is not protected by a cordon of satellite states, but abuts directly on the free world. The Soviets have sought in various ways to remedy this. Their main effort, in this as in other areas, was for long directed against the states immediately beyond their borders. Since the great failure of 1946, however, when they were held back from Turkey and talked out of Persia, they have not, in the main, relied on direct political action. With the exception of the abortive understanding with Dr. Mosaddegh in Persia in 1953, they have made no serious attempt to intervene on the governmental level in Middle Eastern affairs, but have preferred to wait on the sidelines, watching—and where possible augmenting—the difficulties of the Western powers, until

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such time as 'the inevitable contradictions of capitalism' would destroy the economic and political structure of the Middle East and throw the pieces into the Soviet lap. To hasten the working of these contradictions, they pursued a strategy of agitation and disruption, based on the exploitation of national, religious, and social grievances, and applied through the local Communist parties and other parallel agencies.

In the second half of 1955 the moment seemed opportune to return once more to direct political action, and to try and wrest the initiative from the Western powers. The objective this time was not, as on previous occasions, the states on the Soviet border, but the Arab countries to the south of them. The time and place of the Soviet action were well chosen. The withdrawal of British forces from Egypt and the subsequent attempt to form an alternative defensive arrangement among the states of the Northern Tier gave new occasion and new opportunity for anti-Western agitation and action; the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East were bitterly divided among themselves—Turk against Greek, Arab against Jew, even Arab against Arab, as Egypt and Iraq vied for leadership within the Arab world.

Russian aims and methods in these recent developments are easy enough to understand. It is less easy—and not less important—to understand the aims, policies, and sentiments of the Middle Eastern governments and peoples, in their response to Soviet advances.

So far the peoples of the Middle East tend to be neutralist rather than pro-Communist; many, especially among the younger generation, look to Nehru as their model. But we would delude ourselves if we failed to recognize the existence among them of deep-rooted and widespread anti-Western feeling, which has no counterpart in their attitude to the Soviet Union. This feeling is expressed in various ways; the most striking, to the observer of international affairs, is the double standard applied by Middle Eastern and indeed most Oriental peoples in judging Western and Soviet actions. While every utterance and act of a Western government is at once subjected to minute and resentful scrutiny, the Soviets are usually given the benefit of the doubt—that is when any doubt is felt or expressed at all. I may give two examples from different fields: gift horses from the West to Middle Eastern countries are not only looked in the mouth; they are examined with dental X-rays, and then either rejected with contumely or grudgingly and silently accepted as part-payment of a debt. The mere promise of Soviet benefactions, on the other hand, is received with rapturous acclaim, and Soviet spokesmen are allowed a latitude in boasting of their promises which is never accorded to Westerners even when speaking of their accomplishment.

Another example is the Palestine question, undoubtedly a cause of very deep resentment in the Arab countries—resentment directed primarily against the Western powers, which are held responsible for Arab humiliation and suffering. The Soviet government has generally been hostile to Zionism,

but during the critical year 1947 the Soviet and satellite delegations at the United Nations spoke and voted for the Partition Resolution which provided the legal basis for the establishment of the state of Israel. In the Arab countries America is usually held responsible for organising the majority that carried that famous resolution—but the Soviets also had their share of responsibility, for without their bloc of votes the resolution would not have been adopted. Nor is that all. The U.S.S.R. followed immediately after the United States in recognizing Israel on the very day of its establishment, and indeed went one further by at once granting *de jure* recognition. American recognition for some time remained *de facto*. Perhaps most important of all, it was the swift supply of arms and aircraft from Czechoslovakia which enabled the infant Jewish state to meet and repel the invading armies of the Arab states, and to save itself from extinction in the first weeks of its existence.

All this was, of course, the subject of reproach and criticism in Arab circles at the time, though not of anything resembling the bitter and passionate diatribes directed against the West. And in a few years it was forgotten. Britain, on the other hand, opposed the partition scheme, refused to join in implementing it, and for long refused to have any dealings with Israel. This policy does not appear to have brought any noticeable reward in terms of good will.

What, we may well ask, is the reason for this disparity in the treatment accorded to Russia and to the West—this indulgence towards Russia, as contrasted with the mistrust and anger with which most Western actions are received?

It is easy enough to draw up a long list of specific grievances of the Middle East against the Western powers, all of which have at one time or another been adduced as the principal cause of discord. Palestine is the most important, but there are and have been others—North Africa, the Sudan, the Suez Canal, oil rights, and the rest,—each of which has had its importance at one time or another. Generally speaking, Middle Easterners will lay greater stress on the importance of those issues in which they are directly involved—Westerners on those in which they are *not* involved. And, of course, there will always be someone, in East or West, who is ready to grind an axe or titillate a prejudice by urging the importance of one particular issue to the exclusion of all the others.

But is the passion aroused by any one or other of these problems the sole, or even the main cause of anti-Western feeling? Or is it rather an expression—a symptom—of a more generalized condition which had deeper origins, and is itself the reason why these various specific problems become so intractable, why the West is regarded with such hatred and suspicion—and why, in consequence, the enemies of the West are viewed, if not with enthusiasm, at least with tolerance and some measure even of esteem?

The Palestine problem is that most frequently cited as the main cause of anti-Western feeling; but, as we have seen, this very problem provides a good example of the different treatments accorded to Russia and to the West—of how Western offences are cherished and magnified, while those of Russia are forgiven or overlooked. Much the same is true of the other specific problems. Each of them is an example—an expression and also an aggravation—of a profounder anti-Western feeling, the roots of which must be sought deeper down. This much at least is clear; the settlement of any one problem brings at best a local and temporary alleviation. The British withdrawal from Suez would seem to demonstrate this.

Is the answer, then to be found in the larger struggle against imperialism, or colonialism, as it is now more frequently called? This is undoubtedly a major theme in the political thinking of the Arab countries, as of much of Asia and Africa, and brings us rather nearer to the root of our problem. Recently a distinguished Indian historian and diplomat, Mr. K. M. Panikkar, the former Indian ambassador in Peking, wrote a book on the recent history of Asia, in which he spoke of the ending of what he called 'the Vasco da Gama epoch' in human history. This era is indeed ending, and its ending is one of the great historic events of our time. It began in the late 15th century, when the peoples of Western Europe embarked on a great career of expansion which eventually brought the whole world into the political, cultural, and economic orbit of the West. The process has been known by various names—discovery, settlement, imperialism, colonialism, 'the white man's burden' and 'manifest destiny'. In some areas, as in the Americas, it ended in the permanent replacement of earlier cultures by new ones of a European type. In other areas, as among the ancient civilizations of Asia, it subjected existing societies to a devastating impact in both their moral and material life, and superimposed on them, for a while, Western ideas, Western social habits and attitudes, Western economic and technological methods, Western forms of law and government, and sometimes also Western rule.

At the present time the wheel has come full circle, and the paramountcy of the West is being strongly challenged by nations which, until now, have more or less acquiesced in Western preeminence even when protesting against Western domination. This revival of Asian self-awareness and self-confidence has no doubt been helped by the lamentable political and moral failures of the West during this last half-century. It has also been stimulated by such Western ideas as political liberty and national self-determination, which have first come to many oriental peoples in the languages and from the schools of their Western overlords.

In most oriental countries, the great East-West struggle means the struggle of Asia to throw off Western tutelage, and not the struggle between Communism and Democracy to which we commonly apply that term. The states



of the Arab and Asian bloc at the United Nations have shown on numerous occasions that it is in terms of their struggle against the West, rather than of our struggle against Communism, that they view world problems.

But even here we still note the same inconsistency in the attitude of those states—the same double standard for judging Western and Soviet actions. We observe that their anti-colonialism is selective; it is directed only against some colonial powers, and not against others. And sometimes one almost gets the impression that it is only the liberal and retreating colonialists, like the British or the French, that have anything to fear from the anti-colonial bloc, while the ruthless and advancing imperialism of Russia passes without criticism, almost without notice.

To us in the West it may seem grotesque that a power which has so recently extended its rule over so many subjugated nations should pose as a champion of the rights of the oppressed colonial peoples against their imperial masters—all the more so at a time when those imperial masters, for various reasons, are withdrawing or have already withdrawn. We could not expect the Sovietization of Eastern Europe to make much of an impression; the conquest and subjugation of Christian, European peoples would not, in the present mood of the Arab and Asian states, make any great impact on them, nor would such a conquest, of Europeans by Europeans, be recognized as having any connection whatever with the hated phenomenon of imperialism. Even the Communization of China is liable to various interpretations. But apart from these, Russia is also an imperial power on the classic pattern, with a vast Asian colonial empire, conquered and colonised by Tsarist Russia at the same time as the Western European powers were expanding overseas. As a result of these conquests, there are today in the U.S.S.R. between 20 and 30 million Muslims, mostly Turkish-speaking, living on the sites of ancient Muslim kingdoms and centers of civilisation, such as Samarkand, Bokhara, and the other cities of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Transcaucasia—of what we may call the Soviet Middle East. These countries, though nominally organised as autonomous republics within the U.S.S.R., in fact have less political autonomy than an American county or city, and are entirely under the control of Moscow in every aspect of their existence.

Their fate has not always been happy. On June 26th 1946, the Moscow newspaper *Izvestiya* published a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR announcing that since 'during the Great Patriotic War . . . many Chechens and Crimean Tatars, at the instigation of German agents . . . had engaged in armed struggle against units of the Red Army', the Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic and the Crimean autonomous republic were abolished, and 'in this connection, the Chechens and the Crimean Tatars were resettled in other regions of the U.S.S.R. . . .'

In this way the last vestiges of a Muslim state and people with a history

going back to mediaeval times were finally liquidated. So far as I am aware, no subsequent pronouncement has given any news of the arrival of the Chechens and Tatars at their unnamed destination. The disappearance of the Karachay, Balkar, and other small Turkish Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus was accomplished without even the courtesy of a decree from the Supreme Soviet. The only outward sign of their fate was the tacit omission of their autonomous republics, their regions, and their names from later revised editions of the Soviet atlas and gazetteer. The larger peoples, such as the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs, have not so far been in danger of total elimination, but have been subjected to a relentless pressure of assimilation—to a process of enforced Sovietization and Russianization that is striking at the roots of their religion, their culture, their languages, their very nationhood.

Yet Muslim public opinion in the outside world, which reacts so swiftly and so violently to events in Casablanca, Suez, or Abadan, remains indifferent to events in Baku, Tashkent, or Stalinabad, and is ready to overlook, if not to condone, the silent disappearance or denationalization of whole nations of their co-religionists. We may well pause to wonder why the passionate and deeply-felt anti-colonialism of the oriental peoples does not extend to Russia, which today is the largest and most ruthless of colonial powers—the only one that still rules, without any sign of relaxation, over vast territories in Asia.

We shall be better able to understand the present anti-Western mood of the Arab states if we bear in mind that this is something deeper and vaster than a quarrel between state and state, even between nation and nation—and is concerned with problems at once more profound and more extensive than the specific grievances that can be discussed, or even formulated, on the level of inter-governmental debate. What we are seeing in our time is no less than a clash between civilizations—more specifically, a revolt of the world of Islam against the shattering impact of Western civilization which, since the 18th century, has dislocated and disrupted the old order, bringing much that is new and valuable, but also imposing terrible problems of transition and adjustment. There was a time when the Arab attitude to the West was one, if not of affection, then at least of admiration, and when their leaders were willing and anxious to follow Western guidance and imitate Western examples. That mood inevitably passed, and in the present mood of revulsion and disillusionment there are many who see in the West the source of all their troubles and difficulties. As long as more or less colonial regimes existed in most of the Arab countries of the Middle East, it was possible to keep anti-Western sentiment on a limited, political basis, and to accept Western ideals while rejecting Western imperial rule. But since the war the removal of foreign colonial rule has revealed, instead of solving, the fundamental social, economic, and political problems of the area, and the resulting anger and frustration are often generalized against Western civilization as a whole. It is



because they are enemies of the West—of both the Western states and the Western way of life—that the Soviets have been able to pass themselves off as friends of the Orient, and to secure a degree of indulgence and good-will denied to the Western powers. It was for the same reasons, and among the same circles, that the Nazis in their day were able to rally so much support in the Middle East for their war against the Western powers and Western democracy. And today the crisis is far more acute.

In considering the different attitudes of Middle Eastern peoples to the West on the one hand and to Russia on the other, there are a number of other points to take into account.

One is the familiarity of these peoples with despotism. One of the things that are most frighteningly strange to the Westerner about Communist government is the arbitrary and capricious dictatorship of the men in the Kremlin. To Middle Easterners, this is neither frightening nor strange. I would not say that they like despotic government, but it is something of which they have long experience. The processes by which policy, in democratic countries, is formulated, enunciated, and applied are complex and bewildering even to the citizens of those countries—how much more so to the uncomprehending alien, accustomed to the simple certitudes of autocracy. Dictatorship is after all far easier to operate and to understand than democracy, and corresponds more closely to the common experience of mankind. They can understand it; they can respect it.

To make matters worse, their attitude to democracy is unfortunately one not only of incomprehension but also of disillusionment. It began with admiration in the nineteenth century, when they were deeply impressed by the overwhelming power and wealth of the West as contrasted with their own weakness and backwardness, and sought above all else to discover and win for themselves the elusive secret of Western superiority. Many of the Middle Eastern reformers of that time saw that secret in constitutional and parliamentary government, which of all Western institutions was the most peculiar and distinctive in Oriental eyes. The first victory of an Asian over a European state—of constitutional Japan over autocratic Russia in 1905—seemed to confirm this theory, and the victory of the Western democracies over their autocratic opponents in 1918 provided the final proof. A series of attempts followed to adopt and adapt democratic government in one Middle Eastern country after another. In most of these countries the experiment—partly but by no means entirely because of Western interference—failed. The democratic order was able to command neither respect nor esteem, and the manifest defects of the parliamentary regimes and parties brought the whole concept of democracy into disrepute. And naturally enough, the average Middle Easterner, in judging democracy, will tend to judge it by the only examples within his direct experience. Thus for example, to an Egyptian the term

'parliamentary government' connotes in the first instance the regime of Faruq and the Pashas,—and he will not hold it in high regard. We can hardly blame him; what other experience does he have to guide him?

This does not mean that the Middle Easterner is not attached to liberty; but liberty means a different thing to him from what it means to us. It is conceived in collective rather than individual terms and means the freedom of the nation or community or group from the control of alien groups. It has no necessary relevance to the status of the individual or of the sub-group within the group, and the Middle Easterner therefore sees no absurdity, as did the *Economist*, in the recent spectacle at the United Nations of 'the French Republic being lectured on liberty by the representatives of Byelo-Russia and of the Yemen.'

Moreover—and this is perhaps the most important of all—the direct experience of the Arab peoples of imperialism is only of the Western kind. They may have heard of Russian imperialism, but they have not experienced it themselves. On the other hand, they have long experience of the Western kind, and can therefore only conceive of imperialism of that kind—that is to say, of a maritime and commercial imperialism, quite different from Russian overland military expansion. In the Arab lands, as in most of Asia, there is a popular image of the imperialist—a stock figure in contemporary political demonology. In race-conscious India, national oppression is often only clearly visible when the oppressor and the oppressed are of different colours; in the Muslim world, religion is more important than pigmentation, and imperialism is deemed to have taken place when the ruler is of a different faith from the ruled—more specifically, when a Muslim nation falls under the domination of non-Muslims. One element is constant and necessary in all these definitions of imperialism—salt water. An imperialist is a man who comes across the sea on a ship. He lands on the shore, he buys and he sells, and by various devices—mostly dishonest—he establishes himself in power. The salt water is essential—it is its presence which by some chemical or mystical catalysis, transforms a common and familiar process into the outrageous crime of imperialism. If the conqueror come by land instead of by sea, it is not imperialism but something different. It may be intellectually apprehended, as is shown by the inclusion of a perfunctory reference to Soviet colonialism in the Bandung resolutions, but it makes no emotional impact, evokes no response among the mass of the population,—and is therefore useless for current political controversy. Most people can conceive of a danger only in familiar terms.

Since the Arab experience of imperialism is only of the Western kind, they know it in a form that is not only maritime and commercial, but also liberal. That is to say, they know only the kind of imperialism which tolerates opposition to itself and in some measure even encourages it by imparting Western liberal ideas. And so the struggle against imperialism is thought of in terms of popular demonstrations and mass meetings, of press and parlia-

mentary campaigns, of nationalist leaders going to Paris or to London or, latterly, to Washington, to argue their views and present their case to public opinion. Now the students of the University of Tashkent do not riot against Soviet rule; I have not heard of any tram-cars being overturned in the streets of Bokhara, nor of any representative of the Uzbeks addressing meetings in some Muscovite Hyde Park. The leaders of the subject peoples do not visit the Kremlin to argue and negotiate on their demands. In the absence of these and other familiar phenomena of the anti-colonial struggle, the majority of Middle Easterners find it impossible to conceive the existence of such a struggle at all; and so the quiescence of the Muslim peoples of the U.S.S.R. is assumed—irrationally and no doubt unconsciously—to be evidence of their complete satisfaction with their present situation.

There are other reasons which are more directly our own responsibility. One of them is the racialism of some, though not all, of the Western powers—the discrimination by race and color which probably arouses more resentment all over Asia and Africa than any other single factor. This is a failing from which the Russians appear to be free; I say appear, not in order to cast doubt, but simply because I have no evidence one way or the other. They have, however, the reputation of being free from it, and this is a priceless moral trump in their hands in their dealings with Oriental peoples—one that is wantonly surrendered to them by our side. This matter is of far less importance in the Middle East than in other parts of Asia and Africa, but it is not without effect. The Russians do seem to be able to establish personal relations with Orientals on a natural human basis, without falling into the cold aloofness of some Westerners or the back-slapping affability of others—both equally affronting to Oriental self-respect.

Finally, there are the real difficulties caused by Westernization in the Middle East—the genuine troubles and grievances which are the result of the whole process of impact of the expanding West on non-Western societies, with all the political, social, and economic dislocations that followed.

This is not entirely an action of the West. It is not only Westerners who do these things, but also Westernizing Middle Easterners. The native plutocrat and bureaucrat were quick to make use of new, Western-style avenues to wealth and power. The native reformer is always much more ruthless and destructive in transforming his country than any Imperial power would ever dare to be. No Imperialist, for example, could ever have done what Kemal Atatürk did in Turkey, or what Nasir is attempting in Egypt. Nevertheless, the process of change is initiated by Western impact and Western example, and the resentments which it arouses are directed outwards against the West.

We of the West like to flatter ourselves that our society is in all respects superior to all others, and that any change in a non-Western society in the direction of a greater resemblance to ourselves is necessarily an improvement. It is not always so. When civilizations meet, there is usually one that domi-

nates. Missionaries from the one side, reformers from the other, may speak hopefully of 'a marriage of the best elements of both cultures', but the more common result of such a meeting is a cohabitation of the worst. Westernization has brought and is bringing great benefits to the Orient. It has also done great damage, of which we may consider one or two examples.

One of the most striking of these in the Middle East is the political disintegration of the area. Until the first world war, the greater part of the Middle East was under the effective or nominal rule of the Ottoman Sultan. He may not have been loved by all his Muslim subjects, but he was generally accepted as the legitimate Muslim ruler of a Muslim Empire, and as the heir of the great Emperors of the past. Few of his subjects could have conceived of any alternative, except perhaps a better Sultan with better ministers than those who happened to be in power at the time.

That government, the only legitimate political authority in the area, was destroyed. Its territories and peoples were divided into a number of prefabricated nation-states; its theocratic sovereign was replaced by a motley array of kings, presidents, ministers, and, latterly, colonels, none of whom have ever succeeded in winning for themselves that automatic acceptance of their right to rule which was enjoyed by the Ottoman Sultans and other traditional Muslim rulers before them. This loss of governmental legitimacy and the destruction of the traditional political order have left a gap which is still not filled, and which accounts in large measure for the political formlessness and irresponsibility that are so depressing a feature of the Middle Eastern scene.

The same thing can be observed in the sphere of social relations. There too the impact of Westernization destroyed the complex web of social obligations and loyalties which had existed in the traditional order, and replaced them with a set of institutions and laws, imitated from the West and imposed from above, which failed to evoke any response or understanding. The earlier values survive to some extent in a vestigial and surreptitious form, as vices in the new order. Thus nepotism, which we of the West condemn as vice, is not a vice at all by traditional standards, but a virtue—the virtue of family loyalty, the only intelligible form of social loyalty that remains. And I must confess that, for my part, I see no moral superiority in promoting one's political associates instead of one's second cousins; they are just as likely or as unlikely to be qualified.

Not the least important of the troubles of the Middle East is the economic upheaval resulting from Westernization. The process of development has, of course, brought enormous economic benefits to the area. But it has also brought grave problems. One of these is the rapid increase in population, without any corresponding increase in food production. The natural checks on population increase which operated in earlier times—famine, disease, and the rest—have for the most part been reduced or eliminated by the introduc-



tion of Western medicine, hygiene, and public security. As a result the population has increased at a fantastically rapid rate. Little has been done to produce more food for them to eat.

The rich, for their part, are richer, since the introduction of Western commercial and financial techniques has made possible the accumulation of fortunes on a scale impossible in the more rudimentary economy of earlier times. The adoption by the rich of Western forms and standards of clothing, housing, amenities, and to some extent social behavior, has differentiated them more sharply and more visibly than ever before from the impoverished mass of their fellow-countrymen. The gulf between rich and poor, no longer bridged by a common pattern of life and by mutual religious and ethical obligations, yawns wider and deeper than before.

The poor are more numerous, and in many areas are actually poorer than they were. What is more to the point, they are more conscious of their poverty. In earlier times they were resigned to their fate, partly because of religious fatalism, but more because they could not conceive of any way of life other than that in which Allah had seen fit to place them. But now, thanks above all to the cinema, but also to other mass media, the poor man in a Middle Eastern country has a fairly good, or at any rate a fairly detailed idea of what he is missing, and is more and more inclined to resent it.

Nor is it only the poor man that is discontented. Even more discontented—and far more dangerous—is the up-and-coming young craftsman or technician, the half-educated, half-trained, but boundlessly self-confident and ambitious artisan or mechanic who is appearing in all the centers where industrialization has begun; his grievances are naturally directed against his Western superiors, whose authority and salaries he resents.

Each new center of economic development is thus a new focus of dislocation, of discontent, and therefore, of anti-Western feeling. First, there are those, in the Middle East as everywhere else in the world, who object to all change and development on general principle; they are hostile. Then there are those whose vested interests are adversely affected. There must always be such, and they will be even more hostile. But what of those who benefit by the change, who are enriched and educated as a result of it? They will be most hostile of all, for the change will create new appetites and new ambitions far more rapidly than it can create the means of satisfying them, and the resulting discontents will be directed upwards and outwards against those who began the process and who themselves command those higher rewards which they withhold from others.

These difficulties have been accumulating for some time in one Middle Eastern country after another. It is our misfortune that in our day they seem to be coming to a head. The resulting tensions and discontents make many people in the Arab countries receptive to the overtures of a great power that is not compromised in their eyes by any previous record of domination,

tutelage, or interference in Arab affairs, that offers seductively simple and final answers to the problems of politics and economics, and that is in a state of political and ideological conflict with the West. I end where I began, with the recent reappearance of Russia as an active factor in the Middle East, exploiting and augmenting existing anti-Western feeling and trying to turn it into pro-Soviet feeling.

In her new Arab policy, Russia undoubtedly has not one but many motives, and will shift and change her tactics from the pursuit of one to another, according to the response of the Arabs, the reaction of the West, and the world situation in general. Her minimum objective is probably to assert her status as a great power with Middle Eastern interests, with the same right of representation and consultation as she enjoys in German and Far Eastern affairs; her maximum objective is presumably to win the whole Middle East for Communism, and reach through it into the rest of Asia and Africa. The Sovietization of the Middle East does not seem to be an immediate danger. Here as elsewhere, armed intervention would be necessary before the local Communists could have any chance of establishing or maintaining themselves in power. And in the Middle East there are no satellite states or armies that could be manipulated in a limited intervention or a local war. If any Communist soldiers are to invade the Arab lands, they must come from the Red Army itself—and that would almost certainly begin a third world war. Unless and until they are ready to face such a war, the Soviets are therefore unlikely to try and impose Communist regimes in the Arab states. Their policy will rather be to reduce and if possible eliminate all Western influence, and to build up their own to such a point that on the outbreak of general war or for any other reason of similar urgency they would be able to take over control.

The Russian arms deal with Egypt was a first step in this direction, and has been widely represented as a major defeat for Western policy. In a sense, it is. Certainly it is a danger, but we should view it as a challenge rather than as a defeat. It does not mean that we have lost the struggle; it means rather that the struggle, for the first time, is seriously engaged. Since 1946 the Russians have stayed outside Middle Eastern politics, leaving that area as more or less a Western preserve and making their own main effort elsewhere. Now they have joined in. As the *Economist* of London put it a little while ago, hitherto the Western powers have been playing patience in the Middle East; now the game is poker and the Russians have sat down at the table.

Poker is, of course, a more dangerous game than patience, and one may suffer serious losses. But so may one's opponent, too. The Russians, by joining in the Middle Eastern game, have given up their advantage of non-involvement and remoteness—of having no past record of dealing with the Arab states which could be brought against them as a reproach. The things which they are now doing or promising to do, such as delivering arms and offering loans and technical advice, are, after all, the same things as the West-



ern powers have been doing for some time. By engaging in these activities, the Russians are challenging comparison with the West, and, on the whole, it is a comparison which the West has no reason to fear. As the Russians become more closely involved in dealing with Middle Eastern governments and individuals, they too will encounter all the personal difficulties, the incomprehension, irritation, and exasperation, that are a familiar experience of their Western counterparts. I can almost find it in my heart to be sorry for them—they don't know what they are letting themselves in for.

At the present time many leaders of Middle Eastern and Asian states are still blinded by the new light from Moscow. But we may reasonably hope that in the long run, when they have had the opportunity and leisure to compare Russian and Western treatment—in what is given, how much is given, and what is required in return—the comparison will not be to our disadvantage. The principal task of Western statesmanship at this time is to make sure that there is a long run.

## THE ARAB LEAGUE: A REASSESSMENT

*T. R. Little*

THE ARAB LEAGUE met in Cairo in October in "an atmosphere of cordiality". To judge by reports of every meeting it has held in the eleven years in its existence, it has never done otherwise; but the glib assurance had slightly greater meaning than usual on this occasion. If cordiality was too strong a word, it was at least true that Egypt and Iraq sat down together at the same table, deliberately forgetful of the storms and stresses of the Turco-Iraqi Agreement quarrel. Colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasir, the Egyptian Prime Minister, newly assured in public favor by the Czech arms deal, met the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Al-Sayyid Burhan al-Din Bashayan, with goodwill and promises of a better future for relations between their two countries. Indeed, the simple fact that the League met at all, after the violent polemics between Egypt and Iraq during the first nine months of 1955, was enough to warrant the satisfaction of the Arab statesmen.

The League had seemed to lie in ruins, its decayed fabric torn irreparably apart by the strife between its two main members. For two or three years its reputation had declined among the Arabs themselves. It had ceased to be identified with "the Arab renaissance," and the sophisticated townsman spoke of it with contempt. Yet, in all their disillusionment, the Arabs still wanted the Arab League to meet.

The League was for a long time regarded as the expression of Arab unity; an incomplete and imperfect expression of unity, but one which could grow into reality and perfection because it responded to the deepest yearning and desire of the Arab peoples. It failed to satisfy the desire, but it would not be easy to find support for a policy which involved its dissolution. Politicians diligently avoid the issue of its failure because they are reluctant to affront the genuine and popular sentiment which reposes in the League idea. For the truth is that the League did attempt to fulfill the yearning of the Arabs. There was something genuine behind the political manoeuvrings which accompanied its creation. What it did not, and still does not, express is the political realities of the Arab world. Indeed, the tensions and conflicts among the Arab states were brought to the surface within the League and seemed greater by contrast with the ideals which the League was intended to achieve.

Arab unity does not exist. I question whether it has ever existed. The empire of the Arabs was created by Islam, which fused the Arabs into a single

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purpose but did not give them real unity beyond that purpose. But Islam and the Arabic language, by their diffusion, have given the Arabs a feeling of oneness. As they understand each other in speech, so they understand each other in thought. They have come to feel that historically they were one and that only the aggressions of their enemies and, in recent decades, the machinations of great powers, have broken their union. The Arab League revealed from the outset this historical condition of the Arabs: their persistent inability to unite politically but their abiding belief that union is a natural condition of their peoples which only required political formulation. In the Arab League, the Arabs trod a little too heavily upon their own dreams.

## II

The fundamental conflict within the Arab world reposes, in fact, in the Charter of the League itself and becomes apparent by a comparison of the report of the Preparatory Commission from which the Charter derives. The representatives of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Transjordan—not Saudi Arabia, although it sent representatives toward the close of the meeting—met in Alexandria between September 25 and October 7, 1944, and on October 7 drafted the report which is now known as the Alexandria Protocol. In it, the five states announce that, "anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries," they have met and decided that "a League will be formed of the independent Arab States". On March 22, 1945, these five states, plus Saudi Arabia and Yemen, signed the Charter of the Arab League, which was the fulfillment of the Alexandria decision.

In the six months which divided the Protocol and the Charter, the yearning for unity had already been blighted by the cold winds of political reality. The Protocol, which was intended to be the instrument to encourage and help the growing-together of the Arab states, had been transformed into a concrete frame which congealed each Arab state within its petty frontiers. Ever since, Article 5 of the Charter has been the subject of conflicting interpretations within the League between those anxious to see that no section of the Arab world expands its power inside the region, and those who consider that the League is intended to encourage union. Actually, a close reading of the Protocol and the Charter shows beyond doubt that the intention of the latter was to prevent the fusion of Arab states.

The Protocol declared that the decisions of the League Council shall be *binding* on the member States. It further declared that "every State will be free to conclude with any other member State of the League, or other powers, agreements which do not contradict the text or spirit of the present dispositions." Now, the spirit of the text is clear from the preamble and throughout. These states were "anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries and to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world". The League was being formed "in response to public opinion in

all Arab countries". The only reference which the protocol made to the independence and sovereignty of the member states was a promise to defend each state against aggression.

The change in spirit becomes immediately apparent in the opening two sentences of the preamble to the Charter. "Desirous," it begins, "of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States; and anxious to support and stabilize those ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of those States . . .". In the six months between the Protocol and the Charter, the "ties" have ceased to "bind" the Arab states; they only "link" them. And, what is more, the League is now only intended to "support and stabilize"—not "strengthen and consolidate"—those ties, within the framework of existing sovereignties of the states. The League now puts the protection of the member states against internal transformations before the protection of these states against aggression from outside. In the Charter itself, a new provision, clause 8, states that each member state "shall respect the systems of government established in other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of Government". The clause which entitles member states to establish "closer bonds" is ninth and has a secondary condition which specifically entitles other member states to decide that they are not bound by the treaties or agreements—presumably "the closer bonds"—of other member states. Clause seven binds states only to those decisions of the Council for which they have voted; in other words, the majority decisions of the Council become only an expression of the opinion of certain members. And even the measures to be taken to repulse aggression shall only "by *unanimous* decision" be determined.

What had happened between October 1944 and March 1945 was simply that the Arab League had become an instrument of Egyptian and Saudi Arabian politics and had been constructed to obstruct Iraq and Transjordan in any moves they might make to unite the Arab states of geographic Syria and beyond. Yet the League had found its most powerful instigator in Nuri Pasha al-Said, the powerful Iraqi leader, who had sought in it, no doubt for Iraqi purposes, an organization to encourage some fusion of existing Arab states. The idealism of the League idea, the popular concept of the League, had already been perverted before it was born; and it never learned to walk straight. It enshrined the fundamental conflict between the Hashimite states of Iraq and Jordan on one side, and of Saudi Arabia on the other. Furthermore, the Charter illustrated the power of Egypt to use that conflict for its own ends, for it was the influence of Egypt which, more than any other, transformed the Protocol into the League.

In a sense, the Arab League has had no development from its birth. Things have happened to it. It has responded to outside pressures and diffi-



culties and played its part in the creation and evolution of the historical situations of the last decade; but its responses have almost always been conditioned by its inner weakness.

### III

The cause of this weakness is well known. King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud had seized Mecca and the Kingdom of Arabia from the Hashimite family. The Hashimite family, *sharifs*, descended from King Husayn in direct line from the Prophet, regarded Abd al-Aziz as a usurper, however much political necessity might compel them to sit at table with his representatives. King Abd al-Aziz, on the other hand, regarded the Hashimites as people likely to reclaim the throne of Arabia if ever they got the chance, and therefore as people whose aggrandizement was to be opposed at any cost.

This conflict colored almost every action of the League. In general, the effect was that the Arab League could only be united in reaction to outside pressures. Even then, it could seldom retain its cohesion when those pressures strained the balance of power inside the Arab world. Measuring the shortcomings of the League against the passion of its decisions and words, one could easily conclude that it was born in deceit and reared in hypocrisy; but this would not be just. In action, it frequently was driven by inner stresses to sin against itself. Indeed, as time went on, the League began to dissemble in its words, rather like an old sinner who repents equivocally in order to leave a margin for the weaknesses of the flesh. It knew how far it fell short of virtue.

No matter how one explains its motivation, the weakness of the League was consistently damaging to the interests of the Arabs. Condemnation of French colonial policy might sustain nationalist morale, as indeed did opposition to the British in Egypt and Iraq, but this was not enough to make a foreign policy. At the outset of its career, the League had a number of related problems. On the one side was a group of "national demands," notably independence of the French in the Levant, which was almost won; and independence of Britain, firstly in Egypt, secondly in Iraq and, somehow, somewhere in the future, in Transjordan. On the other side was the question of the Jews in Palestine, which also concerned Britain closely and affected relations with the Western powers generally. Nuri al-Said had advised the preliminary commission of the Arab League in 1944 to leave the national issues aside and concentrate all efforts on preventing the loss of Palestine to the Jews, but the League elected to fight on all fronts at once. As a result, it became profitless and almost altruistic to advocate a pro-Egyptian policy in the Foreign Office, the Quai d'Orsay, or the State Department; for the Arab leaders, whatever they might be prepared to concede in private, were unable to make any constructive compromise. Men like Ernest Bevin, who were sympathetic to the Arab case, made no headway, and the inevitable result was that the Arab League was left to fight almost alone.

When the League was left to itself its division became obvious. When division was written into the Charter, Iraq recognized the fact at once and was accordingly annoyed. Events quickly justified the Iraqi view. For example, the opposition to Musa Bey al-Alami, a sincere and intelligent Arab leader who had been put in charge of the Arab Offices in Jerusalem and abroad, was motivated to a large extent on behalf of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husaini. Whereas Musa al-Alami was on good terms with Iraq, Hajj Amin was hated by Iraq for his part in fomenting the Rashid Ali revolt of 1941. This was not the entire story, of course. Musa Bey had been brought out of retirement by the Palestine Arabs to represent them at the meeting of the Preparatory Commission in 1944, but many still looked to Hajj Amin, then in exile in Germany, as the real leader of the Palestine Arabs. There were, however, no real reasons why Hajj Amin's enmity for Musa Bey should have been sustained by Egypt and Saudi Arabia against the Arab Offices, which were doing excellent, if limited, propaganda work for the Arab case on Palestine. It can hardly be doubted that in the mixture of motives that formed the opposition, the desire to weaken an influential figure friendly to Iraq was one.

The exclusion of Musa Bey exemplified an important trend. He was probably the only man who could have led the anti-Mufti elements in Palestine. (Later, in 1947, Sami Taha, the young leader of trades unionists in Palestine, who was building one of the best working class movements in the Arab world, and went into opposition to the Mufti, was assassinated). Musa Bey was a political opponent; but King Abdallah was a rival to Hajj Amin in the wider context of his ambitions in Palestine. For the League to have stood by Musa Bey would have meant nothing in terms of the inner tensions of the Arab world. To exalt Hajj Amin meant the heightening of tension both in relation to King Abdallah and Iraq. Yet the League chose the latter course. At the Bludan Conference of 1946, Arab League policy made Hajj Amin and the Arab Higher Committee the voice of Palestine, against the will of Jordan and Iraq. Having reinstated the Arab Higher Committee, the League found itself a slave to the extremism of the Committee, which, by public statements, created a policy that no Arab statesman dared openly dispute and which ruled out constructive compromise. This was most obvious at the Palestine Conference in London in 1947. The Arab statesmen knew that Ernest Bevin was at the end of his tether and some desired to retain some freedom of maneuver to keep his efforts alive. The Arab Higher Committee would have none of this, and in the end the delegations rejected Bevin's final proposals outright. That rejection set the stage for the United Nations debates and, ultimately, the Palestine war.

When the Palestine war came, the effect was disastrous. The Arab League supported Hajj Amin, although King Abdallah, an enemy of Hajj Amin, was the leader most able to launch an efficient force. An Iraqi general sat in



Damascus reluctant to arm the irregulars of Hajj Amin, who, in turn, were unwilling to cooperate with people who were not his sworn supporters. And King Abdallah believed his Arab Legion was intended to spend its strength winning a Palestinian throne for the Mufti. The League's divisions exerted themselves in war, as in peace.

The same conflicting forces were at work after the war. The All-Palestine (Gaza) Government, formed in September 1948 and composed of supporters of Hajj Amin, was established in a Cairo suburb, where it still has a shadowy if ineffective existence. It emerges at each meeting of the Arab League to represent, symbolically, the continued existence of Arab Palestine, still uncompromising, still inimical to Jordan and Iraq. When King Abdallah saved the eastern half of Palestine for the Arabs, it roused itself alongside Egypt and Saudi Arabia in a campaign to secure the dismissal of Jordan from the League, a policy which was frustrated only by the reluctance of other member states to go to such extremes. Only time and the advent of the military regime in Egypt has closed the curtains on the political influences of the All-Palestine Government.

#### IV

The emphasis has inevitably been upon the anti-Hashimite element within the League because that element was dominant and most active. Of the seven votes in the League Council, Iraq and Jordan could count only on their own, while Syria and Saudi Arabia usually agreed with Egypt and either Lebanon or Yemen or both could be relied on to go with the majority opinion. In so far as they were active, Iraq and Jordan had to seek their influence within Syria and Lebanon and not at the meetings of the League.

The fall of the first Shukri al-Quwwatli regime and the advent of a series of unstable military regimes in Syria during 1949 altered this situation. Syrian opinion wavered in its adhesion to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as the northern region, centering on Aleppo, the industrial "capital" with strong economic and historic links with the Iraqi trade route, increased or lost influence in Damascus. It is an interesting sidelight on Arab politics that the Collective Security Pact of 1950, which became a genuine and integral part of Arab thinking, was born from this period in opposition to Iraq's increasing influence in Syria. It seems to have been elaborated in the palace of King Faruq, probably in the fertile brain of Karim Thabit, who lobbied it through the League. Its purpose then was to obstruct a defensive line-up between Iraq and Syria by propounding a more grandiose scheme which no Arab statesman could possibly reject. Iraq disliked it but could not oppose it, although Nuri al-Said giped that, to meet the needs of Iraq, it should be designed as a defense against Russia as well as Israel. The Pact did serve its immediate purpose and then lapsed; but, despite the fact that no real organization grew from it, the plan came back into prominence as the Arabs

realized it could become a defensive system if the Western powers would expand the armed strength of the participating states. It became the Arab counter to western plans for regional defense and played an important part in the approach of the present Egyptian regime to the British in the negotiations for a Canal Zone settlement.

The success of the Collective Security Pact idea was typical of what one might term the psychology of the League. Although there were many Arabs who subscribed to the cynical view of one leader, that "strategically speaking, the pact was an aggregate of zeros," there was no question of its widespread appeal. For the League, beneath its intrigues, had a genuine passion for nationalism which the Western world frequently failed to recognise. It is true that the very nature of its difficulties required a slow building of confidence among its members; but building slowly was not in the nature of the organization. If it talked bigger than itself, it was often because it generally felt big. At times it has seemed to itself to be a wand which could conjure a surging spirit of Arabism to the national cause. When the Palestine war broke out, many of the statesmen felt that spirit could not help but succeed and forgot the disastrous undercurrents which were there to obstruct united military action.

It is consistent with this feeling that popular opinion, as it recognized the failures of the League, should attribute them to foreign influences. It was argued that Britain had "created the League" and, inevitably, that Jordan and Iraq were the instruments of "imperialist" policy within the League. Others pointed out that the difficulties of the organization derived from the fragmentation of the Arab Middle East after World War I. This was partly true; although the main division within the League came from the conquest of the Arabian peninsula by that great warrior Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud. The divisions created after World War I were, furthermore, in embryo in the structure of that part of the Ottoman Empire.

The more important fact is that the small states created in the Arab world quickly congealed into national units, into separate nationalisms, which won the minds of the peoples and secured the vested interest of ruling groups. However some people might dream of a united Arab world, there was no doubt that kings, presidents and parliaments were unanimous in their intention to retain the separate identities of their states. King Abdallah might scheme sincerely for unity with Syria, but the price was his greater glory. And Iraq might scheme for union with Jordan and/or Syria; but only under the crown of Iraq. In these conditions, the Arab League was about as much in the direction of unity as could be expected at that time.

It was equally inevitable that the League's failures should be associated with Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, the first Secretary General of the League and a lifelong exponent of the idea of Arab unity. He more than anyone

else is identified with the first eight years of the League's existence; he acquired such influence in Arab affairs that Iraq condemned his actions on the ground that he had become a creator of Arab policy by public pronouncements, sometimes transcending the policies of the individual states.

The dominant political group in Iraq regarded Azzam with a critical eye. He was an Egyptian with strong Saudi Arabian connections and close friendship with King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud and his successor King Saud Ibn Abd al-Aziz. He was often, if not continuously, in close relation with King Faruq. His power derived to a large extent from these connections although, in his own right, he had great personal influence on Arab opinion, which saw in him the exponent of Arab unity. Azzam virtually ruled the League he was intended to serve. It is beyond question that he frequently "ruled" it in line with Egyptian and Saudi Arabian policy.

Like most Egyptians, Azzam regarded Egypt as the natural leader of the bloc of states; and, indeed, without Egypt's money, the League would find it difficult to exist. In this he was undoubtedly sincere; it is also undoubted that he was party to some intrigues within the League states which were deliberately directed against the Hashimite Kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq and were, therefore, contrary to the spirit of the League. In effect, he worked against the gradual extension of Arab unity by opposing any tendency toward the fusion or partial fusion of existing states. The reason for this was evident: any amalgamation or partial amalgamation could only take place in the section of the Arab world between the Tigris and the Mediterranean and north of the Arabian peninsula. It could only affect the two Hashimite kingdoms and Syria. Such fusion was contrary to the policy of Saudi Arabia and to Faruq's zest for leadership. In his view, it could only take place at the expense of the League itself. All Azzam's natural associations in Egypt and Saudi Arabia were at one with his idealism to convince him that the interests of the League could only be served by opposition to the Hashimite kingdoms' ambitions. His policy was therefore directed to the ultimate ideal. There should be no fusion of states unless all states amalgamated or federated.

Even after he left the Arab League in 1953, Azzam Pasha preached this impossible doctrine. He pursued his policy with the infinite subtlety of an expert practitioner in Arab politics; as a result, he enjoys the reputation in some quarters of being a dishonest schemer and in others of being the supreme idealist. His behavior was in part due to the complex character of Arab politics in which intrigue is an essential instrument. But it was mainly due to the very structure of the League itself, with all the contending ambitions and hopes of the separate states. There is evidence for the rightness of his method in the fact that while he led the League it was, for better or for worse, a force in Arab politics, whereas now it is politically moribund. Fundamentally, Azzam believed in the sanctity of the League idea which had to be preserved at all costs.

## V

The replacement of Azzam by Abd al-Khaliq Hassuna, an Egyptian career diplomat and former Foreign Minister, marked a turning point in League affairs. Dr. Hassuna regards himself strictly as secretary general and therefore exerts much less influence on policy taken by the League but maintains a more efficient administration. The change was made by the military leaders of Egypt. It reflected, in part, the general spring-cleaning they were conducting inside Egypt, but also, in part, the disillusionment of the young military men with the ineffectual policies of the League and the methods it employed. They were, furthermore, much more concerned with Egypt's problems: with the Sudan, the Suez Canal question and their need to overcome internal enemies. The change also reflected the steady attrition of "old-guard" power in the Arab world. Syria began it with the Husni Zaim *coup d'état* in 1949. It was continued in Lebanon with the overthrow of President Bishara al-Khuri. In Jordan the assassination of King Abdallah loosened the bonds of antique patriotism in which that remarkable old man held the state, although there and in Iraq there has been no substantial change.\* The stronger control of the state evident in both countries has yielded, perhaps too slowly, to the rising generation of politicians such as Anwar al-Khatib and Anwar Nusaybah in Jordan and Burhan al-Din Bashayan in Iraq.

The most decisive change was, of course, in Egypt. It was quickly apparent that the decline of Egyptian interest in the League considerably reduced its political influence, until it became simply the vehicle for the organization of the economic boycott of Israel and such practical problems of reorganization as Middle East communications. In these matters, Dr. Hassuna has made it organizationally more effective.

During this phase, the League could have changed its nature. The most evident fact of the League's history is that the veiled conflict between Iraq and Saudi Arabia was important only so long as Egypt took the side of Saudi Arabia, for the influence of Saudi Arabia alone could never have controlled majority opinion within the League. The government of Lieut. Col. Gamal Abd al-Nasir was clearly not prepared to adopt out-of-hand the Middle East policies of the preceding regime it had destroyed. Its hesitancy came near to a decision in favor of closer ties with Iraq and a recognition of the ineffectiveness of the Saudi alliance, during the autumn of 1954. It is not necessary to examine in detail here the complicated pattern of misunderstanding and mistiming, after the Sarsank Conference between Salah Salim and the Iraqi leaders, which arrested this tendency in Egypt. It was destroyed finally by the Turco-Iraqi agreement.

The net result has been to restore the old lines of inter-Arab policy, with Egypt lining up in defense agreements with Syria and Saudi Arabia; but the

\* Editor's note: This article was written before the events of early March in Jordan. See *Developments of the Quarter*.



foundations of that policy have changed. The initiative for the anti-Iraqi policy is now much more with Egypt, which is conducting a vigorous anti-Hashimite campaign of its own, with Saudi Arabia as a useful adjunct. Saudi Arabia's reasons are unchanged but those of Egypt have changed so much that it would be unwise to conclude that the present phase has established a permanent attitude. Furthermore, the Syrian government's hesitancy over the proposed tripartite pact (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria) was due to the desire of strong sections of Syrian opinion to avoid a break with Iraq: even now the Syrians do not regard the defense pact with Egypt as denying good relations with Iraq. One must not exclude the possibility that Egypt has an eventual aim of coming to terms with the government in Baghdad.

The basis of Colonel Nasir's policy is "neutralism" in world affairs. He has been influenced in this direction by Nehru, but there is good reason to think that Nehru's contribution was to give ideological content to a policy reached empirically by the Egyptian leaders during their study of the Canal Zone question. They came then to the opinion that they should reach a friendly settlement with Britain without committing themselves to the Western defense system. (The commitment regarding an attack on Turkey was probably the most hard-fought point in the discussions of the Council of Revolution). The argument regarding Middle East defense was that the moribund Collective Security Pact of the Arabs should be made effective by armaments from the West supplied to individual Arab states without commitment on their part. These states would then "turn to their friends" and so establish a relationship which, because it was founded on the military organization of the states themselves, would be more valuable than a written commitment.

This policy was too intangible for the Western powers and conflicted with their concern to avoid an Arab-Israeli war. They turned, therefore, to the Turco-Iraqi agreement and its extensions eastwards which are now regarded as the foundation of the Western defense system in the Middle East. They apparently knew that Egypt would dislike the agreement but felt that it could be extended to other parts of the Arab world. In some quarters it was even believed that Egypt itself would come to see the logic of the position as the West saw it and at least acquiesce.

The Turco-Iraqi pact may be strategically necessary and an alternative arrangement which included Egypt may have been impossible, but the effect has been to restore, and renew the vigor of, the old policy. Egypt embarked immediately on a bitter "spoiling" offensive, the aim of which was to prevent any expansion of the Turco-Iraqi agreement in the Arab world and to demonstrate beyond any doubt that an over-all Middle East policy could not be achieved without Egypt. This it successfully did. The Arab League was almost killed. The division between Iraq on one side and Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the other, became wider and more difficult to bridge.

In the summer of 1955 it seemed impossible that the League could assemble with anything like the calmness of temper evident at the October meeting.

Egypt had, in the meantime, taken the first step to demonstrate that it was not dependent on the West for a defensive system. It had ordered substantial quantities of heavy armaments from Czechoslovakia. The Israeli attack on Gaza on February 28 and the subsequent uneasy situation on that frontier had increased the demand of the Egyptian army for equipment. Even more important was the fact that Czechoslovakia was willing to take a large part of the payment in cotton from stocks which were steadily declining in value. But it is at least open to question whether these two factors alone would have led to the deal in September 1955, if Western policy had not been so far committed to the "northern tier" defensive system. Since Iraq was associated with the Western powers, Egypt demonstrated its neutralism by a deal with the Eastern bloc. However "commercial" the deal may be in Egypt's estimation, it is evident that Russia does not regard it in that light and has seen the potential significance of it. Moscow immediately embarked on a diplomatic offensive throughout the area from Syria to the Yemen, in order to strengthen its position in the whole area split from Iraq. The division within the League is now, therefore, no longer a question of inter-Arab politics but of world politics.

## VI

In the last resort, any estimates of policy in the Middle East at the present time must depend on an estimate of the Arab League. Despite its depressing history, despite its divisions and internal conflicts, it enshrines an effective urge toward unity which is a vital condition of political life in the Arab world. Its very survival through the last difficult decade is evidence in itself of this fact. Iraq was widely criticized because the Turco-Iraqi pact had been signed without the consent of the other states and would therefore be a source of conflict; and Egypt, in turn, was condemned because its vitriolic campaign against Iraq split the Arab League wide open. One of the factors in the present situation is undoubtedly the reluctance of Lebanon, Jordan, and strong elements in Syria to confirm the relative isolation of Iraq within the Arab Middle East.

It may well be that the record of the League has hidden from the Western powers the evident fact that the League idea is, in itself, a substantial obstacle to any policy which is not designed to secure the adhesion of all the member states. Any analysis of the history of the League demonstrates beyond doubt that there cannot be an "Arab" policy unless it is based on the agreement of both Egypt and Iraq. Together, they can unite the Arab world; apart they can destroy any policy. Together they may make the Arab world a more formidable bargaining force, but at the same time they can ensure that any bargain reached can be carried out.



The real danger is that the urge for unity will be confused by the present situation to an extent that a large part of the Arab world will drift into relations with Russia which will be difficult to break. The Western position would more and more depend on the stability of Iraqi policy, which would in turn be affected by the influence of its own left-wing nationalism. It would be a bold man who would answer for the effects of time and Soviet inducements. This is, of course, crying havoc too early. The effective forces in the Arab world are not by any means committed. Neither in Egypt nor Syria are the leaders certain that they desire to go further than absolutely necessary into the Soviet commitment, and Soviet diplomacy may yet find it comes against the obstacle of Egyptian neutralism. What does seem evident is that, no matter how difficult the task may be, Western policy should be devised to secure the approval of the whole League of Arab states. It is the departure from this concept, the piece-meal approach to the Arab states, which has thrown open the door to Soviet Russia and bids fair to turn the flank of the Western defensive system. It is a policy which can be approved at the League Council table and not one adopted in any capital of the Arab world, which can secure Western policy in Middle East.

## VII

It is clearly true that since the "cordiality" of the Arab League meeting last October there has been no small amount of discord; but the effort to secure unity has persisted. During this period, the counteraction of Britain and the United States has gathered pace, culminating in the draft agreement by which, in association with a loan from the International bank for Reconstruction and Development, they will contribute towards the High Dam to be built in Egypt. But this has not resolved the internal dilemma of the Arab world. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were able to capitalize upon the high repute of Nasir's policy by rousing a willing Jordan in opposition to a proposal to join the Baghdad Pact (as the Turco-Iraqi agreement, in its enlarged form embracing Pakistan, Iran and Britain, is now commonly known). Thus, at the turn of the year, Nasir's successful opposition to the Pact seemed to be complete. Without Jordan's adhesion, Lebanon cannot join and the other Arab states will not. Indeed the Jordanian leaders, including King Husain, were concerned that their rejection of the pact might force Iraq into isolation in the Arab world and, with the blessing of the King, the Prime Minister, Samir Pasha al-Rifai and the Chief of the Royal Cabinet, Bahjat al-Talhuni, toured the principal Arab capitals to propose a peace-making conference of the Heads of State. Lebanon, Syria and Iraq agreed to attend but Egypt demanded as prior condition that Iraq should publicly deny any future efforts to bring other Arab states into the Baghdad Pact. Presumably the response of Saudi Arabia was similar.

This is tantamount to rejection but when an Egyptian spokesman let it

be known that it was rejection of the conference, not even Nasir's popularity saved Egypt from criticism for impeding an attempt at understanding. Col. Nasir thereupon explained his position to the Arab world in a statement issued through his spokesman, Col. Abd al-Qadir Hatim. The crux of this statement was that Egypt, which stood for an independent defence system for the Arabs, was in fundamental conflict with the policy of Iraq, which was committed to an association with great powers. It is in this conflict of policy that the cleavage within the Arab League is sustained, and with it the dilemma of the Western Powers. The Eden-Eisenhower communique, from their Washington conference, proclaimed the Baghdad Pact as a prop of their Middle Eastern policy; and in practice the two governments show their recognition of the vital importance of Egypt and the Nasir regime by practical support, of which the High Dam loan is the most striking example. Yet Col. Nasir himself leads the opposition to the Baghdad Pact in the Arab region, stating, almost in so many words, that the Arab League can stay split, that the unity for which the Arabs call must be denied, until Iraq will join with Egypt in a regional "neutralism" outside the Baghdad Pact.

# CURRENT POPULATION TRENDS IN IRAQ

Doris G. Adams

SETTLED by migration from early historic time and fought over by rival empires desirous of possessing Mesopotamia's agricultural wealth, the land that is now the modern state of Iraq is inhabited by a people of diverse ethnic and religious origins. The population of Iraq cannot be considered a unified whole. In order of size, the three most important ethnic-religious groups are Shi'ite Arabs, Sunnite Arabs, and Kurds, these three groups in the late 1940s having constituted about 45, 30, and 18 percent of Iraq's population respectively.<sup>1</sup> Serious political problems are created by the fact that no one group constitutes the majority of the population. For example, the restlessness that has been characteristic of Iraqi Kurdistan and the lower Euphrates region is in large part an outgrowth of heavy local Kurdish and Shi'ite majorities.

However, at least two factors are at present in operation to reduce ethnic and religious differences. First and most important, Iraq will be increasingly differentiated from some of her neighbors by the wealth and economic development resulting from the oil royalties accruing to the government. The most recent Five-Year Plan of Iraq's semi-autonomous Development Board envisions spending over 304 million dinars on economic development projects between 1955 and 1959,<sup>2</sup> an amount equal to approximately twice Iraq's national income of five years ago, as estimated by the United Nations. The transformation of Iraq's potentialities has taken place during the past few years, as a result of the rapid growth of oil revenues; from 3.2 million dinars for the fiscal year 1949-50, the revenues are expected to exceed 75 million dinars in 1956. This growth has been a result of three factors: the profit-sharing agreement with the international oil companies concluded in 1951, which gives the government of Iraq 50 percent of oil profits, as amended by the March, 1955 subsidiary agreement on the method of profit computation, the opening of the thirty-inch pipeline from Kirkuk to Banias, and increasing oil production. As expenditures made possible by the royalties filter through Iraq's economy and reach the various population groups, it is probable that resistance to assimilation will be greatly reduced.

<sup>1</sup> Albert H. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947); and U. S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, *Data Book: Near East and Independent Africa* (1952).

<sup>2</sup> Law No. 43 of 1955.

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Secondly, the maintenance of ethnic and religious differences depends upon an ethnic division of labor. Skills must be passed from father to son and endogamy strictly observed; each craft, whether it be vegetable-raising, sheep-herding, or boat-building, is a way of life as well as an occupation. This "mosaic system," to use Carleton Coon's term, cannot survive a move toward large-scale production. In Iraq, rural-to-urban migration is giving the cities large numbers of workers who have no industrial skills, while the government is favoring large-scale industry, making possible the utilization of unskilled workers. Furthermore, it is already visible that rising incomes and expansion of education bring secularization and a consequent decline in the importance of religious differences. A spirit of patriotism, which the schools have been attempting (with some success) to inculcate, will undoubtedly grow as economic development gives increasing basis for national pride.

Therefore there is meaning in the phrase "the population of Iraq", although great inter-group differences will remain in the foreseeable future.

#### POPULATION STRUCTURE: THE CENSUS OF 1947

The best available picture of Iraq's population structure is furnished by the first and only population census of 1947. Partial enumerations had been made before that time, but never before had there been an attempt to enter each home in the country and enumerate its inhabitants. For each person in the family, the following information was recorded: His name and sex; the name of his father, mother, and paternal grandfather; his relationship to the head of the family; his occupation; whether he was literate or illiterate; his religion; his age; his place of birth; infirmities, if any; his marital status; and his type of dwelling. Detailed data have been released slowly, and only in 1954 were the complete results published.<sup>3</sup>

Many difficulties were encountered, as would be expected in the first complete census of any country. The most important cause of difficulty was the people's memory of the Ottoman period, when the government counted population only for the purposes of taxation and conscription. A representative of the central government is still regarded with fear or suspicion in many parts of the country; and when he asks the names and ages of young men, there is no doubt in the minds of those being questioned as to his motives. Only the building of confidence in the central government through just and consistent policies will eliminate this problem.

A second cause of difficulty was ignorance, combined with certain social traditions, as for example, reluctance to talk about the women of the family.

<sup>3</sup> *Liwā* (the largest geographical subdivision, of which there are fourteen) totals appeared first, in the Ministry of Economics' yearly *Statistical Abstract* for 1947, published in 1949, and in subsequent issues. Data for smaller geographical subdivisions appeared in a three-volume publication of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Directorate General of Census, *Census of Iraq 1947*, published in 1954. I am grateful to the Directorate General of Census and particularly to Dr. Fu'ad G. Massa of that agency for much assistance.



The great majority of rural people did not know their ages. Lack of understanding of the meaning of objective truth existed on the part of both the enumerated and the enumerators; the result was distortions which are not systematic and therefore cannot be corrected.

Fully nomadic bedouin posed such great problems of enumeration that they were excluded from the census. Their number was estimated by the Ministry of Interior at 250,000, or about five percent of the total population.

Technical problems, such as inadequate definitions and instructions for enumerators, transportation deficiencies, lack of maps for some sections of the country, and lack of skilled tabulators, caused further inaccuracies. The experience gained during the census of 1947 will enable the authorities to eliminate or reduce many of these specific difficulties in the coming census of 1957.

The accuracy of the results of the census is substantially reduced by the difficulties outlined above. However, a rough and, to some extent, correctable, picture of Iraq's population structure can be obtained from the census returns. The Appendix table summarizes the more important of the data by major geographical division and for the four largest cities.

#### *Total numbers and geographic distribution*

The accuracy of the count of numbers, by sex and geographic location, is basic to all the other data, because any individual omitted in the count was omitted in all the tables. A total of 4,566,185 individuals were enumerated, including 2,127,345 males and 2,438,840 females. If the estimate of 250,000 fully nomadic bedouin is added, the total population would stand at 4,816,185 including 2,257,345 males and 2,558,840 females. There is reason to believe that these totals reflect an underenumeration of at least five percent and possibly as great as twenty percent. The deficiency of males, who represented only 46.6 percent of the enumerated population, has no adequate explanation other than their omission for fear of conscription. There is no reason to suspect a large volume of overenumeration to counteract the underenumeration. Therefore it can be said with a fair degree of certainty that Iraq's total population numbered above five millions in 1947.

The population was distributed over the fourteen administrative districts (singular *liwā*) with an average density of twenty persons per square kilometer. Lowest density was found in Dulaim *liwā* on the upper Euphrates and highest density in Baghdad *liwā*, or 5 and 64 persons per square kilometer respectively.<sup>4</sup> Approximately 70 percent of the population was living in the region named by Sir Ernest Dowson the Irrigation Zone, in which agriculture depends upon irrigation rather than rainfall. Two-thirds of the people lived outside of municipalities, in villages and bedouin camps, and

<sup>4</sup> Only the fourteen *liwās* are included in the density figures; they include 53 percent of the total area of Iraq. The three desert zones, assumed to be uninhabited, include the remaining 47 percent of the area. The bedouin were assigned to the *liwās* where they camp in summer.



only in Baghdad *liwā* did more than half of the population live in municipalities. Baghdad city alone contained 10 percent of the country's population and 30 percent of its urban population. It was more populous than the next six largest cities combined.<sup>5</sup>

### *Age-Sex structure*

The data on population by age and sex were seriously affected by the difficulties of enumeration, resulting in substantial underreporting of males in the military ages, overstatement of age among the middle aged and elderly, reporting of male babies as female, possible general omission of females, and grouping of all ages at five and ten-year intervals. The reported age-sex distribution of the enumerated population is presented in percents in Table 1 which follows:

Table 1: POPULATION OF IRAQ BY AGE AND SEX, 1947, PERCENTS  
(nomadic bedouin excluded)

Age	Male	Female	Both Sexes
0-4	9.0	9.4	18.4
5-9	7.4	8.7	16.1
10-19	7.0	9.1	16.1
20-29	4.4	6.3	10.7
30-39	5.5	6.6	12.1
40-49	5.5	5.1	10.6
50-59	3.2	3.2	6.4
60 and over	4.6	5.0	9.6
Total	46.6	53.4	100.0

The most obvious conclusion that can be drawn from Table 1 is that an extraordinarily large percentage of the population consists of children—a fact strikingly apparent to the casual observer in Iraq. According to Table 1, 18 percent of the population was below five, and 34 percent below ten years of age, as compared with 14 and 26 percent respectively for Egypt in 1947, 11 and 20 percent for the United States in 1950, and 8 and 16 percent for England and Wales in 1950-1 (Table 3). Even if a hypothetical 7 percent are added to the population, most of them to males between the ages of ten and thirty, the percentages under five and ten years would be reduced only slightly, to about 17 and 32 percent respectively. This kind of age-sex structure is typical of conditions of high fertility and mortality, matters to which we will devote attention later in this article.

### *Literacy*

8 percent of Iraq's population was reported as able to read or write, including 14 percent of the males and 3 percent of the females. Nomadic

<sup>5</sup> Baghdad city in this article is defined as including the urban portions of its immediate northern and southern suburbs, 'Azamiya and Karrada Sharqiya. So defined, Baghdad city had 466,783 inhabitants. The six cities next in size were Mosul (133,625), Basra (101,535), Kirkuk (68,308), Najaf (56,261), Kazimain (48,676), and Karbala (44,150). It is noteworthy that, after the four cities containing most of the country's industry, the three cities next in size contain the important Shi'ite shrines.

bedouin are included in the percentages because they can be assumed to be almost 100 percent illiterate. The literacy data can be taken as a maximum estimate, because no test was applied to a statement that a person was literate. There were undoubtedly reported among the literate many adults who had attended *mullā* schools and had been taught to "read" the *Qurān*, having in truth only memorized it, and others who had attended school long ago and had had little opportunity to use their literacy, as well as children who had only recently begun school.

The fact that literacy is correlated with urban agglomerations is to be expected and appears in the Appendix table. In the four major cities, upwards of one-fifth of the population was literate. In Baghdad city alone lived 31 percent of the country's literates and 44 percent of its literate females.

#### *Marital status*

56 percent of the enumerated persons aged ten and over were married with spouse present, and an additional 10 percent had been married and were widowed, divorced, or separated, indications of the near-universality of marriage in Iraq. A sizeable proportion of the women and a negligible proportion of the men were widowed and not remarried. The most probable explanation is not differential mortality but rather that most widowed men remarry, whereas most widowed women do not; the desire for numerous progeny leads a man of any age, when he marries, to choose a young wife.

Rural-urban differences in marital status existed for the males in the form of a surplus of unmarried males in the largest cities over the percentages for the country as a whole, indicating migration in search of employment as well as the presence of educational institutions in the cities. For females, the urban marital distribution did not differ noticeably from that for the country as a whole, evidence that in 1947 economic independence and secondary and higher education for women were still on a small scale.

Polygamy is disappearing in Iraq but is still common among the portions of the population who consider it a source of prestige. In 1947 8 percent of married men were married polygamously, and of these 90 percent had two wives, 8 percent had three, and 2 percent had four. If data on the marital status of the nomadic bedouin were available, these percentages would undoubtedly be higher; for their influence is seen among the sedentary populations of the two *liwās* closest to Arabia, those of Diwaniya and Muntafiq, in each of which over 12 percent of the married men were married polygamously. Economic pressures have always tended to limit polygamy to the upper class, but in recent years this group, through education and contact with the West, has been acquiring a new set of values strongly disapproving of plural marriage. Moreover, new sources of prestige—automobiles, for example—are available to those who formerly would have been married polygamously.

### Religion

The data on religion make it clear that Iraq is a Muslim country, even in areas in which minorities are relatively numerous. The Christians, the largest minority, numbered only 149,656, or 3 percent of the total population and only 13 percent in Mosul *liwā*, the area of their greatest concentration. Jews constituted 2.5 percent of the total population, and, of the 118,000 Jews, 82 percent resided in the four largest cities. In the four years following the census, all but an estimated 15,000 Jews permanently moved to Israel. The only other religious minority of significant size was the Yazidis, of whose total number, 32,437, all but 27 lived in Mosul *liwā*. In all, 94 percent of Iraq's population was Muslim in 1947. However, the significant breakdowns of the population religiously into Sunnities and Shi'ites and ethnically into Kurds and Arabs were not made.

### Occupation

The data on occupation were badly obscured by a definitional confusion of occupation and industry and by the difficulty of determining who was economically active, particularly among females and children engaged in agriculture. However, certain generalizations can be drawn from the data. As Table 2 below demonstrates, over half of Iraq's employed population was in 1947 engaged in agriculture, excluding food processing and preservation; if the women and children who are partially employed in agriculture had been more widely included, this percentage would undoubtedly be higher. Service trades and commerce were next in importance, while manufacture occupied only 7 percent of the labor force. The casual labor force, who listed no definite occupation and were termed "workers, not specified," comprised 9 percent of the labor force; however, in Baghdad and Basra cities, the major receivers of rural-to-urban migration, casual laborers com-

Table 2: EMPLOYED POPULATION BY INDUSTRY, 1947  
(nomadic bedouin excluded)

Industry	Percent of Employed Population	
Agriculture . . . . .	55	
Manufacture . . . . .	7	
Public utilities, transport, communications . . . . .	4	
Service, government and private . . . . .	12	
Commerce . . . . .	10	
Miscellaneous employment . . . . .	1	
Workers, not specified . . . . .	9	
Apprentices (under ten years of age) . . . . .	1	
Total . . . . .	100	
	Total Employed Population	Percent of Non-Nomadic Population
Both sexes	1,333,737	29
Males	1,232,219	58
Females	101,518	4

posed 21 and 28 percent of the labor force respectively, reflecting a serious social problem which will be discussed below in conjunction with housing and internal migration. Only 4 percent of females in the country as a whole reported an occupation. Those women who reported occupations were predominantly engaged in agriculture, with smaller but significant numbers in domestic service, production of animal foods, dressmaking, and teaching.

### *Housing and internal migration*

Inadequate definitions have again obscured the data, but it can be said with certainty that in 1947 a minimum of 45 percent of Iraq's population was living in dwellings that were not classified as houses—*i.e.* tents for the bedouin and mud and reed huts for the *fallāhīn* and urban poor. Of the remainder of the population, 37 percent lived in single-family houses, 16 percent in multi-family houses, and 2 percent in institutions. In urban areas the majority of the population lived in houses, while in rural areas the majority lived in huts. The large cities showed a greater percentage living in multi-family houses than in single-family houses, the reverse of the situation in the country as a whole. Most of the multi-family houses are found in the oldest sections of the cities, where economic pressure and proximity to employment force a people who place a high value on familial privacy to congregate.

The social problems of Baghdad and Basra cities are reflected in their housing as well as in their employment situations; in Baghdad city 13, and in Basra city 40, percent of the population were living in huts rather than in houses. The urban hut dwellers are also to a large extent the casual labor force and are people of rural origin who have migrated to the city and continue to live within the city limits in a rural manner. Some fragmentary social surveys indicate that most of them find employment, although with great insecurity because of their lack of skills, and that their level of living is higher than it was when they were *fallāhīn*. However, they are a source of social unrest in their competition for employment not only with each other but also with the skilled artisans, whose place in the economy is gradually being replaced by more mechanized operations. This group, accustomed to living in an urban fashion with established patterns of consumption, faces two undesirable alternatives: increased competition within their trades, as the market for hand-made products diminishes, or competition in the unskilled labor market with people having much lower standards of consumption. The only long run solution for this group is to learn new skills.

Moreover, the presence of the hut dwellers in the cities frustrates plans for making the cities more beautiful and sanitary. City planners face a serious dilemma, for they fear that providing subsidized housing and other facilities for this group will encourage a rural exodus. However, such encouragement could be offset by rural reforms which would give the *fallāhīn* higher in-



comes. The migration has continued since 1947, although it cannot be said with certainty whether the percentage of huts in the cities has increased or decreased, as the cities themselves are growing rapidly.

The data on internal migration present a striking picture of the destinations and origins of the majority of migrants from rural areas. One of the questions on the census schedule was the *liwā* of birth. There appear from the data two *liwās* of sizeable net immigration, Baghdad and Basra; 22 percent of Baghdad *liwā*'s population and 17 percent of Basra's were born outside of their *liwās* of residence, while the former had sent out only 7 and the latter only 4 percent of people born therein. One *liwā* stood out above all others as a source of migrants: Of the 396,722 persons living in Iraq who were born in Amara *liwā*, 101,242, or over 25 percent of them were in 1947 living in another *liwā*.<sup>6</sup> Of the 101,242 migrants from Amara, 81 percent were living in Baghdad and Basra *liwās*, most of them undoubtedly in or near the large cities. The pull of Baghdad city can be explained by its glamour as well as its rapid recent growth of industry. Migration to Basra city can be explained by its proximity to Amara, the seasonal needs of the date industry, the presence of the port, and its recent growth of industry.

The push factor is more difficult of explanation in the absence of more detailed information. For example, it may be that the process of soil salination and the shortage of irrigation water, major problems in southern Iraq, are especially severe in Amara. Semi-feudal conditions are frequently cited by the Arabic press as responsible for the exodus from Amara. The Agricultural and Livestock Census of 1952-3, conducted by the Ministry of Economics, disclosed the average size of agricultural holding in that *liwā* to be 4,260 acres, as compared to an average of 126 for the country as a whole. Mechanization is not the reason for the large size of holdings, for Amara had at the same time only 1 percent of Iraq's tractor power. It is known that living conditions of the *fallāhīn* there are among the worst in the country. According to the population census, in 1947 85 percent of Amara's population lived in huts rather than houses, a greater percentage than in any other *liwā*. The government of Iraq has shown its concern over the land tenure situation in Amara by repeated attempts to reduce inequalities in tenure there. Existing legislation divides holdings between the sheikhs and their families on the one hand and the *fallāhīn* on the other, granting the former group perpetual tenure and placing the latter's holdings under government lands (*Miri Sirf*) control.<sup>7</sup>

#### TRENDS IN MORTALITY

In every country reliable vital statistics are more difficult of collection than reliable data on the size and composition of the population, for the

<sup>6</sup> The corresponding average for the country as a whole was 9.5 percent. Next to Amara, the *liwā* of largest net out-migration was Karbala (13 percent), followed by Kut (12 percent). All three are in the south.

<sup>7</sup> Ordinance No. 28 of 1954.

reason that vital statistics must be collected continuously, while censuses can be conducted periodically. In countries in which the majority of births and deaths take place without the presence of a medical authority who can be depended upon to report vital phenomena, voluntary reporting of births and deaths by individuals is also on a small scale. The Ministry of Health, the agency in charge of collecting vital statistics in Iraq, is currently taking steps to increase the scope of vital registration. At present, however, the published vital statistics cannot be used as a basis for estimating rates of fertility and mortality. Instead, a variety of sources must be used for making rough estimates of these rates.

Mortality in Iraq stands at present at a relatively high level, as compared with that of more developed countries, but is in the process of falling. The crude death rate is believed by medical authorities to be about 30 per thousand population; that is, for every thousand people, 30 die each year. This rate is matched or exceeded by a number of South American, Asian, and African countries, while the crude death rate in European and North American countries ranges from 8 to 12 per thousand.

Infant mortality, the most sensitive index of social and economic conditions, varies widely throughout Iraq. The major killers of infants are malnutrition, diseases borne by impure water, and, in some areas, malaria. In the cities, where the level of education is higher than in rural areas and where medical care and pure water are available, infant mortality is probably in the neighborhood of 100 per thousand live births; that is, about 10 percent of babies born alive die in the first year of life. In rural areas and small towns lacking urban amenities, infant mortality ranges from 250 to 400 per thousand. In areas where malaria is present, there is evidence that infant mortality is as high as 500 per thousand; that is, half of the babies born alive die before reaching the age of one. An overall average of 300 to 350 per thousand for the country as a whole is probably not far wrong. This rate can be compared with rates of under 50 per thousand currently shown by industrialized countries.

Infant mortality at such high levels is an important factor in maintaining general mortality at high levels. If a child survives to the age of five, he stands almost as good a chance of living to a ripe old age as he would if he had been born in Europe or America. Moreover, infant mortality can be immediately and dramatically lowered by measures such as education, sanitary improvements, and increasing availability of medical facilities—all of which are important parts of Iraq's development program. Striking evidence is given by a study made in Samawa, a town on the lower Euphrates in which a team of American and Iraqi medical experts has been operating a Maternal and Child Health Center since early 1953. In that same year the town's water purification system went into operation for the first time. The case histories of four hundred families of infants born during 1953, whose mothers visited the

Center for pre- and post-natal care, were carefully studied. Infant deaths among the babies brought more or less regularly to the Center were found to be 70 per thousand live births. Infant deaths among these same families prior to the Center's opening (and prior to the time when purified water was available) were calculated to have been 390 per thousand.

It can be reasoned from an examination of the causes of its present levels that mortality in Iraq has been declining in the past few decades, and that its decline will undoubtedly accelerate as economic development proceeds and incomes rise. The important sources of morbidity and mortality are diseases of poverty and ignorance—those caused by contamination of food and water, by malnutrition, by poor housing and overcrowding, by flies and dirt, and by traditional unhygienic practices and lack of knowledge as to the communicability of disease. Over 50 percent of the pregnant women examined in the Samawa Center in one month of 1954 were found to have one or more types of intestinal parasites. Studies made by the Ministry of Health on the incidence of bilharzia, a debilitating disease caused by human pollution of irrigation canals, showed incidences ranging from 15 to almost 70 percent of persons in various *liwās* of the Irrigation Zone. On the Dujaila land settlement in Kut *liwā*, a UNESCO worker estimated that 80 percent of the people had trachoma, a highly contagious eye disease spread by flies, general uncleanliness, and lack of knowledge as to communicability. Anemia is said by medical authorities to be almost universal among pregnant women and young children, its causes being intestinal parasites, inadequate food, excessive child-bearing, and overlong nursing. The writer was told that if mothers could simply be taught not to pack the cut navel cord of the newborn child in manure (believed to have medicinal value, but a common cause of tetanus), a significant reduction could be made in infant mortality.

Many facets of Iraq's program of economic development are acting to reduce mortality. For example, water purification systems, which existed only in the largest cities a decade ago, were as of late 1955 in operation or under construction in about ninety cities and towns. The public school system has grown from 160 primary schools with 6,000 students in 1913 to 1,451 schools with 258,000 students in 1953-4, and from 22 secondary schools with 3,000 students in 1931-2 to 134 schools with 35,000 students in 1953-4. Village development and public housing projects will have their influence on mortality also. Perhaps the most important factors influencing the level of health and vitality of Iraq's population will be the general rise in incomes brought about by the flow of oil revenues through the economy and the gradual abandonment of traditional beliefs and practices in favor of a more rational outlook on life. It is a general rule that the higher the level of mortality the easier it is to reduce it. It is apparent that mortality in Iraq is entering a period of decline, although it will not in the foreseeable future approximate the rates achieved by highly industrialized countries.

## TRENDS IN FERTILITY

All evidence points toward the conclusion that reproduction in Iraq is close to the biological maximum. *A priori* evidence exists in the social customs, which cause the vast majority of females to be married soon after puberty, which cause men of any age to take a young wife, and which reward high fertility and give almost no incentive to limit it. Maintenance of the population under conditions of high mortality in the past has required a body of traditional beliefs and practices supporting high fertility; these mores remain despite changing conditions of mortality, and, because they are so important a part of the culture, they will be slow to change.

Statistical evidence is furnished by the age-structure as it appeared in the 1947 census. A fertility ratio can be computed by relating the number of children under five years to the number of women in the childbearing ages; although the age distribution contains many inaccuracies, as indicated above, these two groups were fairly well reported. In Table 3 below Iraq is compared with selected countries with respect to the fertility ratio as well as the percentage of the population under five and under ten years of age. It is evident that fertility in Iraq is high, even as compared with other countries of relatively high fertility.

The crude birth rate ranges from 10 to 20 per thousand population in highly industrialized countries. For Iraq it is certainly above the rate of 44 shown in 1947 by Egypt, for example, for Egypt's fertility ratio appears in Table 3 as significantly lower than Iraq's. In the early 1940s the crude birth rate of the Palestinian Muslims ranged from 49 to 54 per thousand, probably not far from the rate that would appear for Iraq's population today if reliable vital statistics were available.

Table 3: FERTILITY RATIOS AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION UNDER FIVE AND UNDER TEN YEARS OF AGE, IRAQ AND SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1944-51.<sup>a</sup>

Country and Year	Fertility Ratio <sup>b</sup>	Percent of Population Under:	
		5 years	10 years
Palestine Muslims, 1944	856	19	33
Iraq, 1947	837	18	34
American Samoa, 1950	746	19	34
Jordan, 1950	669	14	31
Formosa, 1950	635	16	29
Turkey, 1945	538	13	27
Egypt, 1947	536	14	26
Japan, 1950	525	14	25
Netherlands, 1950-1	519	12	21
United States, 1950	470	11	20
Sweden, 1949-50	433	9	17
England and Wales, 1950-1	405	8	16
Austria, 1951	358	8	15

<sup>a</sup> Sources: For Iraq, computed from the Census of 1947; for other countries, computed from the United Nations Demographic Yearbooks.

<sup>b</sup> Fertility ratio =  $\frac{\text{children under 5 years}}{\text{females aged 10-39}} \times 1000$



An asymmetry exists between mortality and fertility. A decline in mortality is generally agreed to be beneficial, while there is less agreement about the value of lower fertility. Moreover, measures to lessen mortality can be imposed by government action, while the lessening of fertility depends upon the voluntary action of individuals. An environment conducive to family limitation is being created in Iraq's cities among the educated upper middle and upper classes. Education for women not only postpones marriage but gives them alternatives in the form of careers. The growth of material desires, also a product of urbanization, offers new sources of prestige and makes children more costly to the minority of the population who attempt to feed, clothe, and educate them in a Western way. At the same time, a larger proportion of children are living to maturity. The educated urban group has been the first to develop a spirit of rationalism; and experience in the Western world has taught us that, once parents begin to question how many children they wish, they have fewer on the average than they did before. However, these influences are limited as yet to a few percent of the population in the largest cities. To the great majority, having many children remains a source of prestige as well as the major form of social security for the parents' old age. It is impossible at present to predict whether or when family limitation will begin to be practiced by the rural majority of the population and the urban lower classes, whose present level of fertility is supported by tenacious cultural factors. It can be said with certainty that the birth rate will remain at or near its present high levels during the coming several generations, until a time when the population is much larger than it is now.

#### *POTENTIALITIES FOR POPULATION GROWTH AND A RISING LEVEL OF LIVING*

A high and rising rate of natural increase may be deduced from the falling mortality of Iraq's population when combined with its steadily high fertility.<sup>8</sup> The resulting rapid increase in the size of the population has been termed by demographers a "population explosion." However, this term carries with it implicitly a warning of impending disaster that has less relevance in Iraq than in densely populated countries, such as India or Egypt, in which plans to raise levels of income are in large part frustrated by the immediate increase in numbers resulting from any temporary rise in real incomes.

Among the underdeveloped countries of the world Iraq is one of the most fortunate, in her possession of a unique combination of attributes: (1) Significant unused resources, particularly in land and the waters of the two rivers. The Development Board envisions a doubling of the area under cultivation during the coming generation, combined with more intensive use of

<sup>8</sup> If the crude death rate is assumed to be 30 per thousand and the crude birth rate 50 to 55 per thousand, the crude rate of natural increase is twenty to 25 per thousand, or two to 2.5 percent per annum. Taking the population in 1947 as five million, we estimate the population in 1955 to number 5.9 to 6.1 million.

presently cropped land. The quantity of water will eventually set a limit to the amount of land that can be cultivated. (2) A population small in comparison with those resources. As economic development proceeds, thereby lowering death rates and accelerating natural increase, the increased numbers can be put to work both on agricultural land newly brought under cultivation and in newly created industries. Factors which have caused fertility to fall in the Western world, themselves causally related to economic development, will undoubtedly begin to operate in Iraq to bring the period of rapid natural increase to a close, although not for at least several generations. Finally, (3) a large source of foreign exchange in the form of oil revenues, with which Iraq may purchase the capital goods and technical assistance necessary for economic development.

Other countries in the Middle East have one or two of these attributes, but no other has all three. For example, Iran has oil revenues but lacks the unused land and water resources possessed by Iraq. Syria has unused land and water and a spatially sparse population but encounters the usual problems of capital formation and foreign exchange shortage faced by underdeveloped countries. Jordan has a sparse population but few undeveloped resources of any kind and no large source of capital. Egypt's problems are not only the lack of a continuing source of foreign exchange but also a dense population whose rate of growth has tended to outstrip the maximum possible rate of development of unused resources. Iraq's resources, properly developed, are fully capable of supporting a growing population at a rising level of income.

By encouraging the rapid exploitation of oil resources, thereby enlarging present national income at the expense of potential future revenues from oil, Iraq is attempting to attain in a generation the economic development that took many times longer in countries now industrialized. It may be that rapid development is the only way to achieve political stability and to break out of the vicious circle of self-reinforcing poverty. However, high oil revenues do not of themselves bring economic development—for example, if they are spent primarily to finance a temporarily higher level of consumption. They must be invested in increasing productivity in agriculture and industry if poverty is to be permanently eliminated. Development as rapid as is indicated by the size of the oil revenues and by the plans of the Development Board demands rapid and profound institutional adjustment in order to remove the barriers to increasing productivity. New skills must be spread among the increasing population. The government must replace its leisurely and personal way of doing business with more impersonal, impartial, and efficient methods of administration. Means must be found to encourage private savings and to channel them into productive investment. Most important, a system of incentives for increased productivity must be found, particularly in agriculture as the most important segment of the economy. The


only sense in which rapid population growth acts as an obstacle to the economic development of Iraq is that it demands an increase in the speed with which these institutional changes must take place if rising per capita income is to be achieved.

Appendix: CENSUS DATA BY MAJOR GEOGRAPHICAL SUBDIVISION AND FOUR LARGEST CITIES, 1947<sup>a</sup>

Liwā	Enumerated Population			Nomadic Population <sup>b</sup>	Persons per Square Kilometer <sup>d</sup>	Urban Population <sup>d</sup>	Literates as Percent of Population <sup>d</sup>			Percent of Employed Population Engaged in Agriculture <sup>e</sup>
	Both sexes	Male	Female				Both sexes	Male	Female	
Mosul	525,190	248,199	276,991	70,000	20	35	8	12	4	65
Arbil	239,776	108,488	131,288	—	13	21	4	8	1	63
Sulaimaniya	226,400	101,767	124,633	—	24	24	5	9	1	68
Kirkuk	286,005	129,365	156,640	—	14	33	7	13	2	57
Diyala	272,413	133,749	138,664	—	17	19	8	14	2	72
Baghdad	817,205	408,404	408,801	—	64	67	18	27	10	28
Dulaim	167,983	84,034	83,949	25,000	5	26	8	15	2	55
Karbala	149,264	69,616	79,648	125,000	45	42	8	13	3	29
Hilla	261,206	124,897	136,309	—	48	28	7	12	2	68
Kut	224,938	103,987	120,951	—	14	22	5	8	1	74
Diwaniya	378,118	159,875	218,243	—	25	21	4	9	1	69
Muntafiq	341,867	133,034	208,833	30,000	25	15	3	8	1	76
Amara	307,021	138,207	168,814	—	17	20	5	9	2	68
Basra	368,799	185,723	183,076	—	30	40	11	18	4	32
ALL LIWĀS	4,566,185	2,127,345	2,438,840	250,000	20	34	8	14	3	55
City										
Baghdad <sup>c</sup>	466,783	241,460	225,323				27	36	17	3
Mosul	133,625	67,392	66,233				24	32	17	7
Kirkuk	68,308	36,852	31,456				20	29	9	5
Basra	101,535	53,762	47,773				20	28	12	7

<sup>a</sup> Source of data: See footnote 5.<sup>b</sup> Nomads were evenly divided between sexes in Dulaim, Karbala, and Muntafiq, but in Mosul there were 40,000 males and 30,000 females; therefore the total contains 130,000 males and 120,000 females.<sup>c</sup> For definition of Baghdad city, see footnote 7.<sup>d</sup> Nomads included.<sup>e</sup> Nomads excluded.<sup>f</sup> Urban population defined as percent of people who were living in municipalities.





### MOVEMENTS OF SYRIAN TRIBES

(Material for this map was prepared by Youssef Ibish of the American University of Beirut)

# RECENT AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEDOUIN SETTLEMENT IN SYRIA

Adnan Mahhouk

THE DESIRABILITY of bedouin settlement is axiomatic with all governments. An examination of the problem as it applies to the Euphrates and Jazirah districts of Syria, however, indicates that recent agricultural developments are not fostering a natural trend toward sedentarization. Any official policy of settlement, therefore, is certain to arouse tensions within the bedouin community. These tensions deserve full consideration if this important area of Syria is to develop, both socially and economically.

## ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

The bedouins in Syria are frequently classified into three groups in accordance with their traditional degree of nomadism. Most nomadic are those tribes, sometimes referred to as the "bedouins of the camel" (*ahl al-abal*), which roam the Syrian Desert and other arid regions, relying almost exclusively on camel products and dates for their livelihood. The Shammar and Baggaret al-Jabal tribes of the Jazirah may be considered examples of this type. The former are now in possession of some good soil, but the latter, as late comers, were driven into less fertile land and thus have been forced to prolong their nomadism. Less nomadic are the tribes referred to as the "bedouins of the sheep" (*ahl al-ghanam*). They occupy regions near the large market centers, such as Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus, and agricultural areas where they are assured of fodder and more regular sources of water than is supplied by the Syrian Desert. The Jubur of the Jagjag tribe, which possesses some fertile land north of Hassetche in the Jazirah may be included in this category. Least nomadic of all are the largely settled tribes (*al-asha'ir al-mutahaddarah*), which engage in agriculture and move only within a limited area of land. The Tay tribe, which is in possession of some of the best land of the Jazirah extending between Tal Brak and the booming small town of Kamishli, is an example of this type.

Obviously, the above classification of bedouins is only a rough one; and to the extent that it masks the simple truth that between the most nomadic bedouins on the one hand and the sedentary cultivator on the other is a continuum of all degrees and forms of nomadism, it is misleading. In fact, it is owing to the difficulty of drawing the line between a nomadic and a sedentary pattern of life that one encounters widely varying estimates of the

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size of the bedouin population in Syria. The most frequently quoted estimate, however, places it at 300,000, of which about a half are settled tribes.<sup>1</sup>

The primary means of subsistence of the bedouin has been traditionally derived from two animals: the camel and the sheep. These provide him with his simple, basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter. The few supplies which have to be procured from the towns against cash payment are paid for by marketing such products as wool and *samnah* (clarified butter). Prior to the introduction of railways and motor vehicles into the Arab Middle East, bedouin caravans provided the sole means of transportation across the desert, but this source of income is now almost entirely lost to the bedouin community.

In addition to these regular means of subsistence, the bedouins formerly derived intermittent income from various unstable sources. These included booty appropriated as a result of occasional excursions into the cultivated areas. The frequency of such raids varied with the extent to which the central government exercised political and military authority over the frontiers of settlement; it was also affected by such extraneous factors as rainfall and livestock disease. The bedouins, living as they did on the exploitation of marginal resources, often had to resort to force to supplement their meager income. Raids on settled agriculture provided an outlet very much to their liking.

In addition, the various tribes often claimed regular tribute from the sedentary cultivators. This tribute was presumably for the use of land which belonged to them but which they had allowed the settled population to till unmolested and even protected from the raids of other tribes. The larger tribes on occasion even received tribute from the central government, paid because the government was unwilling or unable to subdue the tribes, or as a disguised bribe for some ulterior purpose. Whatever the motive, the tribute was invariably received by the shaykhs, or leaders, of the tribes.

Occasionally the bedouins have themselves engaged in agriculture, particularly in raising cereals and cotton. Their interest in agriculture is usually sharpened following a period of rapidly rising prices or exceptionally good crops. Very rarely have they resorted to the growing of fruits and vegetables. The long period required for fruit trees to give a yield does not suit the nomadic inclinations of the bedouins; and the social stigma which they attach to "vegetable-growers" withholds them from such pursuits.

The composition of the bedouins' sources of income has been undergoing important changes during the past generation. The relative importance of livestock products is probably diminishing, while that of agriculture is

<sup>1</sup> Weulersse, in his *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient* (Paris, 1946), places the bedouin population of Syria at 250,000 to 300,000 (p. 60). Uthman Hassoun, in a paper on *Bedouin Settlement and Education* submitted to the Faculty of Education at the Syrian University in 1955, quotes the Department of Tribal Affairs' estimate of 320,000 individuals (p. 7). The International Bank Mission to Syria recently estimated the bedouin population at 150,000, of whom about a half are engaged in some form of settled agriculture. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD], *The Economic Development of Syria* (Baltimore, 1955), p. 58.

increasing. At the present time the bedouins not only derive a higher income from the land which they claim to own, but actually take greater interest in agriculture. The tribute which was formerly collected from the farmer for protection is now collected as rent for the use of land. Consequently, the interest of the bedouin in agriculture is tending to become less vicarious, especially if the rent on the land is received on a share-tenancy basis, as is the general practice in Syrian agriculture.

These changes in the composition of the income of the bedouins originated largely from outside the bedouin economy. They do not, therefore, necessarily indicate a corresponding change in the pattern of consumption, for changes in the latter must originate primarily from within the bedouin economy and social fabric. This leads to the observation that whereas the composition of income and the pattern of consumption of the bedouins almost coincided when the tribes relied mainly on livestock products, rapid changes in the former created a sharp diversity between the two. This is at present one of the most potent forces for change in bedouin life.

#### LEGAL STATUS

The bedouins in Syria have always been accorded a considerable degree of autonomy in the management of their civic life. Their customs were even allowed to prevail over civil law in all matters relating to marriage, divorce, and homicide in which they were directly involved. Civil authorities interfered in tribal affairs only when discord among the bedouins threatened to disrupt public security.

But the expansion of the frontiers of settlement during the second half of the 19th century intensified the conflicts between the bedouins and the sedentary population. This brought home to the civil authorities the fact that the bedouins present problems which require constant attention and not only intervention whenever things are seriously out of order.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, a Bedouin Administration was created in 1870 and was invested with the functions of attending to all matters in which the bedouins were involved. The Administration was judiciously entrusted to both government officials and bedouin shaykhs. The importance of this Administration was enhanced under the French Mandate, when it was directly attached to the French High Commissioner in Beirut. It was headed by a French army officer assisted by a staff of civil servants and a special camel corps.

Under the Mandate the bedouins received generous treatment. The French authorities were in fact accused by the nationalist leaders of wilfully strengthening them in order to utilize them as a lever against the nationalist movement in Syria should the latter prove recalcitrant to French colonial designs. Since the bedouin owes sole allegiance to his tribe and not to the nation, and since this allegiance is personified in the shaykhs, the tribes are easily vulnerable to external political influence and control. This fact nor-

<sup>2</sup> Norman Lewis, "Frontiers of settlement in Syria, 1800-1950," *International Affairs*, vol. 31 (January 1955), pp. 48-60.



mally led to the preservation of the status quo with regard to the legal status of the bedouins. The first comprehensive law in Syria regulating tribal affairs, promulgated on June 4, 1940, left the bedouins independent in the conduct of their civic life but reserved for the state the role of arbiter in disputes and the right to interfere in the interest of public security.<sup>3</sup>

Living in the memory of the Mandatory period, the nationalist government which came to power in 1943 embarked upon a policy which aimed ultimately at abolishing all special privileges which the bedouins enjoyed and subjecting them fully and directly to the jurisdiction of the civil authorities. This policy has sometimes been followed with such zeal that the law is frequently out of line with current practices: homicide among the bedouins, for example, remains largely a tribal affair. This gap between law and practice gives the officials in charge of bedouin affairs considerable latitude in the performance of their duties and tends to introduce an element of arbitrariness which tribes undoubtedly resent.

In 1953 a new law regulating the affairs of the bedouins was promulgated but did not entirely remove the discrepancy between law and practice. Its most important provisions were: (1) the government reserved for itself the right to remove, for various specified reasons, the head or any other dignitary of the tribe (Article 2); (2) homicide, whether resulting from individual or from collective action, was specifically made subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts (Article 7); and (3) the bedouins were reclassified and some tribes were removed from the status of bedouins to the ranks of full-fledged citizens.<sup>4</sup>

#### CURRENT AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS

While it is not possible at this stage to grasp the full significance of recent trends in Syrian agriculture, it is nevertheless possible to single out for dis-

<sup>3</sup> Tribal Organization, Order No. 132/L, June 4, 1940, Government of Syria, *Official Gazette*, No. 32.

<sup>4</sup> Tribal Organization Law, Legislative Decree No. 124, May 21, 1953, Government of Syria, *Official Gazette*, No. 32.

Table I: COTTON CULTIVATION IN SYRIA  
YIELDS AND PRICES, 1941-54

Year	Area in 1000 hectares	Production in 1000 metric tons	Yields in tons per hectare	Price in L.S. per ton
1941	19	9	0.5	530
1945	17	12	0.7	2,400
1949	25	38	1.5	2,360
1950	78	100	1.3	2,970
1951	217	176	0.8	4,510
1952	189	176	0.9	2,010
1953	128	126	1.0	2,420
1954	187	221	1.2	2,680

Source: Ministry of National Economy, *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1950-1954*. The 1941 price of cotton was taken from the *Economic Bulletin* of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce, Vol. 28, Nos. 3 and 4. Prices are those of Texas ginned cotton in Damascus.

cussion some of the developments which are likely to produce a significant impact on bedouin settlement. Among such are the rapid spread of cotton cultivation, the expansion of the cultivated area, the increased use of agricultural machinery, and the attempts made by the government to introduce measures of land reform.

The total area of land in Syria devoted to cotton plantation, as well as total production, average yields, and cotton prices between 1941 and 1954, is given in Table I.

It will be noted that between 1941 and 1949 there was only a slight increase in the area of land put under cotton cultivation. Then, under the stimulus of the rise in cotton prices following the outbreak of the Korean war, cotton production increased by leaps and bounds. It will also be noted that both cotton yields and cotton prices show considerable fluctuation between 1945 and 1954.

Of further interest is the fact that, while the outbreak of the Korean war resulted in a sharp increase in cotton production in Syria, World War II resulted in a slight fall. This may be explained by the fact that the sharp rise in the price of cereals during World War II and the shortage of agricultural machinery and irrigation equipment imposed by conditions of total war made a shift from cereal to cotton production neither remunerative nor practical. Conditions were different in 1950, when the rise in cotton prices far exceeded the rise in the prices of cereals and the capital requirements for increased cotton production could be easily imported. Thus, while cotton prices in December 1943 were only five times as high as the prewar level, cereal prices for the same period were higher by over twelve times. In contrast, the price of Texas ginned cotton in Damascus in 1951 was about twice as high as the price in 1949, while the price of wheat was only 28 percent higher.

Table II gives some data on the area of land devoted to cereals as well as the total area put under cultivation between 1946 and 1954.

Table II: AREA OF LAND PUT UNDER CULTIVATION IN SYRIA, 1946-1954

(In 1,000 hectares)

Year	Area devoted to cotton	Area devoted to cereals	Total cultivated area
1946	20	1,480	2,970
1947	19	1,520	2,820
1948	24	1,440	2,750
1949	25	1,650	3,600
1950	78	1,740	3,490
1951	217	1,670	3,230
1952	189	1,900	3,490
1953	128	2,070	3,670
1954	187	2,220	4,040

Source: Ministry of National Economy, *Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1950-1954*.

It will be seen that the expansion in the area devoted to cotton growing in 1951 (150,000 hectares) was made possible at the cost of reducing the area devoted to cereal production, but that the failure of the cotton crop in 1951 and the fall in cotton prices in 1952 resulted in a reverse shift from cotton back to cereals.

The period between 1948 and 1954 witnessed a rapid expansion in the total area put under cultivation. Table II shows that the cultivated area decreased by about 200,000 hectares between 1946 and 1948, but then increased by about 1,300,000 hectares between 1948 and 1954. Only a small proportion (about 150,000 hectares) of this rapid increase in total cultivated area was devoted to cotton production. The rapid expansion in the area put to the plough was made possible by increased use of mechanical agricultural equipment. Thus, while in 1942 only 30 tractors and 20 combines were being used in Syria, by 1950 about 500 tractors and 430 combines were in use.<sup>5</sup> By 1954 the figures had risen to about 1,300 tractors and 500 combines.<sup>6</sup>

Yet despite this rapid increase in the number of agricultural machinery used, the areas affected are not very large and Syrian agricultural methods remain predominantly primitive. Thus, of a total of about 4 million hectares of cultivated land, only about 750,000 hectares are tilled by mechanized means. Furthermore, the ownership and operation of the agricultural machinery and the ownership of the land are in most cases distinct.

Aside from a few operators who specialize in cultivating and harvesting for a specified fee, landowners who cannot make full use of their equipment also hire out their equipment, drivers, and mechanics to others. In view of the great demand for capital and mechanics, such a practice helps in making it possible to utilize such factors more fully and to cut down overhead costs.

That the rapid expansion in cultivated areas should lead to conflicting claims and to uncertain titles of ownership, usufruct, servitude, etc. is not surprising, especially since over half the land in Syria still remains to be surveyed.<sup>7</sup> The Syrian Constitution of 1950 and the various laws of land reform promulgated since then are attempts to remedy this situation and to deal with growing practices whose consequences are deemed highly undesirable.

Article 22 of the Constitution stipulates that the State "shall distribute among landless peasants, at a small cost to be paid by installments, sufficient land to secure their livelihood." A number of laws were promulgated in 1952 and 1953 to substantiate the provisions of the Constitution and to check a growing practice among influential landlords and shaykhs of appropriating

<sup>5</sup> Norman Lewis, *loc. cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>6</sup> IBRD, *op. cit.*, p. 74. Reference to the trade figures indicate similar increases. The value of tractors, harvesters, and similar equipment imported into Syria stood at LS 3.9 million in 1950, LS 11.3 million in 1951, LS 8.6 million in 1952, LS 8.4 million in 1953, and LS 14.3 million in 1954. See Department of Statistics, *Summary of Foreign Trade Statistics*.

<sup>7</sup> The cadastral survey was started in 1923. By 1953 only 45 per cent of the land had been surveyed. IBRD, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

large areas of the public domain by prescription.<sup>8</sup> One is entitled, by the provisions of the Syrian Civil Code, to ownership rights if he can satisfy the Department of Public Domain that possession occurred in good faith and was based on a proper cause, and that the land has been tilled for a period of five consecutive years. Needless to say, whenever concrete proof is lacking, influence closes the gap and the result has been the creation of large estates carved out of the public domain. Thus, in the statement of Objects and Reasons of Legislative Decree No. 135, the government recognized the fact that "prior to the registration of . . . lands in the name of the State, any one who has exploited these lands and cultivated them gains free right of usage or . . . regains the right to pay a very insignificant consideration in lieu of his ownership. . . . Thus, a few number of the citizens were able to control a huge area of these lands without a previous authorization from the State."<sup>9</sup> It was to remedy this situation that the above laws were passed, invalidating all unregistered titles to land acquired by prescription and providing for the sale of government land in allotments of 10 to 50 hectares, depending upon irrigation facilities.

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR BEDOUIN SETTLEMENT

Recent developments in Syrian agriculture and land tenure have been summarized with a view to studying their impact upon the bedouin and their implications for a bedouin settlement policy. We have seen that the bedouin economy subsists by utilizing the scanty yet vast grazing resources of the desert and of such land which, for one reason or another, is not put under regular cultivation. The rapid expansion of the cultivated area since 1948 has deprived the bedouin of the most fertile and suitable grazing land. On the one hand, this has resulted in pressure on them to settle down, especially if they have acquired rights by prescription over the land thus put to the plough. On the other hand, the expansion in cultivated areas was made possible largely by the extensive use of mechanized equipment which the bedouin could neither understand nor operate for himself. The introduction and rapid spread of agricultural machinery leaves him bewildered and lost, and the change seems to be too rapid and too drastic for him to play an active role in it. Whenever the bedouin engages in agriculture, his reliance on the technical skill of mechanics and the experience of the town merchant becomes of vital importance.

Nor is it likely that the bedouin will find it possible in a short period of time to adapt himself to these radical changes in the technique of agricultural production. The old methods used in Syrian agriculture and the channels of trade in agricultural products were slowly becoming familiar to him, and a

<sup>8</sup> Of special importance are Legislative Decree No. 96 promulgated on January 31, 1952 (*Official Gazette*, No. 6); Legislative Decree No. 135, October 29, 1952 (*Official Gazette*, No. 64); and Ministry of Agriculture, Decree No. 768, November 3, 1952.

<sup>9</sup> *Middle East Journal*, vol. 7 (Winter, 1953), p. 70.



gradual adaptation to those techniques was taking place among the bedouin community. The introduction of machinery brings a violent interruption in this normal continuous pattern of sedentarization, and thus tends to retard rather than hasten the process.

Furthermore, the fact that the more fertile grazing land has been diverted to agricultural use leaves the bedouin with inferior land and necessitates more extensive movement in order to utilize equivalent grazing resources for his herds. The result again is to make the bedouin even more nomadic than he was tending to become.

Likewise, the rise of cotton growing has retarded sedentarization. It is true that livestock raising has never been a part of the Syrian agrarian economy. Neither has the bedouin taken the initiative in utilizing for his herds the fodder left over after the harvest. This function has been performed mostly by the livestock merchant in Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. But the gradual integration of livestock raising with agriculture is interrupted by the shift to cotton plantation, which leaves no fodder in the field.

More important still is the fact that the technical know-how requisite for cotton production, and particularly pest control, is far more complicated than that required for the production of cereals. This renders cotton production rather precarious for the bedouin, as is reflected in the figures on average yields given in Table I. It will be seen that they fluctuated between 0.5 tons per hectare in 1941, 1.5 per hectare in 1949 and back to 0.8 in 1951. The uncertainties of cotton production are further intensified by the sharp price fluctuations which cotton is subject to. Reference to Table I also illustrates this phenomenon. The significance of these ramifications on bedouin adjustment to sedentarization will be seen when it is remembered that the traditional bedouin economic goal is complete self-sufficiency.

With regard to tribal organization, the impact of current developments has been in the direction of breaking up traditional loyalties and affiliations. Taking advantage of the complexity and confused state of the law on land tenure, influential shaykhs have found it possible, as we have seen, to appropriate for their personal aggrandizement large areas of the public domain.<sup>10</sup> These shaykhs now find themselves dependent on the technical skill and business experience of the town centers. Their interests soon shift from the wandering tribes to their estates and to the towns with which they have established business connections. The allegiance of the tribesmen to their shaykhs is also weakened as the ties of the mutual interests become weaker.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Only recently it was reported in a newspaper that 18 tractors belonging to a shaykh were confiscated by the government for ploughing state land in the Aleppo district without authorization. *al-Nasr* (Damascus), October 5, 1955.

<sup>11</sup> It is worth noting that in the elections of 1954 one of the shaykhs of the Sha'ban tribe in the Euphrates district failed to get the majority votes of his tribesmen.

*GOVERNMENT SETTLEMENT POLICY*

The breaking up of tribal organization constitutes a force which, contrary to concurrent trends, on the whole hastens the sedentarization of the bedouins. In this development, the state has played the major role through its settlement policy.

Underlying the drive for bedouin settlement from the economic standpoint is the assumption that the scanty grazing resources of the desert on which the bedouin economy subsists are now largely submarginal resources. Needless to say, the lack of any detailed income study on the bedouin economy and on the agrarian communities of Syria renders arbitrary the assumption that settlement brings a higher standard of living. Indeed, the argument for bedouin settlement which the civil authorities advance relies more heavily on social and political considerations than it does on any economic reality. The difficulty of extending to the bedouins free health and educational services, and the fact that nomads may fall easy prey to external political influences seem to be the overriding considerations in the eyes of the government.

With these considerations in mind, the Syrian government has worked out a settlement policy which is based on the allotment to bedouin families of plots of land varying from 10 to 50 hectares each. Already 100,000 hectares in the Radd area of the Jazirah have been set aside for bedouin settlement and actually divided into allotments, and another 50,000 hectares in the same area are in the process of being allocated and divided. In the meantime, the whole area has been leased to operators for a period of three years in the expectation that the rent thus derived will provide the necessary finances for settlement.<sup>12</sup>

Leaving aside the wisdom of such an arrangement, which runs the risk of having the land unduly exhausted by wasteful methods of cultivation, it is clear that the government's settlement policy is closely related to reform of the system of land tenure. The government is, in other words, trying to attain two objectives simultaneously: land reform and bedouin settlement. Whether such a daring experiment will succeed or not still remains to be seen. A fuller discussion of this subject, however, falls outside the scope of the present article.

In the extraordinary Development Budget promulgated by the Syrian government on August 28, 1955, LS 10 million (about \$2.8 million) was earmarked to be spent on bedouin settlement over a period of seven years. Since the budget was drafted in the light of the recommendations of the International Bank's Mission to Syria, the Mission's view on settlement may be adopted as a basis for discussion of future government policy.

The Mission recommended that in dry-farming areas bedouin families be settled on the basis of 50 hectares per family, of which 20 hectares would

<sup>12</sup> IBRD, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

be held in reserve as pasture land. The size of a dry-farming settlement would be an area not larger than 5,500 hectares. "On such a dry-farming area 120 families, including 10 nonfarming families, could be settled initially; and the total might ultimately be about double if the land first held in reserve as pasture were subsequently allocated to new families."<sup>13</sup>

Notably lacking in the Mission's discussion is the psychological and human factor in settlement. The technical aspects of settlement have undoubtedly been carefully and thoroughly worked out. But one misses the bedouin himself from the picture. It has already been noted that certain current developments are giving rise to forces which tend to impede sedentarization. The bedouin is therefore likely to show considerable resistance to settlement; this may not reveal itself in the form of physical resistance, but rather as a stronger and more prolonged attachment to his traditional values. Settlement may then retard sedentarization rather than accelerate its pace. Inherent in the bedouin value orientation is the contempt for all forms of manual labor. Such traditional values may indeed become impractical upon settlement, but they are not necessarily relinquished. The acceptance of new values is a slow and gradual process in which change over a period of a few years or even a few generations passes almost unnoticed.

If the object of the Syrian government's settlement policy is to create a sedentary community out of the bedouin tribes, then the mere distribution of land, even if accompanied by an extensive program of education, may not be of great value. Settlement on a fixed plot of land will not in itself turn the bedouin into a farmer or an artisan, for sedentarization is a process of gradual social development and not one of social will or action.<sup>14</sup>

Yet this observation should not be interpreted as a plea for inaction. The functions of the government in mitigating some of the consequences of a nomadic pattern of life, or in helping bedouins to adapt themselves to a sedentary pattern of life, provide a wide scope for action. What the government should not attempt to do is to impose a sedentary pattern of life, especially where there are potent forces working against sedentarization.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>14</sup> It is owing to this oversimplification of bedouin problems that "settlement" is often wrongly identified with the wider and more comprehensive expression, "the bedouin problem."

<sup>15</sup> The International Bank Mission's recommendation that a part of the land allotted to bedouin families be kept as a reserve for grazing is in the spirit of the above discussion. "Such a pattern will make it easier for the bedouin to accomplish the transition to settled agriculture by enabling him to carry on his customary pastoral pursuits as he crops his land." IBRD, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

## DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

**V**IOLENCE, the upsetting of long-established patterns and the threat of worsened conflict marked the developments under survey. Colonial régimes, and what some populations considered the vestiges of colonialism, were under attack progressively more bitter.

### Algeria

The situation in Algeria continued to deteriorate. Violence is mounting, and it now becomes clear that the moderates on both sides have been swept aside by the extremists. The reactionary *colon* group continue their opposition to any measure which would tend to give greater powers of self-determination to the Algerians. The Algerian extremists state that they will now be satisfied only with immediate complete independence and the eviction of the French; reason and logic have disappeared in a wave of emotionalism.

The group of sixty-one ("The Sixty-One") Algerian officials who could have safely been considered French-oriented suddenly boycotted the bodies on which they serve. The boycott, made under nationalist pressure, is further evidence that the initiative now lies with the extremists. "The Sixty-One" are demanding the recognition of Algerian nationality, direct talks with Algerian leaders on the future of Algeria, and the release of all political prisoners.

The withdrawal, under *colon* hostility, of the nomination of General Catroux, whose known liberal tendencies made him unacceptable to the French settlers, and the equivocal speech of M. Mollet on February 9 succeeded only in further embittering the Algerians.

The emergence of an Algerian-Muslim Federation of labor union with strong political ties to similar federations in Tunis and Morocco makes it more difficult for France to deal with Algeria as a separate unit. The formation of this federation, which has the approval and encouragement of the American Federation of Labor, was

strongly resented by the French as a manifestation of American "interference."

Calls to the rebels to lay down their arms have been completely ineffective. The "men in the mountains," estimated at some 18,000, are pinning down some 220,000 French troops, and Algerian public opinion, stimulated by incendiary broadcasts from Radio Cairo, is now even more strongly behind the terrorists. Algerians working in France have added their voices to those of the Algerians at home by strikes and riots in Paris and other centers.

Even the full emergency powers granted M. Mollet may not succeed as a "last chance" of pacification short of full scale war. The troops are pouring in from France, the guerillas are being joined by fanatic fighters for independence, nationalist idealists and an army of peasant farmers who have sometimes been coerced by the rebels into taking to the hills with their rifles. The nationalists are setting up an effective underground, and political infiltration is spreading. Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are upholding the Algerian nationalists, and the Communists are doing their best to inflame the situation. The Algerian workers in France were coming back to Algeria by the thousands, until stopped by the French ban on travel. The French feared they were being called back to the rebel armies. Units of the French fleet went to the Mediterranean to blockade the Algerian coast.

On March 20, Ambassador Dillon made a conciliatory speech in Paris, in which he praised the "liberal solutions" offered in hope of peace in Algeria. The French were jubilant at this evidence that they were not deserted by the "anti-colonial" United States, and the Arab world reacted with increased resentment toward America, already held responsible for the French use of American-built helicopters and NATO troops.

The French continue to offer appeals to the Algerian Muslims to stop fighting and work with France. Resident Minister La-



coste recently made a speech saying that the Algerian people and the French must learn to live together, or rush headlong into catastrophe, but that the Algerian people must be offered the hope of a better life. He said that the income of 5,000,000 Algerians did not exceed \$45.00 a year at present, and hunger and unemployment had driven them to desperation. His plans call for more irrigation, better pay for farm hands, family benefits, expanded agricultural credits, inducements to industry, and search for new resources. The Algerian nationalist leaders say that France must leave or fight.

### The Eastern Mediterranean: Jordan, Egypt and Israel

In the eastern Mediterranean, the increasing influence of Egypt on the Northern Arabs, bolstered by its Czech and Russian arms, helped bring about major changes in the status of Jordan. The struggle between the old, Trans-Jordanian elements and the new Palestinian refugee population, almost continuous since 1949, veered sharply in favor of the latter with the abrupt dismissal, on March 2, of British General John Glubb from command of Jordan's Arab Legion. Opinions on the extent and propriety of Egyptian—and Saudi Arab—influence on this event varied, but that it existed was plain. Several days of demonstrations in favor of King Husayn's action and against the Baghdad Pact followed the dismissal. Although many assumed that this step marked the practical end of British influence in Jordan, indications in the ensuing weeks were the King Husayn would go slowly towards any irretrievable identification with the anti-Pact forces. But the impetus of uncompromising nationalism was strong and how much braking would, or could, be applied to this force was still doubtful.

Although the armistice lines between Israel and the Arab states had not been uncommonly perturbed in the earlier part of the period under review, the comparative quiet that prevailed was little indication of how deeply uncertain the future might be. Both Arabs and Israelis accused the other of plotting immediate war. High American and British officials took several occasions to express their fears and their intent to

act—if necessary, outside the United Nations framework, to preserve what peace existed. An American call for Security Council examination of the problem, which would include a visit to the area by Secretary General Hammarskjöld, was part of the design to hold the line against an outbreak—a limited objective. The latest word on the Israeli request for arms from the United States was that President Eisenhower had decided against granting the arms at the present.

### Intensification of the Cyprus Dispute

The long-standing demand of the Greek Cypriotes for "enosis"—union with mainland Greece—reached an intensity greater even than that of the 1931 riots which resulted in suspension of the constitution. Never a simple matter, since it is emotional rather than pragmatic, enosis has lately become more clouded by external pressures. Britain considers Cyprus as Crown soil and as a vital base; her strategic position and prestige in the Mediterranean are at stake in any surrender to a group of her subjects. Greek governments have historically used Cyprus as a diversion from unattractive policies at home, but there is no question that British repressive measures on the island plus tacit acceptance of Turkish interests have hurt Greek nationalistic feelings. So the simple demands of the Greek Cypriotes are buried in the mazes of Middle Eastern politics.

Talks between Field Marshal Sir John Harding, the British Governor, and Archbishop Makarios, leader of the Greek Cypriote Orthodox Church, over the past four months, failed to produce the desired agreement on the future of the island which might have restored order. The 1954 British position, that Cyprus could never receive full independence, underwent considerable modification. The British now agreed to the *principle* of self-determination, at some date when world conditions permitted. This departure from precedent was followed by a series of secret talks in which divergences between the Archbishop and Governor Harding, as H. M. representative, shrank to three. By early March the Archbishop was reported accepting the British insistence on retention of internal security pow-

ers, for an indefinite period, while the Governor agreed to amnesty for political offenders (but not those convicted of actual terrorist attacks). The third difference, regarding the proportional makeup of the Parliament, seemed certain of a solution in which the Turkish minority and Greek majority would each be represented.

The British suddenly broke off negotiations on March 5. On March 9 the Archbishop and three of his colleagues were deported to the Seychelles Islands, as a necessary prerequisite to the re-establishment of law and order on Cyprus, because Makarios was deeply implicated in EOKA (National Organization for the Struggle for Freedom of Cyprus), the Cypriote terrorist organization. The British statement on Makarios' deportation also contained the statement that the Archbishop had suddenly become impossible to deal with—he balked at relatively minor points in the negotiations, and seemed to be acting under EOKA orders to insist on enosis or nothing.

Reactions to the deportation were generally unfavorable. A general strike on Cyprus itself paralyzed business and transportation. EOKA intensified its terroristic activities. For the first time in many years, the Greek Cypriote majority and Turkish Cypriote minority engaged in communal clashes; although the initial Greek attack on a Turkish village was reported as having been inspired by Lenten wine, there was no doubt that Greek resentment of British support of Turkish minority rights and Turkish fears of enosis were the primal reasons. On mainland Greece the Karamanlis government authorized protest strikes, and rioters surged against British property. In England the liberal press and the Anglican church joined in condemning the order, and in Washington Department of State

officials, although maintaining the official position of mediator, privately criticized British haste and failure to consult them.

Despite Greek cries of "Foul!", the difference between British and Cypriote views of the future of Cyprus has not appreciably widened. Governor Harding considered that the presence of the Archbishop on the island constituted a deterrent to moderation, while the Archbishopric provided an excellent cover for EOKA terrorism. While the British are not giving out information on their knowledge or penetration of EOKA, they have said that law and order will be restored within six months. They believe they have offered the Cypriotes unusually broad self-government within the framework of colonial policy and consonant with their strategic interests, an offer acceptable to all but the extremists. An encouraging sign that the moderates on Cyprus are gaining, could be found in the statements of some churchmen that Makarios had become more of a political than a religious leader—he has preached almost no sermons this year. Given the extraordinary veneration accorded the head of the Cypriote Orthodox Church, the intimation is that the Church might do well to stay out of politics.

However, it appears that Governor Harding will have to exercise all his skill and patience over the coming months. Both mainland and Cypriote Greeks are as stirred up nationalistically as they were in 1821-25. Unless Greece finds other issues to divert the Greek people's concern for their colonial cousins, and Cypriote fear of EOKA reprisals is removed, Greek intervention is likely to take on a more active form of support, such as arms and leaders. Meanwhile the rift in NATO widens, and, sixty miles from Cyprus' long northern coastline, Turkey watches without comment.

## Chronology

DECEMBER 1, 1955—FEBRUARY 29, 1956

### General

1955

*Dec. 18:* Ambassador 'Awni Khalidi, Iraq's representative to the UN, announced that he had been selected by members of the Baghdad Pact Council as secretary general for the Pact.

1956

*Jan. 2:* Britain reaffirmed its intention to prevent an arms race in the Middle East in a declaration by Hugh Gaitskell, Labor Opposition leader, before the House of Commons.

*Jan. 7:* Yugoslavia's President Tito denounced the Baghdad Pact, asserting that it did not serve the best interests of the Middle East peoples.

*Jan. 9:* Representatives of the 5 members of the Baghdad Pact ended a 4-day meeting of the Pact's economic committee.

*Jan. 12:* The Soviet radio broadcast a bitter attack on the West and accused Britain of threatening armed intervention in Jordan.

*Jan. 19:* Britain admitted that 100 Sherman tanks were shipped through export controls to Israel via France.

*Jan. 24:* 'Abd al-Khaliq Hassuna, Arab League Secretary General, informed the West German Ambassador to Egypt of the Arab League's desire that West Germany reconsider the German-Israeli reparations agreement now that West Germany has become independent.

*Feb. 6:* Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent announced in Parliament that his government had lifted its arms embargo to the Middle East. This action cleared the way for shipment of 12 more Harvard training planes to Egypt and \$30,000 worth of 25-pounder ammunition to Israel.

*Feb. 13:* The Soviet Union announced that it would consider the sending of British and U. S. troops to the Middle East as a threat to peace and a violation of the UN Charter and the sovereignty of Middle Eastern countries.

*Feb. 18:* Lieut. Gen. Richard A. Hull, Commander of British troops in Egypt, moved his headquarters from Moascar to Port Said, inaugurating the fourth and final stage of British withdrawal from Suez.

### Afghanistan

(See also Pakistan)

1955

*Dec. 8:* Prime Minister Mohammed Da'ud Khan dismissed Gen. Mohammed Arif, Defense Minister and army commander, reportedly because of the general's objections to closer ties with the Soviet Union.

*Dec. 15:* The USSR's Prime Minister Bulganin and Communist Party leader N. S. Khrushchev arrived in Kabul for an official visit.

*Dec. 16:* N. S. Khrushchev, in a speech at Kabul, backed Afghanistan against Pakistan in the dispute over the Pathan peoples.

*Dec. 18:* The Soviet Union's delegation and the Afghan government announced a number of agreements completed during recent days: a loan of \$100 million by the USSR to Afghanistan, a joint statement on general foreign policy matters, and a protocol extending for ten more years their 1931 treaty of neutrality and mutual nonaggression.

In a news conference, Foreign Minister Sardar Naim Khan said that the agreements with the Soviet Union did not in any way weaken Afghanistan's determination to remain neutral in major international problems.

*Dec. 21:* The U. S. State Department confirmed that it had offered its good offices to help Afghanistan and Pakistan settle their dispute over the Pathans in the border area.

1956

*Jan. 24:* A Soviet Economic delegation arrived in Kabul to hold talks with the Afghan Government about the \$100 million agreement concluded on Dec. 18.

*Feb. 4:* An Afghan post 2 miles from Dacca was attacked by about 50 unknown persons. There were no casualties.

*Feb. 18:* The U. S. and Afghanistan signed a \$2 million technical cooperation agreement for 1956.

*Feb. 28:* Soviet Premier Bulganin sent a congratulatory telegram to Premier Mohammed Da'ud Khan of Afghanistan, on the 31st anniversary of the First Soviet-Afghan treaty.

### Algeria

(See also Egypt)

1955

*Dec. 5:* A skirmish between French and nationalist forces in a village near the Algerian-Tunisian border resulted in at least 17 nationalist deaths.

*Dec. 10:* The French cabinet announced that Algeria would not participate in the national elections scheduled for Jan. 2. Algeria would have elected thirty deputies to the National Assembly, but because of the "exceptional situation" in Algeria and the probable boycott of both candidates and voters there, the elections were postponed "to a later date."

*Dec. 17:* The French announced that at least ten persons had been killed during the past 24 hours by Algerian terrorists. It was also stated that

French troops had attacked a nationalist arms convoy crossing the border from Tunisia. Seven of the nationalists in the convoy were killed.

*Dec. 21:* French authorities announced that attacks on nationalists scattered throughout Algeria had resulted in the deaths of 89 rebels.

*Dec. 23:* Thirty-five guerillas in the Djurdjura Mountains were killed in a raid by French troops.

*Dec. 26:* Clashes between the nationalists and French troops continued, with the French reporting 24 nationalists killed and a large patrol of native troops under French leadership missing.

1956

*Jan. 4:* Sixty-one Algerian members of the French National Assembly, the French Union Assembly, and the Algerian Assembly issued a series of requests to the new National Assembly. They asked that France recognize Algerian rather than French nationality for the citizens of Algeria, that the Assembly arrange for talks with representative Algerians on the country's future, and that all political prisoners be released.

*Jan. 9:* French authorities reported that 64 persons were killed during the previous day, 39 by French troops and 25 by nationalists. Of the latter figure, 23 were Muslims who had cooperated with the French.

*Jan. 11:* The coastal area of the Kabylia Mountains was put under military rule prior to a major effort of the French army to eliminate the rebels in that area.

*Jan. 12:* About fifty persons were killed in a series of clashes between French and nationalist forces.

*Jan. 15:* The French reported that 71 nationalists and three French soldiers had been killed during the past 24 hours.

*Jan. 22:* French authorities announced that 61 rebels had been killed during the day and 580 during the week.

*Feb. 4:* More than 4,000 Europeans paraded in the rain to protest the nomination of Gen. Georges Catroux as Minister Residing in Algeria.

*Feb. 6:* French Premier Mollet announced that he had accepted the resignation of Gen. Catroux, shortly after the French in Algiers had greeted the Premier with flying tomatoes and clods of earth.

*Feb. 7:* Moderate Algerian nationalists expressed the view that the French government had stripped them of political authority, leaving the rebel guerillas of the National Liberation Front as the only representative spokesmen for Algerian Muslims. Their comments resulted from Premier Mollet's acceptance of the resignation of Gen. Catroux as Minister Residing in Algeria. The Committee of Sixty-One, a group of elected Muslim representatives, issued a communique expressing this attitude in official terms.

*Feb. 11:* Premier Mollet returned to Paris after a week's visit in Algeria with no evident solution to the 15-month-old rebellion.

*Feb. 12:* Shaikh Larbi Tebessi, presiding *alim* (pl. *ulama*) of Algeria, told reporters the *ulama* would

not discuss the Algerian problem with French Resident Minister La Coste, unless the French government promised Algeria independence first.

*Feb. 13:* The Algerian Assembly convened in Algiers for the first time since November. It adjourned until Feb. 21 after a brief formal session.

*Feb. 14:* In one of the fiercest combats reported in recent weeks from the operational zone in eastern Algeria, French Foreign Legionnaires smashed a strong rebel band in the Taberdga region of the Nemencha Mountains. French losses were eight killed and ten wounded. The rebels left 45 dead on the field.

*Feb. 17:* Both nationalists and Algerian Europeans demonstrated against Premier Mollet's single electoral roll proposal.

*Feb. 19:* Between 50 and 100 Algerian soldiers deserted from a French unit during a pitched battle with rebel nationalists.

*Feb. 20:* French authorities announced that ten French soldiers and twenty Algerian rebels were killed in a battle at Marnia, near the Moroccan border.

*Feb. 21:* A French supply convoy was ambushed by rebels near El Milia on the road to Philippeville. Twenty French soldiers were killed and twelve wounded. The rebels left 34 dead on the field.

*Feb. 23:* Hadj Messali, Algerian nationalist leader, said that French recognition of Algerian independence was a pre-requisite for re-establishment of peace.

*Feb. 25:* A French commando-style raid smashed a rebel stronghold in the Kabylia Mountains. Twenty-seven rebels were killed and 47 captured.

*Feb. 28:* French Premier Mollet broadcast an offer to Algerian rebels to choose between a cease fire followed by elections and discussions of Algeria's future status, or all-out war. He announced decisions taken at a cabinet meeting Feb. 27 to offer justice and equality to Moslems, and protection of rights to Europeans living in Algeria.

*Feb. 29:* French General Augustin Guillaume, Chief of the General Staff, was replaced by Gen. Paul Ely, a member of the high council, of the armed forces, in a reorganization of the French high command following disagreements over military policy in Algeria.

## Cyprus

1955

*Dec. 4:* British authorities seized arms and ammunition which were being unloaded from a Greek freighter at Limassol.

*Dec. 5:* In a speech in the House of Commons, British Foreign Secretary MacMillan said that Britain's policy had changed to the extent that it was prepared to consider Cypriote self-determination at a future date and under certain conditions.

*Dec. 7:* Archbishop Makarios, leader of the Greek Cypriote Orthodox Church, said that he had turned down a secret British offer to settle the



Cyprus dispute because the Greek aim of self-determination was unattainable considering the conditions attached to it by the British.

**Dec. 14:** British authorities outlawed all Communist organizations on Cyprus and arrested about 130 of their leaders.

1956

**Jan. 10:** The British government announced that 1,600 paratroopers had been sent to Cyprus "in view of the disturbed position in the Middle East."

**Jan. 19:** Charalambos Kyriakidis, brother of Bishop Kyprianos, was arrested for the second time as a terrorist.

**Jan. 27:** Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Governor of Cyprus, returned from conferences in London and opened a new series of talks with Archbishop Makarios.

**Jan. 29:** Archbishop Makarios called a meeting of the Ethnarchy Council of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus to discuss proposals made to him by Governor Harding. He also issued invitations to representative Greek leaders throughout the island to meet with him and discuss their views on the secret British proposals.

**Feb. 4:** Greek Premier Karamanlis told the press that he had refused to accept a British offer to cooperate with Britain in persuading Makarios to accept the British plan for a solution of the Cyprus issue. British troops used tear gas to break up student demonstrators at a Greek elementary school in Limassol.

**Feb. 6:** Greek Cypriote school children touched off a series of riots in Famagusta and stoned the British Army Education Center there.

**Feb. 7:** Petrakis Viallouris, an 18-year-old Greek Cypriote student, was shot to death during a clash between British troops and demonstrators in Famagusta. The youth immediately became a martyr—stores closed and dock workers went on strike in protest against his shooting.

**Feb. 14:** Greek Orthodox Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia, said that Greek Cypriotes would never be content with self-rule under the British flag. He disagreed with Archbishop Makarios' willingness to deal with the British on the basis of "genuine" self-rule.

**Feb. 15:** A British Foreign Office official said that Archbishop Makarios had not agreed to British proposals for self-government, but he considered them suggestive of too slow a process for self-government in the Greek sense.

**Feb. 16:** The British Embassy in Athens sent its 21st protest note to the Greek Foreign Minister regarding inflammatory broadcasts over Athens Radio in Cyprus. The note used the word "warn" for the first time in assigning responsibility for protection of British citizens to Greece.

**Feb. 22:** National Organization for the Struggle for Freedom of Cyprus (EOKA), secret anti-British society, published a leaflet in the Greek-language newspaper *Philadeftheros*, warning Mrs. Lilian Hill, a British housewife, that her son, Lance

Corpl. Gordon Hill, was in their hands and would be killed if British authorities upheld the death sentence for a teen-age Cypriote condemned for the murder of a policeman. Hill disappeared on Dec. 19. The leaflet was in answer to an appeal by Mrs. Hill to EOKA for information about her missing son.

Three leaders of the Turkish Cypriote community met Governor Sir John Harding and expressed anxiety over the security of the Turkish community, especially in villages where there was a Turkish minority. The Governor assured them of the full protection of the law.

**Feb. 27:** British Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd held discussions with Sir John Harding over the British offer to Archbishop Makarios.

**Feb. 28:** Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd held discussions with Turkish Cypriote leaders and assured them of full British protection.

Communists held small demonstrations in Nicosia, Famagusta, and Larnaca, denouncing Makarios' negotiations with the British.

Justice Bernard Shaw upheld death sentences for two Greek Cypriote teenagers charged with "terrorist activity."

**Feb. 29:** A night meeting between Archbishop Makarios and Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd failed to produce any agreement on the Cyprus issue.

## Egypt

(See also Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Palestine Problem, Sudan, Yemen)

1955

**Dec. 17:** The U. S. and Great Britain offered to assist Egypt in the initial work connected with the construction of the High Aswan Dam. The U. S. proposed to grant \$56,000,000 and Britain to release \$14,000,000 in blocked sterling for the necessary preliminary projects. The two governments also promised to consider, within their legislative authority, providing future assistance as the project progressed.

**Dec. 18:** The Soviet ambassador to Egypt announced that his government was still prepared to lend Egypt money for the Aswan Dam, regardless of the U. S.-British offer.

**Dec. 19:** Three French Catholic priests were arrested but immediately released on bail after they had protested the government's plans to abolish all religious courts, as announced on Sept. 27.

**Dec. 26:** Egypt and Saudi Arabia announced in Cairo the first steps in the implementation of their mutual defense pact of Oct. 27. Maj. Gen. 'Abd al-Hakim Amr, commander of the Egyptian army and the recently selected joint commander under the Syrian-Egyptian mutual defense pact, was chosen as the first joint commander. A war council was established consisting of the chiefs of staff of both countries.

**Dec. 28:** It was announced in Brussels that Belgium had been shipping surplus tanks and other war

equipment bought from Britain to Egypt.

President Tito of Yugoslavia arrived in Cairo for a state visit.

1956

*Jan. 5:* President Tito and Prime Minister Nasir issued a joint declaration in which they agreed to remain outside of any major power bloc.

The Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Sidqi, opened the "Atoms for Peace" exhibit sponsored by the Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission and the American Embassy.

*Jan. 11:* Britain announced a revision of its plans for withdrawing troops from the Suez Canal Zone. Evacuation had been proceeding ahead of schedule as arranged in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954, but because of the crisis in Jordan, Britain decided to use the entire period allowed for evacuation.

*Jan. 12:* The British ship *Memphis* arrived in Alexandria but was not permitted to take on supplies and her crew forbidden ashore. She had previously been blacklisted by Egyptian authorities for dealing with Israel.

An agreement was signed at the Foreign Ministry providing for air transportation on a regular basis between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

*Jan. 16:* Prime Minister Nasir issued the new Egyptian constitution, scheduled to go into effect after a national plebiscite on June 23, 1956. It declared Egypt to be an Islamic Arab republic headed by a president whose term would be six years. A national assembly would be elected, under an electoral law as yet unannounced; but the constitution stated that the suspension of all political parties would continue until changed by a two-thirds vote of the assembly. In the interim, a National Union composed of all interests would nominate all candidates for the assembly. The Assembly would elect the president, although in the case of the first president, public approval of the Assembly's selection would be sought in a plebiscite on July 7, 1956. The president would have a veto power over acts of the Assembly, and the veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. The President also was given the power to refer to a national plebiscite on any major national issues.

*Jan. 28:* Eugene R. Black, president of the IBRD, began discussions with Prime Minister Nasir on the proposed International Bank loan for the construction of the High Aswan Dam.

Nasir called for a meeting of the Arab League Council to discuss Iraq's arrest of a member of the Egyptian Embassy in Baghdad.

*Feb. 6:* Talks began in Cairo between Egyptians and Hungarian envoys toward replacing the present Hungarian-Egyptian short-term agreement with a long-term trade and payments agreement. Talks also began with Bulgarian and Communist Chinese trade delegations.

*Feb. 8:* The weekly magazine *Akhir Sa'a* published the first pictures Egyptians have seen of the

Communist arms Egypt has received from Czechoslovakia.

*Feb. 9:* Government representatives reached an agreement with Eugene Black, president of the IBRD, covering IBRD participation in the High Aswan Dam project to the extent of \$200,000,000.

Muhammad Aly 'Isa, member of the Egyptian Embassy staff in Baghdad, was sentenced to four years' imprisonment for leading a conspiracy against the Baghdad Pact.

*Feb. 10:* One of the British Army's three overseas supply reserve depots at Al Kirsh was handed over to the Egyptian Army.

*Feb. 11:* A Soviet agreement to grant Egypt aid in setting up a nuclear research laboratory followed a standing offer by the U. S. to build an atomic reactor in Egypt.

*Feb. 26:* The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Muhammad Abu Nusayr, said that the government had signed an agreement for the importation of 375,000 tons of wheat from the U. S. He stated that 30,000 tons have already been received.

*Feb. 27:* A Japanese trade fair opened in Cairo.

*Feb. 29:* Cairo held its first full-scale civil defense exercise, including a complete blackout for the entire city, an air raid, and incidents designed for the benefit of the various civil defense services.

## India

(See also Pakistan, Sudan)

1955

*Dec. 4:* Unofficial Indian protests increased in connection with the Dec. 2 statement of Secretary of State Dulles and Portuguese Foreign Minister Cunha in which Goa was referred to as a Portuguese "province."

*Dec. 6:* Commenting on the latest Goa controversy, Secretary of State Dulles said that the U. S. wanted a renunciation of force in the Goa dispute, although he repeated the reference to Goa as a Portuguese "province." Dulles particularly criticized the extreme nature of Soviet statements backing India against the Portuguese.

*Dec. 10:* In a speech at Srinagar, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Soviet Union Communist party leader, said that as far as he was concerned the Kashmir controversy was settled and that part of Kashmir under Indian rule was an inseparable part of India.

*Dec. 13:* King Saud of Saudi Arabia, ending a 17-day visit to India, and Prime Minister Nehru issued a statement favoring a "peaceful and non-militant" approach to current international problems.

Khrushchev and Prime Minister Bulganin of the Soviet Union joined Prime Minister Nehru in a statement which, among other general comments on the international situation, emphasized the importance of world disarmament. Arrangements were also made for a trade agreement between the two countries. India would purchase steel and manufactured equipment, while the

USSR would buy an equal amount of Indian raw materials and manufactured goods.

**Dec. 26:** In a speech in South India, Prime Minister Nehru attacked the Indian Communist Party, saying that its ideas were outmoded and not suited to conditions in India.

**Dec. 29:** The U. S. formally replied to India's objections to Secretary of State Dulles' comments on Goa on Dec. 2. It was understood the note assured India the U. S. did not intend to take sides in the controversy over the Portuguese enclave.

1956

**Jan. 5:** The U. S. and India signed an agreement by which the U. S. would grant \$10,000,000 worth of steel products to assist in the development of India's railroads.

**Jan. 16:** Prime Minister Nehru announced that the city of Bombay, under India's proposed reorganization plan, formulated Oct. 9, would be under direct rule from New Delhi, and not form part of any state. This decision paved the way for formation of two separate states in northern India, Gujarati and Maharashtra, neither state including Bombay.

**Jan. 17:** Large-scale demonstrations broke out in Bombay protesting the Prime Minister's decision to make Bombay a city apart from the surrounding states. At least six persons were killed during the day.

**Jan. 18:** Marathi crowds, defying a curfew, continued to demonstrate in Bombay. About twenty persons were killed and 200 injured.

**Jan. 19:** Demonstrations continued on a reduced scale in Bombay, and police authorities charged that the riots were led by the Communist party. The Maharashtra leaders of the Congress party met in Poona and demanded that all Maharashtra resign from the national Parliament, the cabinet, and the state legislature.

**Jan. 20:** More demonstrations, but on a smaller scale, broke out in Bombay. More than 1,400 persons were arrested during the period Jan. 18-20 because of their leadership in the riots.

**Jan. 21:** The Maharashtra of Bombay ended much of their mob opposition to the government's reorganization plan, but objections to the plan led to strikes and demonstrations in other parts of India. In Calcutta, at least two persons were killed as leftist groups objected to the small amount of territory allotted to West Bengal in the reorganization. Likewise in the states of Bihar and Orissa peaceful demonstrations objected to the proposed boundaries for those states.

**Jan. 22:** Prime Minister Nehru met with his close advisers to discuss the opposition to the government's plan for reorganization of the state boundaries. In both Calcutta and Bombay, demonstrations and strikes ended. The Maharashtra members of the state legislature in Bombay began to resign, and their leaders announced that the Marathi-speaking peoples would begin a period

of noncooperation and boycott of all public bodies.

**Jan. 23:** Nehru and other leaders of the Congress party declared that the reorganization plan would continue after final approval and that all of the forces of the state would be used to impose the plan. The group, however, did announce one modification of the plan. The states of West Bengal and Bihar, which were the scene of demonstrations on Jan. 21, would be combined into one state if that action should be approved by the two state legislatures.

**Feb. 3:** V. K. Krishna Menon, chief foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Nehru, was appointed to the Indian cabinet.

**Feb. 8:** The Bombay State Government denied earlier reports in the *New York Times* of between 250 and 400 deaths in the Bombay riots. The Government admitted only 76 deaths. It also refused to transmit two AP radiophotos showing anti-Nehru signs and an effigy of Nehru in Bombay.

**Feb. 11:** Top Congress Party leaders bitterly criticized U. S. and British foreign policies at the opening session of the annual convention of the Congress Party. Prime Minister Nehru particularly attacked "western-sponsored military alliances" for increasing world tensions. At the meeting a unanimous resolution was adopted condemning UN exclusion of Communist China.

**Feb. 12:** The End-The-Kashmir-Dispute Committee adopted a resolution in New Delhi condemning the suppression of opposition organizations by the government of occupied Kashmir.

Master Tara Singh, leader of the Sikh Akali party, surprised Congress Party leaders by attending the Congress convention for a short time. During his visit the convention adopted a resolution condemning violent methods by any section of the people for enforcing reorganization on other sections.

**Feb. 15:** President Prasad, opening the 12th session of the Indian Parliament, criticized Secretary Dulles for his statement that Goa was a Portuguese "province." Dr. Prasad traced the deterioration in world affairs since Geneva to the West's network of military alliances and China's exclusion from the UN.

**Feb. 17:** A bill to nationalize the life insurance business was introduced into Parliament. It provides for the establishment of a statutory life insurance corporation as an absolute government monopoly.

**Feb. 18:** Fifty leading *saddhus* (holy men) from all parts of India held a meeting in New Delhi. G. L. Nanda, Minister for Planning, Irrigation, and Power, urged the *saddhus* to promote the national development program as they preach throughout India.

**Feb. 20:** Prime Minister Nehru visited Bombay under heavy guard and without making any public appearances, after receiving a telegram from Chinese Premier Chou en-Lai warning him that

his life would be in danger if he carried out his proposed plan to visit that riot-torn city.

*Feb. 24:* India protested to Pakistan air violations over her territory by two Pakistani Air Force planes.

An 18-hour general strike paralyzed Calcutta.

Britain and India reached agreement on the construction of a one-million ton British steel plant which would cost \$220,000,000. The plant is to be constructed in Durgapur, West Bengal.

*Feb. 28:* India and Japan reached an agreement whereby two million tons of Indian iron ore would be exported to Japan, in exchange for 75 Japanese locomotives which would be purchased by the Indian government to haul the iron ore from Indian mines to Indian ports.

## Iran

(See also Palestine Problem)

1955

*Dec. 6:* The government rejected the Soviet Union's protest of Nov. 26 over Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact.

*Dec. 7:* Jamal Akhavi was appointed Minister of Justice.

1956

*Jan. 18:* Ayatullah Kashani was arrested by the army in connection with the investigation of the 1951 assassination of Gen. Razmara.

*Feb. 2:* The Iranian Army announced the arrest of Haig Harutanian, a mechanic in Tehran, as a Russian spy.

*Feb. 4:* The U. S.-British-Dutch-French partnership that has replaced the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company reported good technical progress and an atmosphere of cooperation at the end of the first year of operation.

*Feb. 28:* Punitive operations against anti-government elements of the Javanroudi tribe in Western Iran were successfully concluded, and the Iranian flag hoisted over the tribal capital (fortress) of Javanrun, the Iranian Army announced. One Javanroudi chieftain, Keykavous Beg, was killed; 9 other chieftains and 300 tribesmen were captured.

## Iraq

(See also Lebanon, Jordan)

1955

*Dec. 1:* King Faysal opened the new session of Parliament.

*Dec. 17:* Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id resigned and immediately reformed his cabinet with four changes. The new cabinet was as follows:

Nuri al-Sa'id—Prime Minister, Defense  
Burhan al-Din Basha'yan—Foreign Affairs  
Munir al-Qadi—Education  
Dhia Ja'far—Reconstruction  
'Abd al-Rasul al-Khalisi—Social Affairs  
Salih Sa'ib al-Jaburi—Communications, Public Works  
'Abd al-Amir Alawi—Health  
Khalil Kunnah—Finance

'Abd al-Jabbar al-Takarli—Justice

Nadim al-Pachachi—Economy

Sa'id al-Qazzaz—Interior

*Dec. 21:* Britain announced that, in exchange for some £2,750,000 worth of equipment left behind on the airfields recently evacuated by Britain, Iraq would purchase £2 million of military equipment from Britain during the next 2 years.

1956

*Jan. 3:* Prime Minister Sa'id's new cabinet was given a vote of confidence by the Chamber of Deputies, 91 to 10.

*Jan. 25:* Egypt protested to Iraq after a messenger at the Egyptian embassy had been arrested and charged with directing a plot to assassinate high Iraqi officials.

*Jan. 26:* The trial of the Egyptian Embassy messenger opened, along with that of 2 Palestinians also charged with smuggling bombs into Iraq to assassinate certain officials.

'Alal al-Fasi, leader of the Moroccan Istiqlal Party, arrived at Baghdad to discuss the Moroccan question with Arab leaders.

*Jan. 29:* King Faisal received Moroccan leader Sayid 'Alal el-Fasi and expressed his sympathy with the cause of the Arab Maghrib.

*Jan. 30:* The Council of Ministers approved the treaty of friendship between Iraq and Indonesia.

*Feb. 6:* Iraq received 12 Centurion tanks under the military assistance agreement between the country and the U. S.

*Feb. 8:* Ten Libyan cadets arrived in Baghdad to receive training at Iraqi military schools.

*Feb. 26:* Iraq formally offered military aid to Lebanon and Syria in the event of Israel's diversion of the Jordan river.

Nine men appeared for trial before the Baghdad court on a charge of forming a political party without prior permission. They were said to have formed a party which they called "Al-Tahrir" (Liberation).

## Israel

(See also Lebanon, Palestine Problem, Jordan)

1955

*Dec. 16:* Israel and Burma completed arrangements for a 3-year trade agreement.

*Dec. 29:* A meeting of the Mapai party endorsed the "line of action" taken by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in his handling of Israel's affairs. Of particular concern in the vote was the generally accepted fact that the Prime Minister had been solely responsible for the raid on Syria on Dec. 11.

1956

*Jan. 2:* Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and Foreign Minister Sharett spoke during a major Knesset debate on foreign policy. They denounced the Soviet Union as "the factor principally responsible" for the new Palestine crisis.

*Jan. 9:* The Knesset debate on foreign policy was concluded, and the government of Prime Minister



Ben-Gurion was given a vote of approval, 69 to 31.  
*Jan. 25:* The National Civil Defense Council met in Jerusalem to determine a detailed civil defense program, including plans for complete mobilization, construction of air-raid shelters in public places, education for civil defense, and mobilization of volunteers from various public bodies for assistance in setting civil defense machinery into motion.

An employment center for the rehabilitation of Arab youth, first of its kind in Israel, was opened in Nazareth.

*Jan. 26:* Several persons were slightly injured in Tel Aviv as the result of a fist fight which broke out at a public Communist Party rally where Knesset member Mikunis appeared.

*Feb. 6:* The Knesset passed revenue clauses of the additional budget totalling 160.8 million Israeli pounds. The suggestion of the Minister of Finance to pass the question of academic and administrative raises to the Knesset Finance Committee was accepted.

*Feb. 7:* 8,000 Israeli civil servants, most of them physicians, went on strike for more pay.

*Feb. 13:* Premier Ben-Gurion's coalition government won a vote of confidence in the Knesset over bitter attacks by Rightists and Communists. The vote was 58 to 29, with 3 abstentions. The main issue of the debate was the national strike of professional men, led by physicians, against the Government's wage policy.

*Feb. 18:* Beersheba, in the Negev, was linked to the national railway network by completion of a 48-mile line linking the town with the Jerusalem-Lydda line at Naan, 7 miles south of Lydda Junction.

*Feb. 21:* Thirty families of North African immigrants were airlifted across the Negev desert to Elath in the first major transfusion of immigrants to Israel's southernmost settlement.

The Knesset recommended a 3-year income tax holiday for settlers in Elath.

*Feb. 28:* Ambassador Eban demanded a definite yes or no answer from Assistant Secretary of State Allen, as to whether Israel would be allowed to buy arms in the U. S.

A 360-ton Greek freighter with a cargo of cement from Haifa arrived at Elath, Israeli port on the Red Sea.

## Jordan

1955

*Dec. 6:* General Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of Britain's General Staff, arrived in Amman to hold talks with King Husayn and high government officials.

*Dec. 14:* Jordan's application for UN membership was approved in the General Assembly.

Prime Minister Sa'id al-Mufti resigned after four members of his cabinet had quit in protest over British suggestions that Jordan join the Baghdad Pact.

*Dec. 15:* Haza' al-Majali, a proponent of the Baghdad Pact, formed a new government. The members of his cabinet were as follows:

Haza' al-Majali—Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs

Abbas Mirza—Interior

Jamil al-Tutunji—Health, Social Affairs

Bishara Ghusayb—Finance

Farhan al-Shubaylat—Defense

Muhammad 'Ali al-Jabari—Justice, Agriculture

'Umar al-Salah al-Barghuti—Education

'Arif al-'Arif—Public Works

Jalil Badran—Commerce, Construction and Development

Farid Arshid—Posts and Telegraphs, Civil Aviation

*Dec. 18:* Demonstrations against the new government and the Baghdad Pact broke out in Amman, Jericho, and Hebron. In the latter town, the UNRWA headquarters was attacked.

*Dec. 19:* As demonstrations continued in Jordan's major towns, Prime Minister al-Majali resigned and suggested to King Husayn that Parliament be dissolved and new elections held. Six members of the cabinet resigned earlier in protest against the Prime Minister's plans to dissolve Parliament. King Husayn issued a decree dissolving Parliament and calling for a general election within four months.

*Dec. 20:* Crowds in Jerusalem attacked the US, French, and Turkish consulates. At the request of King Husayn, Ibrahim Hashim, president of the Senate, formed a caretaker government to rule until the new elections. The new Prime Minister said that his cabinet would not deal with any political questions. The following were members of the new cabinet:

Ibrahim Hashim—Prime Minister

Samir al-Rifai—Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs

Fawzi al-Mulki—Defense, Education

'Umar Matar—Interior

Khulusi al-Khayri—Finance, Economy

Falah al-Madadah—Justice, Public Works

Hashim al-Jayusi—Agriculture, Posts, Civil Aviation

Anistas Hananiah—Commerce, Development

Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi—Health, Social Affairs

*Dec. 22:* The government announced that 41 persons had been killed and 150 injured during the demonstrations of the past week.

*Dec. 25:* Leaders of the recent demonstrations against the Baghdad Pact met in Amman to form an organization, the National Committee, to prepare for the forthcoming elections. The committee's aims were declared to be opposition to the Baghdad Pact, termination of British influence.

*Dec. 28:* A group of members of the dissolved Parliament issued a protest stating that the dissolu-

tion was illegal because the Prime Minister at that time, Haza' al-Majali, had recommended the dissolution on his own without consulting with the Minister of Interior, as required by the constitution.

*Dec. 30:* Britain announced that its economic aid to Jordan during the coming year would be increased by £500,000 to a total of £3,350,000. The additional money would be used for development work on the port of Aqaba. Plans announced also included construction of a highway from Amman to Aqaba. Britain's military subsidy to Jordan, amounting to £7,500,000, would be continued unchanged during the following year.

1956

*Jan. 4:* The cabinet approved a decision by a constitutional council that the dissolution of Parliament on Dec. 19 had been unconstitutional. The cabinet also cancelled plans for new elections.

*Jan. 7:* Demonstrating mobs in Jerusalem stoned the U. S. Consulate, and in Amman similar groups burned the US technical aid center.

*Jan. 8:* US Secretary of State Dulles protested to the Jordanian Chargé d'Affaires that inadequate police protection had been made available to protect American property and personnel during the demonstrations of Jan. 7.

*Jan. 9:* King Husayn swore in a new cabinet to replace the caretaker government. The new Prime Minister, Samir al-Rifa'i, declared that "the adherence to any new pacts is not the policy of my government." The members of the cabinet were as follows:

Samir al-Rifa'i—Prime Minister, Interior  
Ibrahim Hashim—Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of State  
Falah Madada—Justice, Defense  
Khalusi al-Khayri—Economics  
Anistas Hananiah—Trade, Reconstruction  
Hashim al-Jayusi—Finance  
Mustafa Khalifah—Health, Social Affairs  
Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi—Foreign Affairs  
Saba al-Akashah—Posts, Telegraphs, Civil Aviation  
Dayfallah al-Hamud—Education, Agriculture

*Jan. 10:* The new government charged that broadcasts from Egypt and Saudi Arabia had played a part in stirring up the destructive mobs of the past week. Within Jordan, a curfew was strictly enforced and the arrival of foreign travelers halted.

*Jan. 14:* The government lifted the curfew imposed on the major towns during the riots of the past weeks.

*Jan. 23:* Press censorship was imposed in Jordan.

*Jan. 29:* A new radio station, in Amman, set up to rival the Egyptian "Voice of the Arabs" propaganda station, began broadcasting. Its first transmission was a violent attack on Israel.

*Jan. 31:* The House of Representatives approved the appointment of Samir al-Rifa'i as the new Pre-

mier of Jordan. The vote of confidence was 34 to 3, with one abstention.

*Feb. 5:* Press censorship in Jordan was officially lifted.

*Feb. 11:* Two hundred Jordanian students attacked the Jordan Embassy in Cairo, while Premier Samir al-Rifa'i was visiting Egypt, to protest against the Baghdad Pact.

## Lebanon

(See also Iraq, Syria)

1955

*Dec. 23:* The Chamber of Deputies approved the \$27 million loan granted Lebanon on Aug. 26 for the development of the Litani river.

1956

*Jan. 3:* Maj.-Gen. Ghalib, Egyptian Ambassador to Lebanon, gave Premier Karamy a contribution of £E 15,000 from the Egyptian Government for relief work in Tripoli.

*Jan. 13:* Trade talks between Lebanon and Japan opened in Beirut; Japanese Minister to Lebanon, Hiro Furuchi, was Japan's representative, while Lebanon was represented by Sayed Naim al-Ayubi, Director of the Economic Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

*Jan. 29:* Three prison sentences were handed down for espionage work against Lebanon for Israel. One person received life imprisonment and 2 received 7-year sentences.

*Jan. 31:* The Iraq Government offered to mediate in the dispute between the Lebanese Government and the Iraq Petroleum Co. over royalties on oil passing through Lebanon.

*Feb. 6:* A Lebanese security squad arrested 3 Israeli agents in Bint Jubayl, near the Israeli-Lebanese border. They were tried and convicted of spying for Israel.

*Feb. 22:* A survey team of Russian technicians arrived in Lebanon.

*Feb. 27:* Teachers at private schools in the Lebanon resumed their work after being on strike for ten days demanding equal treatment with teachers in government schools.

## Libya

(See also Tunisia)

1955

*Dec. 14:* Libya's application for UN membership was approved by a vote in the General Assembly.

1956

*Jan. 22:* Premier Bin Halim formally opened the Libyan University at Benghazi.

*Feb. 1:* The first shipment of Western arms was presented to Premier Halim by British Ambassador Gerald Graham.

The first consignment of British arms and equipment were turned over to the Libyan Army in a ceremony at Tripoli. Three formations of U. S. jet aircraft from nearby Wheelus Field took part in the ceremony.

*Feb. 6:* Salah Ben Youssef, Tunisian nationalist leader, escaped into Libya and was granted political asylum.

## MOROCCO

(See also Algeria, Iraq)

1955

*Dec. 3:* The UN General Assembly, without the participation of France, approved a resolution postponing further consideration of the Moroccan situation, a matter originally brought before the Assembly in 1952, and expressed confidence that the French and Moroccans would find a satisfactory solution to their future relations.

*Dec. 7:* Prime Minister M'barek Bekkai's newly announced cabinet was sworn in by Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef. In so doing, the Sultan for the first time formally relinquished many of his absolute powers, although stating that the cabinet would remain responsible to him until a national assembly had been elected. The cabinet members and their party affiliations are as follows:

M'barek Bekkai (independent)—Prime Minister

Mohammed Zechare (independent)—Deputy Prime Minister

'Abd al-Krim Benjelon (Istiqlal)—Justice

Mohammed Douiri (Istiqlal)—Public Works

Ahmed Lyazadi (Istiqlal)—Commerce and Industry

Mohammed al-Fassi (Istiqlal)—Education

Moktar Soussi (Istiqlal)—Religious Affairs

'Abd al-Kader Benjelloun (Democratic Independence)—Finance

'Abd al-Hadi Boutaleb (Democratic Independence)—Labor and Social Affairs

Dr. Faradej (independent)—Public Health

Si al-Kaid Lahcen (independent)—Interior

Ben Bouchaib (Democratic Independence)—Housing

Thami al-Qazzani (Democratic Independence)—Industry and Mining

'Abd al-Rahman Bouabid (Istiqlal)—Minister of State

Driss Mahmedi (Istiqlal)—Minister of State

Mohammed Cherkaoui (Democratic Independence)—Minister of State

Me. Guedire (independent)—Minister of State

*Dec. 15:* Generalissimo Franco of Spain announced that he would not permit the formation of a government based on political parties in Spanish Morocco because he did not feel that the people were prepared for it. His government, however, announced that it was prepared to cooperate with France in arrangements for the two zones of Morocco.

*Dec. 17:* An 8-hour daily curfew was imposed on Meknes because of the renewed outbreak of violence there.

*Dec. 19:* Lieut. Gen. Garcia Valino, High Commissioner for Spanish Morocco, said that he would

make every effort to prepare Morocco for self-rule and would give increased responsibilities to those Moroccans participating in the government of Spanish Morocco.

1956

*Jan. 2:* French troops continued their attacks against rebel strongholds and announced the capture of two points in the mountains north of Fez.

*Jan. 6:* France refused to permit Spanish participation in the forthcoming negotiations with the Moroccan government on the future status of French Morocco.

*Jan. 9:* 'Abd al-Khalik Torres, leader of the Reform Party in Spanish Morocco, and 'Abdullah Guennun of the National Independence Party, resigned from the government organization in Tetuan. They had been the only two nationalists in the 9-man native government group.

*Jan. 21:* The Spanish government announced that "under no circumstances" would it recognize any authority of the nationalist government of French Morocco over the affairs of Spanish Morocco.

*Jan. 23:* Thami al-Glaoui, pasha of Marrakech, died after an illness of several months.

*Jan. 26:* The U. S. announced relinquishment of its extraterritorial rights in Morocco.

*Jan. 29:* French troops clashed with rebels in the mountains north of Fez, with a total of at least 58 deaths.

The Spanish government announced additional governmental authority would be "gradually" assigned to Moroccans in the Spanish zone, although final approval of any reorganization must be given by General Franco.

*Feb. 4:* Rebels ambushed a French Foreign Legion truck 16 miles southwest of Taza, and killed 3 Legionnaires.

*Feb. 8:* Crowds in Casablanca welcomed Sultan ben Youssef's first public appearance outside Rabat since his return from exile Nov. 16.

*Feb. 11:* Limited home rule was restored to Morocco in a protocol signed by Premier Bekkai and Resident General André Du Bois, in accordance with an agreement of Nov. 6.

*Feb. 18:* 12 incidents of terrorism were reported in 24 hours; 11 persons were wounded, including 2 French soldiers. 8 bombs exploded in Rabat and Casablanca.

*Feb. 22:* Premier M'Barek Bekkai said at the start of formal negotiations between France and Morocco that Morocco would undertake discussions on interdependence as a sovereign state and on an equal footing. The Premier outlined the Moroccan position demanding abrogation of the 1912 protectorate treaty, control over their military, diplomatic and security affairs, and complete territorial unity.

## Pakistan

(See also India)

1955

*Dec. 6:* Pakistan issued a note sent to Afghanistan

protesting alleged violations of its border on Nov. 9 and 10 by an Afghan plane and 5 Afghan "saboteurs."

**Dec. 11:** Prime Minister Chaudry Mohammed Ali strongly criticized the anti-Pakistan statements made by the Soviet Union's N. S. Khrushchev in Kashmir on Dec. 10.

1956

**Jan. 9:** The National Assembly began debate on the draft constitution recently approved by the 63-man drafting committee. The draft declared Pakistan to be an Islamic republic. The governmental apparatus would include a president elected by the national and provincial legislatures, a National Assembly of 300 members, and a cabinet responsible to the Assembly.

**Jan. 26:** As demands for semi-autonomy for East Pakistan grew in the constitutional debate, Governor General Iskander Mirza warned against "talk of secession" and said that the government would liquidate those found guilty of "treasonable activities."

**Jan. 28:** The United Front party and the Awami League, the two major opposition parties, announced that they would walk out of the Constituent Assembly unless their amendments to the draft constitution were accepted. The two parties wanted East Pakistan to be given control over many of its provincial affairs and over its foreign trade, including the right to levy and collect taxes on jute exports.

**Jan. 30:** UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld conferred with Pakistani officials on the Kashmir problem and the dispute with Afghanistan over the Pathans.

Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar, the new Moslem League president, asked league members of the West Pakistan interim legislature to meet immediately to form a parliamentary party, elect a leader, following a resolution to that effect adopted at the Moslem League Council meeting in Karachi.

**Feb. 4:** Prime Minister Chaudry Mohammed Ali defended the Public Safety Act controlling freedom of the press, in an answer to charges by Karachi Times Editor Z. A. Suleri that the Government held only skin-deep belief in a free press. The Prime Minister stated that some press control always exists, but that he did not particularly approve of the Act.

**Feb. 6:** Soviet Premier Bulganin offered to exchange Soviet machinery for Pakistani agricultural exports, in a bid for closer ties.

**Feb. 8:** The Pakistan Cabinet accepted a recommendation from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to begin negotiations for a trade pact with the USSR.

**Feb. 9:** The acting president, Pandit Raghunath, and the general secretary, Mohammed Amin Lehri of the Kashmir political conference were re-arrested in Srinagar.

**Feb. 17:** The Chief Commissioner of Karachi imposed a two-week ban on public meetings and the

carrying of arms except by the armed forces and police. 25 persons were arrested for violating the order, including a member of the Constituent Assembly and 5 provincial legislators. They were released on Feb. 18.

**Feb. 22:** The Constituent Assembly announced that Pakistan would be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and that the head of state must be a Muslim.

## Palestine Problem

(See also Israel, Egypt)

1955

**Dec. 11:** In what Israel claimed to be retaliation for Syrian fire on Israeli fishing boats on Lake Tiberias, Israel attacked Syrian army positions across the border.

**Dec. 12:** UN truce observers found that at least 56 Syrians had been killed in the Israeli raid of Dec. 11. Israeli sources said that all Syrian installations near the northeast corner of Lake Tiberias has been destroyed.

**Dec. 13:** Syria requested that the UN Security Council meet to consider charges of armed aggression by Israel.

**Dec. 14:** Israel reported scattered firing along its borders by both Egypt and Syria.

Iraq offered military assistance to Syria at any time "to defend Syrian territory against Israeli aggression."

**Dec. 15:** Egyptian Prime Minister Nasir cabled UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld that any further Israeli attacks such as that on Syria on Dec. 11 would be met by the united action of Egypt and Syria under their new mutual defense pact.

Israel notified UN authorities that it was prepared to exchange all Syrian prisoners it held for Israelis held as prisoners in Syria.

**Dec. 16:** The UN Security Council opened its debate on the Israeli raid against Syria. The Syrian representative called for the expulsion of Israel from the UN and the imposition of economic sanctions against Israel. The 10 members of the Council present, including Britain, France, the U. S., and the Soviet Union, criticized the Israeli attack against Syria.

**Dec. 19:** Israeli authorities in Washington summarized Israel's standing terms for peace arrangements with the Arabs: allow land communications between Egypt and Lebanon, permit free access to Haifa for Jordan, consider possible arrangements for a line of communication between Jordan and Egypt, permit Arab planes to fly over Israel, pay compensation to Arab refugees for lands lost in Israel, join with the Arabs in a unified development program for the waters of the Jordan valley, and make minor territorial adjustments where economic and strategic necessities made these obvious.

**Dec. 21:** In a report to the Security Council, Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, UN truce supervisor, said that the Israeli attack on Syria on Dec. 11 had



been a "deliberate violation" of the armistice, that there was a "striking disparity" between the scale of the Israeli attack and Syrian provocations, and that Israel's policy of reprisals against the Arab nations might lead to "full-scale hostilities."

*Dec. 22:* Israel expressed willingness to consider Gen. Burns' request for a gentleman's agreement to abide by the armistice terms, although it objected to the truce supervisor's proposal, that the use of Israeli patrol boats on Lake Tiberias be limited.

*Dec. 29:* After conversations with Egyptian officials, Gen. Burns talked with Israeli leaders about new peace guarantees in the al-'Awja demilitarized zone. Israel then announced that talks had broken down because of Egyptian objections to the UN proposals.

*Dec. 30:* Gen. Burns reported to the Security Council that Syria, prior to the Israeli raid of Dec. 11, had fired on an Israeli patrol boat in Lake Tiberias.

#### 1956

*Jan. 9:* The Soviet Union submitted its versions of the Israeli censure motion to the UN Security Council. Except for eliminating the requests for Israel's expulsion from the UN and economic sanctions against Israel, the wording was similar to that in the earlier Syrian Draft resolution. It included a demand for Israel's compensation to the families of those Syrians killed in the raid.

*Jan. 11:* Britain, France, and the U. S. submitted their version of an Israeli censure motion to the Security Council. It classified the Israeli attack of Dec. 11 on Syria as a "flagrant violation" of the armistice. No penalties or damage payments were listed, although the resolution warned that future attacks would lead to "further measures." The resolution also included measures to strengthen Gen. Burns' truce organization.

*Jan. 13:* Debate on the Israeli censure motion continued in the Security Council. All 11 members agreed that some form of censure should be approved.

*Jan. 15:* UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld left New York for talks in the Middle East with Arab and Israeli leaders.

Both Israel and Egypt reported an exchange of fire near the al-'Awja demilitarized zone.

*Jan. 17:* Iran and Yugoslavia continued to push a compromise solution in place of the Israeli censure resolutions submitted to the Security Council by the Soviet Union and the Western Big 3. The 3 Western nations modified their original resolution by adding after their reference to Syrian "interference" in Israeli use of Lake Tiberias that this action "in no way justifies Israel's action."

*Jan. 18:* Egypt and Israel agreed to resume meetings of their Mixed Armistice Commission to hear some 130 complaints which have accumulated since meetings were discontinued in September 1955.

*Jan. 19:* The UN Security Council unanimously approved the British-French-U. S. resolution to condemn Israel for its raid on Syria on Dec. 11. The

resolution referred to Syrian "interference" with Israeli boats on Lake Tiberias, but said that the Israeli attack was in no way justified by this Syrian interference and that future such Israeli action would lead to "further measures" by the UN. A final passage was added requesting that both sides cooperate in an exchange of prisoners.

*Jan. 24:* Secretary General Hammarskjöld announced in Jerusalem that Egypt has accepted his proposals to ease Egyptian-Israeli tension at the al-'Awja demilitarized zone. He also announced that Israel had accepted the proposals on Jan. 4. The UN scheme would permit a marking of the lines surrounding the demilitarized zone without in any way affecting the ultimate rights of the parties in and around al-'Awja. Also under the proposal both Israel and Egypt would withdraw unauthorized personnel, remove mines, and other obstacles from the zone.

Gen. Burns suggested to Israel and Syria that they accept a gentleman's agreement to arrange a cease-fire in the Lake Tiberias area.

*Jan. 26:* Syria accepted an invitation to discuss with Gen. Burns means of reducing the tension along the Israeli border.

*Feb. 4:* Egypt lodged an official protest with the UN Armistice Commission over an Israeli attack on an Egyptian outpost south of Gaza.

*Feb. 7:* An Israeli military spokesman reported a 15-minute exchange of fire between Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Beeri sector, southeast of Gaza.

*Feb. 11:* The Belgian Association of Merchants, Exporters and Importers called on the Belgian Government to take international action against Arab business firms which have been sending detailed questionnaires to Benelux businessmen demanding that they reveal any Jewish connections. The questionnaires have been designed to aid Arab economic warfare against Israel.

*Feb. 20:* The UN Mixed Armistice Commission censured Egypt for an Arab-Israeli ceasefire violation on August 26, 1955.

Israeli patrolmen captured a member of the Jordanian National Guard inside Israeli territory.

*Feb. 21-23:* Three exchanges of gunfire between Israeli fishermen and Syrian riflemen broke the 10-week truce on Lake Tiberias.

*Feb. 24:* A UN headquarters communiqué stated that Syria had informed the Joint Armistice Commission that villagers were responsible for the 3 shooting incidents of Feb. 21-23.

*Feb. 25-26:* An Israeli Army spokesman said that Egyptian outposts in the Gaza strip had fired across the Armistice demarcation line at Israeli patrols 7 times.

## Persian Gulf

#### 1955

*Dec. 15:* Troops of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman occupied Nizwa, the seat of government for his rival, the Imam of Oman.

*Dec. 22:* The forces of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman took Rustak, the last stronghold of the Imam of Oman.

1956

*Feb. 10:* Elections were held in Bahrain for a six-member committee to supervise health affairs. The elections were the first in the history of the Persian Gulf.

## Saudi Arabia

(See also Egypt, India, Jordan)

1955

*Dec. 28:* The U. S. suggested that Britain and Saudi Arabia resume direct negotiations, whether bilaterally or through an arbitration commission, in order to reach an agreement on the Buraimi dispute.

1956

*Jan. 15:* Radio Mecca announced the appointment of Amir Khalid ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Sudairi, Governor of the Northern District of the Hijaz, as Minister of Agriculture.

Poland submitted the low bid for repairing and rebuilding the Hijaz railway.

*Jan. 20:* Saudi Arabia recognized the Sudan.

*Jan. 31:* The Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling for the re-establishment of friendly relations with Britain, but saying that the Government would not permit any of its territory to be unjustly taken.

*Feb. 6:* The Polish engineering delegation scheduled to rebuild the Hijaz railway arrived in Amman.

*Feb. 16:* The U. S. Department of State announced that 18 Walker Bulldog tanks were being shipped to Saudi Arabia on the freighter James Monroe. The Executive office promptly placed an embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East.

*Feb. 18:* President Eisenhower canceled the embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East, permitting shipment of the 18 tanks to Saudi Arabia.

## Sudan

(See also Saudi Arabia, Yemen)

1955

*Dec. 3:* Britain and Egypt signed a formal agreement in Cairo which will permit the Sudan the right of self-determination by means of a national plebiscite, with elections to a constituent assembly to take place at the same time. A seven-nation commission is to oversee this process of self-determination.

'Ali al-Mirghani, leader of the Khatmiya sect, and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, leader of the Ansar sect, meeting for the first time since 1946, expressed their hope that all parties would unite to form a national government during the future months of self-determination.

*Dec. 6:* Prime Minister Isma'il al-Azhari announced that the National Union party would be willing to join a coalition government during the self-deter-

mination period if several conditions were agreed to, the most important being that the present Parliament be used as the vehicle for self-determination rather than a national plebiscite, and that the Parliament also be given the powers of a constituent assembly.

*Dec. 13:* Yugoslavia and the Sudan signed a trade agreement under which Yugoslavia would buy £300,000 worth of Sudanese cotton in the next year and the Sudan would be free to buy the goods of its choice from Yugoslavia.

*Dec. 19:* The House of Representatives unanimously adopted a resolution declaring Sudan's independence and requesting Egypt and Britain to recognize the declaration. Parliament also agreed to elect a 5-man commission to assume the duties of the Governor General.

*Dec. 22:* The Senate approved unanimously the lower House declaration of Sudan's independence.

*Dec. 26:* Prime Minister al-Azhari requested that former Egyptian Minister of Sudanese affairs Major Salah Salam cut short his unofficial visit to the Sudan because of reports about his talks with pro-Egyptian groups.

1956

*Jan. 1:* Britain and Egypt recognized the independence of the Sudan, and a new Sudanese flag was raised at ceremonies in Khartoum. A five-man commission was sworn in to assume the functions of the Governor General for the immediate future.

Britain and Egypt informed the seven members of the international commission to oversee the Sudan's process of self-determination that the commission would no longer be needed because of the parliamentary declaration of independence.

*Jan. 2:* India and the U. S. recognized the Sudan as an independent state.

*Jan. 5:* The parliamentary members of Prime Minister al-Azhari's National Union party approved the idea of a coalition cabinet, as originally suggested by the opposition Umma party.

*Jan. 12:* The cabinet approved the memoranda of the Foreign Minister in regard to Sudan's admission to the UN and the Arab League. It also approved the holding of discussions between the Sudan and Ethiopia regarding the transfer of Gambela Post from Ethiopia to the Sudan.

*Jan. 18:* The government of Prime Minister al-Azhari was defeated in parliament on a budget question by a vote of 46 to 44. The Prime Minister refused to resign but called for a vote of confidence in his government.

*Jan. 19:* The al-Azhari government won a 49-46 vote of confidence.

The Sudan was elected as the ninth member of the Arab League in a meeting of the League Council in Cairo.

*Jan. 30:* Prime Minister al-Azhari agreed to form a coalition cabinet after three members of his cabinet had resigned to demonstrate their opposition to his objections to a coalition.

**Jan. 31:** The Sudan formally applied for membership in the UN.

**Feb. 2:** The new national cabinet was sworn in. Its members were:

Isma'il al-Azhari—Prime Minister, Interior Minister

Mubarrak Zarruq—Minister of External Affairs, Minister of Justice

Hammad Tawfiq—Minister of communications

Ibrahim Ahmad—Minister of Finance

'Abdallah Khalil—Minister of Defense and Public Works

Ziyada Arbab—Minister of Social Affairs

Muhammad Nur al-Din—Minister of Local Governments

Mirghani Hamza—Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation

Benjamin Lwoki—Minister of Mineral Resources

Stanislaus Peysama—Minister of Mechanical Transport

Yusuf al-Ajab—Minister of State

Ali 'Abd al-Rahman—Minister of Education

Ibrahim al-Mufti—Minister of Commerce, Industry and Supply

Amin al-Sayyid—Minister of Health

Buth Dui—Minister of Animal Resources

Santino Deng Teng—Minister of Stores and Equipment

**Feb. 6:** The UN Security Council unanimously approved the admission of the Sudan as the 77th member of the UN.

**Feb. 7:** Four Indian experts engaged for services with the Post and Telegraph Administration arrived in Khartoum.

**Feb. 10:** The Sudan budget was ratified by Parliament.

**Feb. 19:** A violent clash occurred between farmers and police in Kosti. The farmers were demonstrating in support of their demands for higher crop prices. Police jailed 281 of the demonstrators, including women, overnight in a small windowless room; 192 persons died of suffocation during the night.

A delegation of lawyers headed by Sayyid Mohamed Ahmad Mahgub, leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives and President of the Bar Association, delivered a note to Prime Minister al-Azhari demanding his resignation and accusing him of negligence in the deaths of the 192 farm workers at Kosti.

**Feb. 27:** Sudanese government officials and school-teachers demonstrated in Khartoum in protest against the Kosti affair.

**Feb. 29:** The Kosti court sentenced Hasan al-Tahar Zarruq, deputy and a prominent member of the Anti-Imperialist Front party, 'Abd-al Rahman 'Abd-al-Rahim, Secretary of the party, and Muhammad al-Sayyid Salam, president of the Workers' Syndicates Union, to six months imprisonment

for taking part in a protest demonstration in Kosti.

## Syria

(See also Palestine Problem, Iraq)

1955

**Dec. 5:** The Chamber of Deputies, by a vote of 56 to 19, with 17 abstentions, approved the new royalty arrangements completed on November 27 with the Iraq Petroleum Company in connection with their pipeline across Syria.

**Dec. 13:** The military tribunal trying the accused persons in the death of Colonel al-Malki on April 22 announced that 8 persons were given death sentences, one given life imprisonment, and 17 given shorter prison terms.

**Dec. 17:** The accused defendants in the al-Malki assassination trial appealed the tribunal's decision of Dec. 13 to the higher courts.

1956

**Jan. 13:** Syria and Lebanon completed negotiations on a bilateral defense pact. As agreed to, the pact called for joint retaliations in the event of any outside attack on either of the signatories.

**Jan. 4:** The Syrian cabinet approved special regulations on military training in Syrian secondary schools.

**Jan. 7:** Retired Colonel Safa and other officers accused of preparing a military coup were found innocent by a Syrian military tribunal.

**Jan. 11:** Syria's prime minister handed a memoire to the Chargé d'Affaires of Jordan in the presence of the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian ambassadors proposing financial aid to Jordan in the name of Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

**Jan. 14:** A trade and payments agreement was signed between Syria and Rumania. The agreement was to run for one year and be renewable.

**Jan. 15:** Saudi Arabia gave Syria \$3,000,000 to complete the terms of a \$10,000,000 loan previously offered to Syria.

**Jan. 17:** A Turkish smuggler was killed in the Kubur al-Bid near the Turko-Syrian border by Syrian border guards.

**Jan. 29:** The Arab Liberation Rally, founded by ex-President Shishakly, ended a four-day conference and issued a statement calling for a united Arab nation of which Syria would form an integral part. Dr. Mamun al-Kuzbary, Syrian Minister of Education who is a member of the Rally, stated that the Rally was no longer connected with Shishakly.

**Feb. 6:** Laborers demonstrated in Aleppo against decree #243, made under the Shishakly government, which prevents members of labor syndicates from belonging to a political party or organization.

**Feb. 13:** The Chamber of Deputies abolished decree #243.

**Feb. 15:** President Quwwatly sent a special message to the Chamber of Deputies urging all parties to unite against external danger.

**Feb. 16:** Representatives of all Syrian parties and parliamentary blocs began meetings under the presidency of Speaker of the Chamber Dr. N. Kudsi.

**Feb. 19:** The Cairo newspaper Al-Ahram published a report, passed through Egyptian censorship, that Syria had joined Egypt in concluding an arms pact with Russia.

**Feb. 26:** A Syrian delegation headed by Dr. Rizqallah Intaky, Minister of Economy, left Damascus for Turkey to conclude a trade and payments agreement.

**Feb. 29:** Jordan officially informed Syria of her decision to suspend the work of the Joint Syrian-Jordanian Yarmouk Committee until further notice.

## Tunisia

(See also Libya)

1956

**Jan. 12:** Salah ben Youssef, the former secretary general of the Neo-Destour party, declared "open war" against his former party and its leader Habib Bourguiba.

**Jan. 28:** The government arrested some 40 associates of Salah ben Youssef, although ben Youssef himself escaped the police assigned to arrest him.

**Feb. 7:** The French Government announced its readiness to treat with Tunisia for its independence. Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia's political leader and president of the Neo-Destour party, stated that agreement was reached for Tunisia to have its own army and diplomatic representation.

**Feb. 12:** Terrorism reappeared in Tunisia following the flight of rebel leader Salah ben Youssef to Tripoli. Plastic explosives were used against the Neo-Destour offices in Tunis. Tahar Lassoued, outlaw chieftain, issued a manifesto announcing the creation of a "Tunisian National Liberation Army." The announcement also coincided with 10 bombings and attacks on French soldiers in Tunis. One soldier was seriously wounded.

**Feb. 28:** Tunisian Premier Tahar ben Ammar demanded at the start of negotiations with France for Tunisian independence that the protectorate treaty be scrapped.

Two French and 2 Tunisian soldiers were killed and one French soldier wounded when outlaws attacked 2 army trucks at Bou Chebka on the Algerian-Tunisian frontier.

## Turkey

(See also Cyprus, Jordan)

1955

**Dec. 9:** Prime Minister Adnan Menderes announced the composition of his new cabinet, as follows:

Adnan Menderes—Prime Minister, Defense  
Cemil Bengü—Minister of State  
Semi Ergün—Minister of State  
Emin Kalafat—Minister of State  
Celal Yardimci—Minister of State

Hüseyin Avni Göktürk—Justice  
Ethem Menderes—Interior  
Fuat Köprülü—Foreign Affairs  
Nedim Ökmen—Finance  
Ahmet Özer—Education  
Muammer Çavuşoğlu—Public Works  
Fahri Ulaş—Economy, Commerce  
Dr. Nafiz Korez—Health  
Hadi Hüsmen—Monopolies and Customs  
Esat Budakoğlu—Agriculture  
Arif Demirer—Communications  
Mümtaz Tarhan—Labor  
Samet Ağaoğlu—State Enterprises

**Dec. 14:** The new cabinet was approved by the National Assembly by a vote of 343 to 37.

**Dec. 22:** Twenty-nine former members of the Democrat Party in the National Assembly who had resigned or been expelled from membership during October because of disagreements with Prime Minister Menderes, formed a new political party, called the Hurriyet (Freedom) Party. Fevzi Lutfi Karaosmanoglu was selected as leader of the party and Ibrahim Öktem as secretary general.

**Dec. 29:** Two members of the National Assembly were expelled from the Democrat Party because of their disagreements with party policy.

1956

**Jan. 11:** The National Assembly voted to investigate 3 former cabinet members charged with importing worthless East German trucks and tires and a general neglect of duty. The officials charged were Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, former Deputy Foreign Minister, Sıtkı Yırcalı, former Minister of Economy and Defense, and Hasan Polatkan, former Minister of Finance.

**Jan. 30:** Former ministers Fatin Zorlu, Sıtkı Yırcalı, and Hasan Polatkan, now under investigation were among those elected by the Grand National Assembly to fill positions in the Budget and Foreign Affairs Commissions.

**Feb. 7:** An editorial in *Pravda* reported that Turkey's economic and political difficulties were due to her dependence on US aid, and appealed for better Soviet-Turkish relations.

## Yemen

1956

**Jan. 18:** Amir Muhammad al-Badr, Yemeni Crown Prince, presided over a meeting of the Arab League Council in Cairo. The meeting discussed Sudan's application for UN membership.

**Jan. 25:** King Ahmad of Yemen sent a special plane to transport 4 Soviet experts from Egypt to Yemen to hold economic talks with the Yemen Government.

**Jan. 28:** Yemen officially protested a concession granted by the British government for oil explorations on Kamaran Island in the Red Sea.

**Feb. 6:** A Soviet delegation arrived in Yemen today with a special message from Marshal Bulganin to Imam Ahmad.



## DOCUMENTS

### ETHIOPIA'S REVISED CONSTITUTION

#### *Introduction*

The revised Ethiopian Constitution promulgated by Emperor Haile Selassie on November 4, 1955, marks a further advance of the Ethiopian Government toward the center stage of the modern world. As pointed out in the Emperor's Speech From The Throne, the new Charter has been introduced in order to keep pace with the economic and social progress which the Empire has made since his accession 26 years ago. It is Haile Selassie's stated desire that the Constitution be adapted to these changes so that Ethiopia "may spring forward to yet further progress and development."

In order to comprehend the importance of this recent law, it is necessary to look back to the Constitution of 1931. The Emperor had just assumed the throne. At that time, there was no pressure for change, no mass demand for a national covenant between the Conquering Lion of Judah and his people. However, centralization of government authority, administrative reform, and the integration of the diverse ethnic and religious communities were the Emperor's goals. The 1931 Constitution, which was Ethiopia's first written constitution in its three thousand year history, had been introduced by Haile Selassie as a contract between himself and the Ethiopian people. The contract, in essence, was an attempt to define areas of mutual interest; further, it served notice that the Ethiopians' stake in their country's development would increase in the coming years.

Ethiopia's revised Constitution differs in several respects from its predecessor. It delegates greater prerogatives to the Ethiopian people through their representatives; further, it makes provision for constitutional

amendment, the impeachment of government officials, and the election of members of the Chamber of Deputies on the basis of direct, universal suffrage. It is twice as long as the 1931 Constitution. The revised Constitution also emphasizes that one of its main objectives is the gradual involvement of growing numbers of Ethiopians in the affairs of their government.

While final authority rests with the Monarchy, which may veto legislation passed by the Parliament, the latter can claim several important prerogatives. Among these are the right to: (1) approve yearly budgets submitted by the various Ministries; (2) initiate legislative proposals and constitutional amendments; (3) adopt various international agreements concluded by the government; (4) receive the reports and accounts of the Auditor General concerning the fiscal expenditures of the several Ministries; and (5) initiate impeachment proceedings against the Ministers.

Ethiopia is not yet a constitutional monarchy in the Western sense of the term, however. The sovereignty of the Empire continues to be vested in the Emperor, rather than the Ethiopian people. The authority and responsibilities of the Monarchy continue to be both extensive and overriding. In addition to the right to appoint the members of the Senate, the Emperor appoints and directs the heads of the several Ministries, initiates legislative proposals in his own right, selects the members of the Ethiopian courts and the heads of Municipal governments, and reserves the right to determine the size, organization, and responsibilities of the armed forces. He also exercises certain administrative controls over Ethiopia's Christian Orthodox Church.

The revised Constitution appears to be

most explicit in two particulars—the order of succession to the throne and the civil liberties which are to be accorded the Ethiopian people. Accession to the throne, henceforth, will be predicated upon the law of primogeniture, and will be applicable only to the male line of the ruling family. By this device the Emperor hopes to eliminate the possibility of a contest for imperial authority upon his demise. Such contests were a frequent occurrence in the past.

The civil rights section of the Constitution appears to bestow broad liberties upon the individual Ethiopian. There are, however, two restrictions. First, many of the guarantees are qualified by the stipulation that they are to be exercised "in accordance with the law." Second, Article 47, pertaining to the right to form associations, relates only to organizations based on "occupations." Thus no provision is made for the formation of politically-inspired associations.

The 1955 Constitution contains several unusual provisions which warrant comment. For example, the Charter is a curious blending of old and new. Article 2, which denotes the ancestry of the "Imperial Family", tends to perpetuate what in the past has been considered a vital qualification for accession to the throne—professed descent from the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon.

Equally significant is the declaration in Article 126 that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church will continue to be supported by the State. The designation of the Orthodox confession as the Empire's established Church may appear anomalous in a country where Christianity vies with Islam and animist beliefs for a majority of adherents. Over the centuries, however, the Orthodox clergy and Ethiopia's rulers have often felt constrained to enter into alliance, as much for the purpose of saving the Empire as the salvation of Christian souls. The revised Constitution quite evidently seeks to perpetuate an alliance which has proven invaluable in the past.

Although no reference is made to Eritrea in the 1955 Charter, the document leaves no doubt that its provisions are applicable to that territory as well. However, Eritrea,

which was federated with Ethiopia in September, 1952, as an autonomous unit, has its own constitution. The Eritrean law, which was prepared under the auspices of the UN, was sanctioned by Emperor Haile Selassie before its promulgation. While the two Constitutions do not appear to conflict in their general provisions, some disagreement could arise concerning the proper interpretation of Article 130 of the Ethiopian law. The latter provides that "the natural resources of, and in the sub-soil of the Empire, including those beneath its waters, are State Domain." However, Eritrea's Charter also stipulates that the Eritrean Government has control of the exploitation of natural resources found within Eritrea's borders. Taken together, the two provisions could lead to some confusion and misunderstanding. Constitutions, however, are simply the products of human intellect as well as human experience. With proper good will and mutual understanding, disagreements of this nature can be readily resolved.

*Condensed Version of the Revised Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia. Promulgated by the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Haile Sellassie I, Elect of God, Emperor of Ethiopia—November 4, 1955.*

## Chapter I

### *The Succession to the Throne*

The Ethiopian Empire, which comprises all the territories and territorial waters under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown, is indivisible (Art. 1).

The Imperial dignity shall remain perpetually attached to the line of Haile Selassie I which descends without interruption from the dynasty of Menelik I, son of the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon of Jerusalem (Art. 2). The order of succession shall be lineal, and only male, born in lawful wedlock, may succeed male; the nearest line shall pass before the more remote, and the elder in the line before the younger (Art. 5).

Regency shall exist in the event that the Emperor is unable to exercise the Imperial Office, whether by reason of minority, absence from the Empire, or by reason of serious illness as determined by the Crown

Council (Art. 8). In the event that the Emperor or his legal successor has not attained eighteen years of age a Regency Council shall be constituted (Art. 9). The Council of Regency shall consist, *inter alia*, of the Empress Mother, the Archbishop, the Prime Minister, and the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (Art. 10). However, Regency shall be exercised by the Crown Prince or the Heir Presumptive, if he has attained maturity, in case of the serious illness or the absence of the Emperor from the Empire (Art. 11).

In the event that the Emperor has provided no male issue, or no male descendant capable of meeting the requirements for succession to the Throne, He shall publicly designate an Heir Presumptive from amongst His nearest male relatives, who is a direct descendant of Sahle Selassie and capable of meeting the requirements for succession to the Throne (Art. 13). Any member of the Imperial Family who, being eligible for the succession, either marries a foreigner or marries without proper consent shall forfeit all Imperial prerogatives for himself and his descendants (Art. 15). The Imperial Family shall include all direct lineal ascendants and descendants of the Emperor, together with their spouses, with the exception of those who fail to comply with the provisions of Article 15 or who are not of the Ethiopian Orthodox Faith (Art. 16).

## Chapter II

### *The Powers and Prerogatives of the Emperor*

The Sovereignty of the Empire is vested in the Emperor and the supreme authority over all the affairs of the Empire is exercised by Him as the Head of State (Art. 26). The Emperor determines the organization, powers and duties of all Ministries, executive departments and the administrations of the Government and appoints, promotes, transfers, suspends and dismisses their officials (Art. 27). The Emperor appoints Mayors of the municipalities from three candidates presented, in each case, by the Municipal Councils (Art. 28).

The Emperor reserves the right, with the advice and consent of Parliament, to declare war. Further, He reserves the right to determine what armed forces shall be maintained in peace and in war. He is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. As such, He has the right to declare a state of siege, martial law, or a national emergency, and to take such measures as He may deem necessary to assure the defense and integrity of the Empire (Art. 29).

The Emperor exercises the supreme direction of the foreign relations of the Empire. While the Emperor, alone, has the right to ratify international agreements, said agreements shall be submitted for approval to both Houses of the Parliament if they involve modification of the Empire's territory, or of sovereignty or jurisdiction over any part of such territory; laying a burden on Ethiopian subjects personally; modifying legislation in existence; or requiring expenditure of state funds or involving loans or monopolies (Art. 30).

The Emperor has the right to coin, print and issue money (Art. 32).

The Emperor has the right to convene the annual sessions of the deliberative Chambers and to convoke extraordinary sessions thereof. He may also postpone the opening of and suspend, for not more than thirty days, and extend any session of Parliament. Further, He may dissolve the Parliament so long as He makes provision for the reconstitution of a new Body and for its convocation within four months of the date of dissolution (Art. 33). The Emperor has the right to initiate legislation and to proclaim all laws after the same shall have been approved by Parliament in accordance with Articles 86, 88, 91 and 92 (Art. 34).

The Emperor has the right and the duty to maintain justice through the courts (Art. 35).

## Chapter III

### *Rights and Duties of the People*

No one shall be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 37). Nor shall there be discrimination in the enjoyment of civil rights (Art. 38).

Ethiopian subjects shall enjoy freedom of religion (Art. 40), of speech and the press (Art. 41), and of correspondence (Art. 42). No one within the Empire may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law (Art. 43). Ethiopian subjects shall have the right to peaceful assembly (Art. 45), to travel freely within the Empire (Art. 46), and to form associations based upon "occupations" (Art. 47).

The Ethiopian family is under the special protection of the law (Art. 48). No Ethiopian subject may be banished from the Empire (Art. 49) or extradited to a foreign country (Art. 50).

No one may be arrested without a court warrant, except in cases of flagrant or serious violation of the law. Judicial arraignment must take place within 48 hours of arrest, unless said arrest is made in isolated locales (Art. 51). The accused shall have the right to a speedy trial, to the confrontation of prosecution witnesses, to obtain witnesses in his own defense, and to the assistance of counsel (Art. 52). The accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty (Art. 53). No one shall be punished twice for the same offense (Art. 56); nor shall the punishment be cruel and inhuman (Art. 57). All persons and all private domiciles shall be exempt from unlawful searches and seizures (Art. 61).

#### Chapter IV

##### *The Ministers of the Empire*

Each Minister shall be individually responsible to the Emperor and to the State for the discharge of his duties (Art. 68). The Ministers shall form collectively the Council of Ministers for purposes of offering advice and recommendations to the Emperor (Art. 69). When He deems appropriate, the Emperor may convene the Crown Council which shall consist of the Archbishop, the President of the Senate, and such Princes, Ministers, and Dignitaries as may be designated by Him (Art. 70). With the approval of the Emperor, proposals for legislation formulated by the Council of Ministers shall be communicated to the

Parliament (Art. 72). The Ministers shall have the right to attend meetings of the Parliament and to speak at such meetings on any question concerning the conduct of their Ministries or relating to proposed legislation (Art. 73). The Ministers, including the Prime Minister, may be tried only before the Supreme Imperial Court upon offenses committed in connection with their functions. Prosecution may be initiated either by the Emperor or by a majority vote of both Houses of Parliament (Art. 75).

#### Chapter V

##### *The Legislative Chambers*

##### Section I—Provisions Applicable to Both Chambers

The Parliament shall be composed of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate (Art. 76). The first election to the Chamber of Deputies shall be completed within two years of the entry into force of the present Constitution (Art. 77).

No meeting of either Chamber of Parliament shall be closed to the public except upon request of the Prime Minister or by a majority vote of either Chamber (Art. 78). Neither Chamber may open its initial session without the presence of two-thirds of its members, and each succeeding session thereafter without a quorum of one-half of its membership (Art. 79). Each Chamber may compel the attendance of a sufficient number of the absent members to assure its convocation (Art. 80). Each Chamber shall determine its own rules of procedure and internal discipline (Art. 82). No Member of Parliament may be charged for a statement made in Parliament (Art. 84), or arrested during a session thereof (Art. 85).

Laws may be proposed to either or both Chambers of Parliament by the Emperor or by ten or more members of either Chamber (Art. 86). All matters before the Parliament shall be determined by majority vote of the members present, except where special provision is made. In case of a tie, the presiding officer shall have a casting vote (Art. 87). The Emperor may return legislative pro-



posals to the Parliament with His observations thereon or with a new proposal of legislation (Art. 88). If a legislative proposal passed by one Chamber is not acted upon by the other within two months, the two Bodies shall meet together to discuss the said proposal. If approved, with or without amendment, within 30 days, the proposal shall be communicated to the Emperor for action (Art. 89). Should a legislative proposal be rejected or unduly delayed in one Chamber after receiving approval by the other, full reports shall be promptly communicated to the Emperor who may offer His observations or His own legislative proposal (Art. 91).

#### Section II—The Chamber of Deputies

The entire territory of the Empire shall be divided into electoral districts containing two hundred thousand inhabitants. Each town with a population exceeding 30,000 inhabitants shall be entitled to one Deputy, and an additional Deputy for each 50,000 inhabitants in excess thereof (Art. 93). Each electoral district shall be represented by two Deputies (Art. 94). All Ethiopian subjects by birth who are twenty-one years of age or more and who can meet the qualifications of the electoral law shall have the right to vote. The system of voting shall be direct and secret (Art. 95).

To be eligible as a Deputy, a candidate must be an Ethiopian subject by birth, who is twenty-five years of age, a *bona fide* resident and an owner of property in his electoral district (Art. 96). Deputies shall be elected for terms of four years and shall be eligible for re-election (Art. 97). The President and two Vice Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies shall be elected each year from and by the members of the Chamber (Art. 99). The Chamber shall be sole judge of the qualifications and election of its members (Art. 100).

#### Section III—The Senate

The Senate shall consist of Senators appointed by the Emperor for six years (Art. 101). The membership of the Senate shall not exceed one-half that of the Chamber of

Deputies (Art. 102). A member of the Senate must have reached thirty-five years of age to be eligible for appointment (Art. 103). Senators shall be eligible for re-appointment if they meet all of the requirements set down in the Constitution (Art. 105).

### Chapter VI

#### *The Judicial Power*

The juridical power shall be vested in the courts and shall be exercised in the name of the Emperor (Art. 108). There shall be a Supreme Imperial Court and such other courts as may be authorized by law (Art. 109). The judges shall be independent in conducting trials and in rendering judgments (Art. 110). The judges shall be appointed by the Emperor (Art. 111). The judges shall sit in public, except in cases which might endanger public order or affect public morals (Art. 112).

### Chapter VII

#### *Finance*

The fiscal year shall be fixed by special law. Each year, the Council of Ministers shall, with the Emperor's approval, present to Parliament a draft law for the approval of the following year's budget (Art. 115). Both Chambers shall examine and vote upon each item contained in the budget (Art. 116). Should the Parliament fail to approve the draft law, the budget of the previous year shall continue in force until a new budget law has been proclaimed (Art. 117). Within four months after the end of every fiscal year, the Council of Ministers shall present a detailed accounting of receipts and expenditures to the Auditor General through the Parliament (Art. 120). The Auditor General shall be appointed by the Emperor and shall make periodic reports to the Emperor and the Parliament (Art. 121).

### Chapter VIII

#### *General Provisions*

The present revised Constitution, together with those international treaties, con-

ventions and obligations to which Ethiopia shall be party, shall be the supreme law of the Empire (Art. 122).

The city of Addis Ababa is the Capital of the Empire (Art. 123). The official language of the Empire is Amharic (Art. 125). The Ethiopian Orthodox Church is the Established Church of the Empire and, as such, is supported by the State. The Emperor shall always profess the Ethiopian Orthodox Faith (Art. 126). The Emperor has the right to promulgate the decrees, edicts and public regulations of the church, except those

concerning monastic life and other spiritual administrations (Art. 127).

The Constitution may be amended by an identical Joint Resolution adopted by three-fourths of the members of each Chamber of Parliament in two separate sessions, and proclaimed with the approval and authority of the Emperor (Art. 131).

◆ The introduction to and condensation of this approved version of Ethiopia's Revised Constitution are the work of William H. Lewis, a research specialist on Africa.

## BOOK REVIEWS

### GENERAL

THE MIDDLE EAST, OIL AND THE GREAT POWERS, by Benjamin Shwadran. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. 500 pages. \$7.00.

*Reviewed by George Lenczowski*

Benjamin Shwadran, a native of Jerusalem and currently editor of *Middle Eastern Affairs*, has here produced a volume which treats of oil in the Middle East on a regional basis. Much of the material contained in the book has already been made available to readers in Mikesell and Chenery's *Arabian Oil*, and especially in S. H. Longrigg's *Oil in the Middle East, its Discovery and Development* (1954), which was the first comprehensive regional study of the subject. But there is considerable difference in emphasis between this book and Shwadran's. While Longrigg stresses the technical, economic, and to a lesser extent political risks and difficulties that the oil companies had to overcome in order to build their enterprises and to assure the flow of oil to the Western world, Shwadran tends to play down these risks and accents instead the companies' profits and native governments' revenues from oil operations.

The book presents in five major sections the historical development of oil concessions in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean. The section on Iran accounts for almost one-half the volume and contains a rather detailed story of the origins and development of the original D'Arcy concession as well as the subsequent vicissitudes of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in its relations with the Iran Government. The section on Iraq recapitulates the history of early negotiations and struggles among the British, American, and French elements of the Iraq Petroleum Company. In the section on Saudi Arabia the author has drawn heavily upon such

documents as the U. S. Senate report of hearings on petroleum arrangements with Saudi Arabia and the staff report to the Federal Trade Commission on the international petroleum cartel. Throughout the book the author endeavors to portray two seemingly irreconcilable tendencies: the intense rivalry between the British and American corporations to control the oil of the region, and their alleged tendency at the same time to work together on a non-competitive basis to the exclusion of other interests.

In the concluding part, Shwadran reviews some general aspects of the development of oil resources in the Middle East. Stressing the profit motive in the companies' operations, he nevertheless criticizes them for having done very little to develop the region, while at the same time castigating the local governments for their waste of the newly-acquired wealth. Israel is contrasted with the rest of the Middle East both as a democracy and as a country of greater social achievements. The Palestinian controversy is minimized as a source of serious difficulties between the United States and the Arab world.

Although the volume is amply documented, the emphasis on certain kinds of documents reveals the author's conscious (or unconscious) preferences. Little charity is shown to the pioneering achievement of Western oilmen in this arid zone, and considerable emphasis is placed on the lack of democracy and social responsibility among the Arabs and Iranians. However, the book contains a great deal of information not easily obtainable elsewhere, and which, commendably, places the oil industry in the broader background of social and political developments in the Middle East.

◆ GEORGE LENCZOWSKI, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, is the author of *The Middle East in World Affairs*.

WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM, by Majid Khadduri. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955. 360 pages. \$5.50.

*Reviewed by Sir Hamilton Gibb*

It is a pleasure to welcome a new edition of Professor Khadduri's study, originally published in London as *The Law of War and Peace in Islam* in 1941. This is, however, much more than a new edition, having been so enlarged as to constitute practically a new work. Little purpose would be served by a detailed comparison of the two books. If occasionally the new work is less specific than the old—for example, "the early caliphs" replaces the more accurate "Abu Bakr" of the original (p. 95), and the restrictions of Hanafi law in regard to the treatment of prisoners have been omitted, in the present work—more often, of course, the new work gives the fuller detail.

The strictly legal expositions follow fairly closely the first edition in their main lines, and the enlargement is due principally to an expansion of the chapters in the original on the bases of Islamic law, the inclusion of new chapters on maritime warfare, Muslims in non-Muslim territory, commercial relations, and neutrality, and an "epilogue" on the gradual extension of the modern Law of Nations into the Muslim World and Muslim ideas. These additions have required the introduction of a good deal of historical detail, and as all students of Islamic history know, it is not always safe to take the traditional historical narratives at face value, nor easy to avoid slips. Thus it is not too surprising to find Ahmad Grafi's campaigns in Ethiopia ascribed to the Ottoman Empire (p. 257), and to read that Muslim traders "adopted from China the practice of issuing paper money and passed it on to other nations." (p. 230). Indeed, such loose and summary paragraphs as those devoted to Muslim seapower in the Mediterranean and to foreign commerce add little to the value of the book.

A more fundamental question is raised by the frequent citation as evidence of traditional narratives and documents profess-

ing to relate to the early years of Islam. It seems to me that Professor Khadduri is entirely justified in using them when they have been accepted by the Muslim jurists as bases of evidence for legal doctrine—even when, as in the case of the "Covenant of 'Umar", he rejects its original attribution. But where he goes beyond this to use them as bases for his own expositions, the method is open to criticism. The traditional story of the arbitration between 'Ali and Mu'awiya occupies more than half the short chapter on Arbitration; but this story, by obscuring the essential facts that the arbitration was on a genuinely legal issue and reached, on that issue, an agreed conclusion, has misled him in regard to its true nature, as it misled all later Muslim writers.

This caveat having been entered, however, it only remains to be said that as an exposition of classical Islamic doctrine on the *jihād* and peaceful relations with the outer world, the new edition is to be confidently recommended as a thorough and reliable guide.

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MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC PAPERS, by the Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut. Beirut: Dar el-Kitab, 1955. 136 pages. \$2.00.

*Reviewed by Francis Boardman*

This second annual publication is one of several types of studies issued by AUB's Economic Research Institute, founded in 1953. The papers have a welcome objective, namely: "To promote regional contacts among specialists . . . to stimulate thinking, writing, and discussion among the students of Middle Eastern economic affairs residing in the area, and . . . to convey their knowledge and experience to students of the region elsewhere in the world." Their common denominator is economic development in the Middle East.

The volume contains five country and three regional studies. Two of the country articles deal with Iran—Albert J. Meyer's



"The Iran Consortium, Solution or Stop-gap?" and H. Motamen's "Iran's Experience with Import Quotas." The latter covers twenty years of Iranian experience with quotas. "Financing Economic Development in Egypt" by Hussein Khallaf, was written before the US-UK-IBRD offer of assistance on the High Aswan Dam project, and adds appreciably to an understanding of the project and the problems it may raise in such fields as taxation, gold cover, and foreign exchange. In "Industrial Development of Lebanon", by Edmond Y. Asfour, an UNRWA economist, Lebanon is advised to emphasize alleviation of her heavy population pressure, no longer eased by famine, disease, and large-scale emigration. D. A. Shepherd, Deputy Financial Secretary for Cyprus, discusses "The Rise of Cooperative Credit in Cyprus". As in the case of the other "single country" papers, this article sets forth helpful lessons for other Middle Eastern countries.

The three regional articles are "The Economy of the Arab World", by Albert Y. Badre, "Whither Land Tenure in the Arab World?" by Paul J. Khlaf, and "Statistical Services in the Middle East," by R. S. Porter. Professor Badre, Director of the Economic Research Institute, covers his subject succinctly and with a sense of time and balance which give the reader confidence. He stresses the need for improved technology as a means of improving area productivity. His brief summary of current development projects reflects the "keen desire for rapid economic growth" which has broken out in recent years and which he attributes primarily to two elements common to all Arab countries—a desire for freedom from foreign political and military domination, and a fear of Zionism. The summary mentions Lebanon's Litani River project and Egypt's High Aswan Dam, but not the Unified Jordan River Valley Plan. The section on "Future Outlook" includes a plea for regional cooperation by saying that Arab countries with surplus capital lack manpower or development opportunities, whereas those with manpower and opportunities are short of capital.

Khlaf's paper is largely historical, tracing developments under Islam which have led to large ownership, absenteeism, disinterestedness, share tenancy, low yields, fragmentation, and other restrictions including uneconomic inheritance laws. He thinks of the 1951 Iraqi and 1952 Egyptian land reform laws primarily as attempts to remedy land tenure conditions by fiat, but in general welcomes the various indigenous attempts which are being made to improve the conditions he has described.

Porter, a member of the British Middle East Office in Beirut, writes the most precise of the three regional articles. His remarks on the need for raising the status of central statistical departments are of much interest, as are those on training and the operations of the International Statistical Education Center in Beirut.

The volume impressed this reviewer as being very worthwhile both in its total impression and for the contribution which, without exception, it makes on each individual subject.

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OLIVE TREES IN STORM, by Morris S. Lazaron. New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1955. 111 pages. \$2.75.

*Reviewed by Abraham Cronbach*

This book reports the author's visit to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel in the year 1954. The journey was undertaken together with a Protestant clergyman and a Catholic layman, under the auspices of the American Friends of the Middle East and amid well-planned arrangements for interviews and observations.

In Egypt the author conversed with former President Nagib, and in Iraq with the King, Faysal, over whose bowed head Lazaron, an ordained rabbi, pronounced the Aaronic benediction. With the other two Americans, the author attended a session of the Israeli Knesset; it happened to be the day on which the subject under discussion was the incident at Kibya. In Lebanon the author spent some time at a camp of Arab

refugees. Of the hardships to which the refugees are condemned, he gives a harrowing description. The author's companions visited Jordan, but the author himself, though anti-Zionist, was for reasons of personal safety barred from that country.

The Arabs who had fled Israel during the Israeli-Arab war furnish the ever recurring topic. Our author deems the predicament of these refugees the heart of the Israeli-Arab problem. He urges that the immediate readmission of 100,000 of the 800,000 refugees would be both conciliatory and practical. The counter-arguments cited by our author are that, as long as the refugees are encouraged to hope for eventual return to their former homes, they will not leave their dismal camps; that refugees could fill the places vacated in the Arab countries by the 350,000 Jewish émigrés; that, if readmitted, the refugees would make the Arab population of Israel 45% of the total and would constitute a dangerous fifth column; and that the property formerly occupied by the refugees was needed to accommodate large numbers of immigrants.

Nor was the plight of the refugees the only Arab grievance. Within Israel itself the Arab population suffered grave disabilities. Our author charges that Israel is creating an Arab ghetto similar to the medieval Jewish ghetto. There may, in 1954, have been 8 Arab members of the Knesset, but these did not effectively represent Arab interests. Five of them, though elected by Arab Israeli voters, were nominees of the party leaders, and these party leaders were Israelis. To leave their towns or villages, Arabs had to comply with burdensome regulations and restrictions, even when the distance traveled was a short one and the urgency, such as illness in the family, a great one. Identity cards had to show the picture of the bearer. In the case of the women among the Druzes, this conflicted with their religious tenets.

Then there was the dread of Israeli expansion, to be promoted, as the Arabs expected, by the aid of Jews all over the world. When an Israeli statesman asserted that "Israel is the only nation the vast ma-

jority of whose people live outside its border," Arab apprehension hardly was allayed. In Egypt the belief existed—an unfounded belief as our author afterwards discovered—that over the portals of the Israeli Knesset building is inscribed Genesis 15.18, "Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates." The president of Damascus University accused the Israelis not so much of military aggression as of economic and cultural aggression. This comported with a view widely prevalent among the Arabs that Israel is an alien element in a culture which has been Arab and Muslim for centuries.

Our author found extremists in both camps and moderates in both camps. An Egyptian leader asserted that "the only solution of the problem of Israel is the dissolution of Israel's fictitious state," while the Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had declared that "not an acre of land won in the war will be returned." And, according to a Beirut journalist, there was among the Israeli people scant opposition to their government's intransigence. But our author met Arabs who did not want Israel destroyed, and he found Israelis who favored concessions. It was an Israeli who told Lazon that among the causes of Israel's economic lag was the flight of the Arabs who had been the country's chief agricultural producers.

Near the end of the book the author sets forth what he regards as a feasible program of Israeli-Arab *rapprochement*. These proposals are in line with views held by Israeli moderates. In these moderates Lazon sees Israel's only hope.

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## ARAB WORLD

THE OASIS OF AL-HASA, by F. S. Vidal. New York: The Arabian American Oil Company, 1955. 210 pages. No charge.

Reviewed by Dr. W. H. Storm

I have spent much time in Hasa and have therefore read the *Oasis of al-Hasa* with

keen interest. The book's title, though, is too ambitious considering its contents; the only factors really stressed are geography and economy. The sociological aspects of the oasis, a huge subject in itself, are not even mentioned. It is a textbook and will be read chiefly by those interested in geography. It is on the whole very accurate and will be invaluable to those living in Hasa or interested in the oasis.

The entire work is meticulous in detail, and the geographical descriptions are accurate. Also the descriptions of the houses, gardens, villages, and springs are exact and full of small details apt to escape the ordinary eye. For one who wishes to know in exact detail the topography of the oasis the book is excellent.

The chapter on economy gives in minute detail a vivid portrayal of the Arab method of cultivation of the land, the methods of irrigation, and the relation between landlord and tenant. In this chapter, however, there is too little mention made of the effect of Aramco on the economic life of the Arabs of Hasa. Many of the reasons for the modern failure in the economic life of Hasa are due to the coming of the oil company. That is not to say that Aramco has not been of great benefit to the people. But the abandonment of the gardens and the decline in the production of dates, once the basis of the Hasa economic life, are due not so much to the failure of water in Hasa as to the lack of manpower for cultivation. Owners of date gardens throughout the oasis complain that all their gardeners go to work with the oil company because they get as much as three times more money for their day's labor; hence the gardens and upkeep of the wells and springs are more and more being neglected. It is also a fact that the higher wages from Aramco have so raised the standard of living that fewer and fewer men are living in the stratum of society to which gardeners belong.

I should take issue with the author in his explanation of the terms "cold" and "hot" as used by bedouins in reference to food. According to my experience, the bedouin follows the ancient theory which

Hippocrates described some hundred years before Aristotle that there are four primary and opposite qualities: hot and cold and wet and dry. Speaking to a doctor, the bedouin often asks if the treatment is hot or cold or wet or dry. It is his belief that the care of certain diseases requires certain combinations of these qualities and that some combinations cannot be mixed. Thus in the Arab mind the expression hot and cold means more than merely good and bad. This same idea is carried over into food.

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THE ARABS, by Edward Atiyah. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955. 242 pages. \$.65.

*Reviewed by Herbert L. Bodman, Jr.*

One would expect that Edward Atiyah, organizer of the former Arab Office in London, would write a partisan account of the Arabs when he turned from autobiography and novels to history. *The Arabs*, a survey of "the origins, present conditions, and prospects of the Arab World", fulfills that expectation. The partisanship of the book typifies the opinions of a sophisticated Arab Christian; the larger body of Arab Muslim intelligentsia will not be happy with Atiyah's persistent minimization of the force of Islam in Arab history. Atiyah subscribes to a theory that the Arab conquests were "essentially an expansion of the Arab nation and not of Islam", and that "Muhammad did not so much create a new movement as stimulate and redirect the latent forces of an Arab national revival and expansion already present when he appeared." The term "nation" is questionable when applied to an essentially tribal society, and does not account for the force of prophetic revelation in shaping Arab history.

The Muslim modernist movement, in addition, is dismissed by the author in one reference to Muhammad Abdu and Qasim Amin, while the influence of Rashid Rida and Sayyid Amir Ali, for instance, is ignored. The inference may even be drawn that Islam has actually been of little importance to the Arab world.

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*The Arabs* covers considerable territory both in space and time, from Iraq and Yemen to Morocco and from the rise of Islam to the future. The author's style is highly readable and his discussion of principal events and conditions sufficiently introduce the reader to this highly complex subject. The emphasis is placed on modern times and on the conflict between the Arabs and the West. Atiyah's inclusion of the history of the Arabs in the early days of Islam, in fact, contributes little more than to maintain the controversial thesis that the culture developed was Arab, not Islamic.

More material on social problems might have been helpful in Atiyah's discussion of modern Arab history. The critical tension between modern desires and traditional values present in the Arab world, for example, appears only by inference. Atiyah's assertion that the conflict between secularism and Islam "need not lead to a deeper rift in the Arab soul than it has caused in the soul of the Western world", while valid, does not consider the moral consequences of the acceleration of secularism in the Middle East.

The author's concluding statements that "the time when the West stood for imperialism in Arab eyes is passing away; in the eastern Arab world it has passed away almost entirely", do not seem in agreement with the present Arab use of the slogan "Western imperialism," which still buttresses Arab nationalism. He does point out, however, that in order to achieve union, which he believes will come about, the Arabs will have to learn "a kind of discipline which the Arab character has never shown itself capable of for any length of time." This statement of historical disunity seems to outweigh all the unifying factors mentioned in the book.

*THE CRESCENT IN CRISIS*, by N. A. Faris and M. T. Husayn. Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1955. 191 pages. \$4.00.

*Reviewed by Myles L. Greene*

The unity of the Arab world in one nation-state has been a dream long held by many of the intellectual leaders of the Middle East. This concept of Arab unity has been thoroughly dissected by Western writers, the consensus being that the foundation for such unity is none too firm. But the idea has persisted in the Middle East, often with nothing more than hope as its basis. It is encouraging, then, to find a book by two Arabs, both of whom are associated with the American University of Beirut, which examines this concept of Arab unity.

*The Crescent in Crisis* (a completely irrelevant title) covers what the authors classify as the unifying and divisive factors in the modern Arab world. The unifying ones, each of which is discussed briefly, are those which are traditionally listed: a common language, history, religion, and "mentality", as well as the more recent advent of modern communication and transportation. The divisive factors are dynastic rivalries, foreign powers, religious minorities, national minorities, and the diversity of political aims and political and economic development.

Although these points are not particularly original, many of them are presented quite well, especially the sections on dynastic rivalries and the national and religious minorities. The authors do not shy away from pointing out the strength of many of the divisive factors; nor do they fall into another often encountered Arab trap, the problem of Israel. Much space could have been wasted on the need to obliterate Israel before the Arabs could unite, but this point is made only once near the end of the book, and throughout the remainder Israel is mentioned only briefly, and then in rather realistic terms.

It is in the chapter on foreign powers as a divisive force that the authors lose their temperate approach to the book's subject. In fact, their interpretation of the diaboli-

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cal influence of the West among the Arabs seeps over into all of the chapters, thus weakening many of the strong points found there. No one could deny that the West in the post-World War I years failed to consider seriously the possibility of a united Arab world. Nor could it be denied that the old colonial powers in the Middle East were delinquent in furthering Arab education and preparation for self-government. But the leap from these facts to some of the authors' more extreme statements is an impossible one. They say that the West, along with collaborating native rulers, perpetuated the ignorance, disease, and poverty of the Arabs. No mention is given of the many noteworthy Western improvements in these fields nor of the problems encountered by the Western governors. In Iraq, it is said that the British in the Twenties furthered the religious divisions of the country, when actually it was the British who insisted that the Sunni leaders give up their traditional monopoly of government power. Again, the British are blamed for having "created" some 38 independent sultanates and shaykhdoms in southern and eastern Arabia. Considering the long centuries of Arab history, to which the authors so proudly point, it is both illogical and tiresome to find all of the ills of Arab society rooted in the few decades of Western political power in the area.

The most interesting point in the book is never really stated. This is that Faris and Husayn, despite their own evidence that the divisive factors outweigh the unifying ones, still deeply believe in both the need and possibility of Arab unity. They criticize the governing classes in all of the Arab countries for their failure to further unification, saying that only these few willful men stand between the masses and their strongly desired unity. How the authors know about the desires of this inarticulate majority of citizens could only be explained as an article of faith. The evidence of this book seems to prove that only the growth of this same faith among many Arabs could ever overcome their disunity.

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## ETHIOPIA

THE LION OF JUDAH HATH PREVAILED: Being a Biography of H.I.M. Haile Selassie I, by Christine Sandford. New York: Macmillan, 1955. 192 pp. \$3.75.

Reviewed by William M. Steen

The year 1955 marked the 25th anniversary of the crowning of the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah—Haile Selassie I—as King of Kings of Ethiopia. Christine Sandford's biography was written to commemorate the Emperor's Silver Jubilee; she dedicates it to him "with respect and admiration." The author, who resided in Ethiopia from 1920 to 1935, and from 1942 to the present, is the wife of a retired British officer, Brigadier D. A. Sandford, formerly a consultant to the Ethiopian Government.

In her latest book Mrs. Sandford has written a very sympathetic biography of the Emperor and his accomplishments. She has repeated considerable material from her previous book, *Ethiopia Under Haile Selassie*, (1946), and brought up to date the progressive changes that have taken place in Ethiopia since that time. She contends that these changes coincide with the career and achievements of Haile Selassie, because they are "the fruits of his vision and perseverance."

Mrs. Sandford admits that "little has been said in these pages about the private life of His Majesty the Emperor." For example, she makes no comment about the Emperor's relations with his children and how he has molded their lives after his. Perhaps too much credit is given to the influence of his father on Haile Selassie, and too little to the fact that he learned to read and write French before he was ten.

Probably the most important parts of the book are the four chapters devoted to the progress made during the period 1944-54. When Ethiopia was liberated from Italian occupation in 1941, a formidable task confronted the Emperor. Much of the coun-

try was ravaged by six years of war. Bands of uprooted people roamed the countryside; communications had been destroyed; buildings and bridges were shattered everywhere; and administration did not exist. In many provinces there was a shortage of the bare necessities of life.

Since Ethiopia had no UNRRA or similar organization to aid in post-war reorganization, the pressing need for relief of some kind was an important factor in the signing by the Emperor of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942. This agreement was, as Mrs. Sandford notes, "a working arrangement, providing for the collaboration of the allies for mutual assistance, during the period which must elapse before world peace could be restored." Her book seeks to show how the Emperor accomplished the amazing feat of reconstruction and rehabilitation in his country.

Perhaps not enough credit is given to the United States for its part in the reconstruction of Ethiopia. For example, Mrs. Sandford fails to mention the United States Technical Project to Ethiopia, sponsored by the Foreign Economic Administration, which operated in Ethiopia from May 1944 to April 1945. Some members of the project staff, a group of competent American engineers, furnished the Ethiopian Government with direct technical advice. At the same time, others worked at the major task: a general survey which would furnish the basis of long-range plans for Ethiopian economic reconstruction and development. This initial survey by the Americans served as a starting point for the Emperor's program of rehabilitation.

It is recognized that source material is difficult to obtain in Ethiopia. However, after 30 years in the country, Mrs. Sandford still does not read Amharic, the Ethiopian language. Some gaps in her book might have been filled from original Amharic sources. It would also have been valuable to interview the Emperor directly as to his early life and dominant influences.

However, the book, which has the official approval of the Ethiopian Government, is well-written and accurate.

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## ISRAEL

SOUND THE GREAT TRUMPET, edited by M. Z. Frank. New York: Whittier Books, 1955. 399 pages; bibliographical notes to 415. \$5.00.

*Reviewed by Edwin Samuel*

This is a collection of English translations of 42 Hebrew short stories, legends, condensed novels, and biographical studies by different people connected with Palestine and Israel over the past 70 years. They are linked together with short commentaries by Mr. Frank, a professional journalist who has worked for a time in Israel. The dramatic title that he has chosen is somewhat misleading as the book does not trumpet forth Israel's virtues. The title is, in fact, taken from the Book of Jewish Daily Prayers: "Sound the great trumpet for our freedom; Raise the banner for the ingathering of the exiles." A large part of the book is devoted to the life and struggle of the new immigrants in Palestine and Israel.

The 42 pieces are by 36 different writers (6 of them anonymous) and are arranged in 15 chronological groups beginning with the 1880's. This is an ambitious plan which has almost come off; but the contents of the pieces are too diverse to be fitted together into a single book.

Secondly, the plan is oddly carried out. There are at the end of the book 55 biographical notes, but only 25 are on the authors whose work is included in the book, while 5 authors, whose work is included, are not mentioned in the biographies. Nor are these biographical notes in proper alphabetical order. In another part of the

book, the sources of each piece and, in many cases, the names of the translators are given, but the editor has not taken the trouble to make his list complete.

Altogether the editing is careless and the spelling is inconsistent. Nor has the editor checked the spelling of foreign words. To complete the list of criticisms, let me draw the editor's attention to the following misstatements:

The Jaffa-Jerusalem railway was not built by the Turkish government early in the 20th century (p. 14), but by a French company under an Ottoman concession of 1888. Wheeled carriages were seen in Galilee long before 1915 (p. 15); my wife used to travel in one as a child. There are two distinct villages—Kafr Kana and Kafr Kama: it is the latter that is inhabited by Circassians (p. 64). The best citrus in the country is still grown on the coastal plain (the Jaffa orange) and not in the Valley of Esdraelon (p. 158).

Although the dust jacket says "this is not a book of glorification" and "it contains no propaganda, pronouncements, nor ideological discussions," the book is sentimental, over-dramatized, and far too concentrated on the kibbutz. Several of the pieces I found boring: for example, Ephraim Auerbach's two stories and Shlomo Reichenstein's "Genesis." It is not enough to present life in the raw; one needs to select, to focus. What can be done with the same sort of material by an experienced writer is seen in the four pieces by Moshe Smilansky.

On the other hand, much of the contents of the book is illuminating, and this includes the editor's connecting remarks. Among these there is mention of the "red tickets" issued by the Turkish authorities to pilgrims, under which guise the first Zionist settlers (who were officially prohibited) had managed to get a footing. I had always wondered how it was done.

Some of the pieces that I enjoyed in particular were Eliahu Even-tov's reminiscences entitled "From Homel to Petah-Tikvah"; "The Story of the Jewish Legion" by Vladimir Jabotinsky, vividly written and with a wry smile; and Itzhaq Shenhar's "Street

Symphony" with its flashes of humor. Several pieces of the reportage stand out in my recollection: "The Citadel" which records the feelings of Moshe Carmel, an Israeli army commander in 1948, after seizing from the Arabs the Citadel of Acre, where he had once been incarcerated by the British. Then there is the dramatic anonymous description—called "The Bevin Blockade"—of the clash at sea between a Jewish immigrant ship and a British destroyer. One of the finest in the book is the story entitled "A Yemenite Boy in Israel" in which the author describes his exodus from the Yemen and his first faltering steps in a new land. But it is S. J. Agnon who, as usual, takes the laurels with his stories "In a Jerusalem Café" and "The Minyan." In this he is fortunate in his translator, I. M. Lask, who is also in a class apart.

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## NORTH AFRICA

THE INTERNATIONAL CITY OF TANGIER, by Graham H. Stuart. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955. 270 pages. \$6.00.

*Reviewed by Rom Landau*

Probably no other country saw so many surprising and dramatic developments in 1955 as did Morocco. At the beginning of the year the display of a picture of the exiled Sultan ben Youssef was punishable by imprisonment, if not more; before the end of the year, the same Sultan returned to his throne on a wave of national enthusiasm unequalled in Moroccan history. Early in 1955, the Moroccan situation threatened to become a full-scale war against France; by the end of 1955, native patriotism and self-interest dictated close cooperation with the French. In the summer of 1955, part of Spanish Morocco even became involved in the armed conflict with France. The only islet of peace within the turbulent Shereefian Empire was the International City of Tangier.

For over a century Morocco's diplomatic

center, the seat of its foreign communities, and the focus of many colonialist appetites, Tangier was bound to attain some sort of international status—if only to prevent any one European Power from gaining exclusive control over it. It acquired that status after World War I; but during World War II General Franco occupied the city, abolished its international regime, and replaced this by direct Spanish rule. The Allied victory of 1945 was needed to restore to Tangier its international government, consisting of a diplomatic Committee of Control, a foreign Administrator, a multi-national Legislative Chamber, and a Mixed Tribunal.

The story of both Tangier and its international government is complex and fascinating. It is also unique in the annals of multi-government administration. Unfortunately, the story of Tangier's administration has not been well publicized. It is therefore fortunate that Professor Graham Stuart should have decided to rewrite his authoritative book of 1931 on the subject. One or two books on Tangier have been published in the last few years, but they do not deal as fully with the important changes in the Tangier constitution, namely the Agreements of 1945, 1952, and 1953.

It was only to be expected that Professor Stuart did not try to emulate the journalists who, after a few weeks' stay in a new area, write an "authoritative" book about it. He not only went back to Tangier, which he already knew well, but also invaded the Foreign Offices in London, Paris, Rome, and Madrid, not to speak of his familiar haunt, the State Department. While he retains much of his original material, he concentrates wisely on the developments of the last few years, and explains with rare lucidity how these developments came about and what they imply. It is also in these new sections that the author—in 1931 still somewhat hesitant to write frankly about France's Moroccan policies—no longer shrinks from suggesting how fatal those policies often were. One reader, at least, is grateful that Professor Stuart is willing to say that, however beneficial were some of the achievements of the International Ad-

ministration, the "international status of Tangier will never be entirely satisfactory" until it "affords the people of Tangier a more direct participation in the government of their city." For more than forty years the natives of North Africa have been treated by those who governed them as well as by those who wrote about them as mere adjuncts to the foreign Powers. Professor Stuart's book shows by implication that these days are now over, and that Morocco is emerging as a fully sovereign state in which the native will, at last, be a master in his own house rather than merely the backward protégé of his European overlord.

◆ ROM LANDAU is a professor at the American Academy of Asian Studies in San Francisco and the author of a number of books on North African affairs.

NORTH AFRICAN POWDER KEG, by Edmund Stevens. New York: Coward-McCann, 1955. 273 pages. \$3.75.

*Reviewed by Roger Le Tourneau*

It is just as difficult for a Frenchman to review this book as it might be for a man on trial to give a fair account of what he has been charged with. It is a fact that Mr. Stevens' book is not so much a study of the situation in North Africa as it is a ruthless record of all the mistakes and shortcomings of France's policy in that area. A better title would have been *France on Trial in North Africa* or *France in North Africa: Study of a Failure*.

I shall nevertheless try to examine this book with less partiality than Mr. Stevens evinced in his study of the situation in North Africa and to speak not as a Frenchman, but as a specialist on North African problems.

Mr. Stevens is a journalist, and I am not going to hold against him the fact that his work is not that of a scholar. However, he should not have made so many factual mistakes, some of which are worth correcting here. Mr. Puaux was never Resident General in Tunisia (p. 18). Mr. Puaux, and not Mr. Labonne, initiated the "Service of



Peasant Modernization" in Morocco, which was created in 1944, and not in 1947. It is not correct to say that the French taxpayer "bears the entire cost of the Protectorate Administration." The name of the town of Sattat has nothing to do with *sittah*, six (p. 98), and even if it had, it would in no way imply that Sattat market day is Saturday, because in the Muslim calendar Saturday is the seventh and not the sixth day of the week. In 1830 the Algerians had no government of their own (p. 179); they were a Turkish colony, and all the high-ranking officials were Turks. French high schools are not the only type of secondary schools to be found in Algeria (p. 180); there are also some joint Franco-Muslim schools in which Arabic is taught exactly on the same level as French. Furthermore, I may personally bear witness to the fact that, in contradiction to Mr. Stevens' statements (p. 180), Amir 'Abd al-Kadir's story is taught in Algeria; as a matter of fact, it is part of the course that I teach at the Institut d'Etudes Supérieures Islamiques in Algiers. Mr. Stevens apparently believes that there is only one professorship of Arabic literature in the whole University of Algiers; there are in fact four chairs of Arabic language and literature, two assistant professorships for Arabic language, and two professorships of Muslim history and archaeology.

Mr. Stevens does not seem to be aware that the first electoral college in Algeria includes a constantly increasing number of Muslim citizens. The number of students registered in the *'ulama* schools, far from reaching 50,000 (p. 231), has never been more than 15,000. Sidi Lamin was not chosen as Bey of Tunis in 1943 "for his docility" (p. 243), but because he was the heir apparent to the throne according to the principle of transmission of the Hussaynite dynasty. And to finish with these remarks, though it is true to say that in Tripoli "the Italian farms and plantations by and large have not reverted to the desert" (p. 257), in Cyrenaica, on the contrary, I could see nothing on the Jabal Akhdar but deserted farms and formerly cultivated areas

turned into waste country. It seems strange to me to see Libya, one of the poorest countries in the world, given as an example to Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

I must also point out that the ideas of the late Professor Robert Montagne are frequently misinterpreted. An estimate of his last book, *Révolution au Maroc*, as that of a "veteran apologist for French Colonialism" (p. 67) certainly shows very little perception. As one who intimately knew what Robert Montagne thought, I want to say that his ideas on the social, economic, and political development of the North African populations were much more progressive than Mr. Stevens is aware.

An even more serious fault of the book is the complete lack of information on the North African past and the social life of the modern Muslims. Though I am ready to admit that this population has undergone a great change in the past 20 or 30 years and that a transformation is in process, the weight of the past is still very heavy on almost the whole of the rural population and an important part of the urban population. One cannot see the complete picture if one simply omits the factor of the past. This is precisely what Mr. Stevens has done.

I would like to have found the charges brought against the French policy in North Africa based on more comprehensive information. Then only could Mr. Stevens, whose good faith is not doubted, have written a less categorical denunciation because he would certainly have realized how complex the problems are. The rapid evolution of human communities which for centuries have lived isolated from the rest of the world is no doubt difficult to achieve, and it is not achieved without clashes. I do not claim that France has had the best possible policy in North Africa during this period, particularly during the past ten or twelve years. Nor do I question anyone's right to criticize it. But since Mr. Stevens has not sought out the pertinent facts I cannot commend his book to readers in quest of impartial and well-documented information.

◆ ROGER LE TOURNEAU is chairman of the study program on the history and civilization of the Western Muslim world at the University of Algiers.

TUNISIA AND FRANCE, by Habib Bourguiba.  
Paris: Rene Julliard, 1954. 462 pages.  
1000 frs. (Written in French)

*Reviewed by Alex Westfried*

Habib Bourguiba, the president of the modern-minded, western-oriented nationalist movement in Tunisia, the Neo-Destour, and one of the most gifted strategists in North Africa, presents in his book the political problems involved in the achievement of Tunisia's genuine national independence. Bourguiba's sense of proportion and realism in dealing with Franco-Tunisian relations during the period 1933-1954 are indeed refreshing. His major thesis is that an entirely new relationship of cooperation must be established between France and Tunisia as equal powers. A balanced equation is proposed whereby Tunisia is free to exercise her sovereignty (within limitations) while France maintains her major strategic, economic, juridical, and cultural interests in Tunisia. Bourguiba contends that Franco-Tunisian cooperation is essential to the political, economic, and cultural progress of his country.

The author's thesis is the result of a closely reasoned analysis of the consequences of 73 years of French rule in Tunisia. His discussion of Tunisia's emancipation poses four major political questions. How can the benefits of French association be retained in Tunisia without endangering the nation's political integrity? What strategy must be followed to achieve independence, given the limited human and economic resources of Tunisia? What program of self-government will achieve the support of all the effective political forces in both France and Tunisia? What stages must Tunisia pass through before she attains full independence? These questions recur throughout the book and are discussed rationally and quite candidly. The author's greatest contributions are his clear analysis of French colonial policy in Tunisia and the strategy necessary to attain self-government. His strategy is based on the unity and effective fusion of all the vital elements in Tunisian society, upon the increasing sup-

port of many political groups in France, and upon the international approval of many foreign powers, particularly Asian and Arab states.

Bourguiba is an evolutionist and an artist in politics. He discovered early that conciliation was his most effective weapon. The three main periods of conciliation described (1936-8, 1950-1, 1954-5) bear eloquent witness to his ability and perseverance in the art of persuasion, rather than force. It is significant that on an international scale Bourguiba is determined that Tunisia should keep closer political ties with the West and refrain from joining the Pan-Arab orbit. He hopes that Tunisia can synthesize the "most progressive" ingredients of Western and Arab civilization and reject the retrograde and racially prejudiced elements on both sides.

The organization of the book could be improved. It is essentially a compilation of letters, speeches, interviews to the press and other documents in chronological order describing the progress of the Neo-Destour. Although major developments are commented on, it is difficult for the novice in Tunisian affairs to follow the course of events. There are many documents of high value, but many are repetitious. A more careful pruning of these with a concise evaluation of major developments would enhance the value of the book to American readers. In Part III, "Le Murissement" (1942-49) is not shown clearly as a key period in the growth of the Neo-Destour. A larger role should be ascribed to such new organizations as the Tunisian labor movement and the Association of Commerce and Artisans in its expansion. Nor is its inner transformation from a party to a national organization confident of its ability to achieve self-government mentioned. The significance of the 1951 reforms (Part IV), the importance of the May, 1950, Congress, and the factors which contributed to the deterioration of Franco-Tunisian relations in December, 1952, are not stressed enough.

The best parts of the book are the Introduction, Part II (1936-38), and Part IV (1952-54). Part II has an excellent presenta-

tion of the basis of Franco-Tunisian cooperation (Speech to Congress, 1937). Part IV has the finest letters of Bourguiba's career, those "letters of la Galité". His appraisals of the party's achievements especially in 1952 are of particular interest, and there is a good discussion of the cooperation between the Neo-Destour and the Tunisian Trade Union movement.

◆ ALEX WESTFRIED recently spent a year in Tunisia on a French Government scholarship. He is a research assistant at The School of Advanced International Studies.

## SUDAN

A HISTORY OF THE SUDAN FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO 1821, by A. J. Arkell. London: Athlone Press, 1955. xviii + 249 pages; 27 figures, 11 maps, 24 plates. 21s.

*Reviewed by Richard F. S. Starr*

No more appropriate time for the appearance of a history of the Sudan could have been found than this period of the Sudan's new independence. Mr. Arkell's book surveys Sudanese history from prehistoric to relatively modern times—a task to test the courage of even so competent a scholar as he. The geographical boundaries which he covers, while ostensibly those of the modern Sudan, often extend beyond this on both east and west, but seldom reach into the southern provinces of the present-day country.

The author pieces together with painstaking patience the prehistory of the Sudan as garnered from numerous archaeological excavations and artifacts of the northern reaches of the Sudanese Nile valley. Sudan's contacts with Pharaonic Egypt down through the New Kingdom are correlated and presented in detail. In fact almost the first half of the book might be considered a history of Egypt in relation to its campaigns and territories in the Sudan. Ample treatment is also given to the heyday of the Sudan when, as the kingdom of Cush in the first millennium before Christ, the disinte-

grating kingdom of Egypt came under its control. Not only was this period a climax in political importance which the Sudan never achieved again, but it seems also to be the high point in the author's sympathy for his subject. From that point on, the pageant of history becomes a rather shabby procession of events, and one feels that Mr. Arkell, despite his ingenuity in reassembling these events, had little of the enthusiasm which he displayed for the earlier periods.

The reader cannot help but be impressed by the skill with which Mr. Arkell has put archaeological and anthropological findings to work in reconstructing not only the earlier phases of Sudanese history but the later aspects as well. His discussion of Nubia after the fall of Meroë, for example, is a particularly interesting case of the use of this technique.

The greatest lack in the book, to this reader, is the self-imposed exclusion of the vast reaches of the south, with its mélange of peoples. Granted that hard facts there are rare, had the author made the same interpretive use of anthropological data as he did on occasion for the north, the work in relation to the other half of the Sudan in its present boundaries would not have been so barren. One feels also that in justice to the dominant role played by the Arabs in the newly formed state of the Sudan today, a somewhat more detailed treatment of the Islamic centuries would have been in order. The author's points, based as they must often be on diverse bits of evidence, are sometimes obscured by involved literary style. One would have appreciated somewhat more careful attention to the inclusion of all place names from the text in at least one of the otherwise adequate maps. The text is enhanced by an excellent bibliography and a comprehensive and useful index. It is sincerely hoped that Mr. Arkell will continue to produce works in this field to which he has for so long been a distinguished contributor.

◆ RICHARD F. S. STARR is in the Department of State.

## TURKEY

TURKEY, by G. L. Lewis. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. 222 pages. \$5.50.

*Reviewed by Roderic H. Davison*

Anyone interested in modern Turkey—student, traveller, businessman—will find this introduction to the country profitable. Dr. Lewis, now Senior Lecturer in Islamic Studies at Oxford, has managed to pack a lot of information into less than 200 pages of text.

He begins with a rapid survey of Ottoman history from the thirteenth century to 1918. This section is naturally the least satisfactory since it is so compressed, but it offers nevertheless some valuable insights into Turkish development. Then follow a more detailed account of the nationalist movement that produced the Turkish Republic out of the post-war chaos of 1918-1923; the story of the reforms, politics, and foreign policy of the republic to 1939; and a similar coverage of the period 1939 to the present. The book ends with a summary treatment of modern Turkey's geography, people, agricultural and mineral development, communications, and economic policy. Even in the more detailed sections there are omissions one would like to see remedied—to take a random example, the international position of Turkey in World War II is meagerly described, and there is no reference to the Soviet designs on the Straits or to Allied plans for using Turkish bases. But such omissions are undoubtedly dictated by the length of the book.

In a second edition there will be opportunity to correct errors of historical fact. Bismarck planned no attack on France in 1875 and did not want to make the Ottoman Empire into a German sphere (pp. 39-40), but rather fondly wished he could divide European Turkey between Austria and Russia. The German-Turkish treaty was signed not on August 4 but on August 2, 1914 (p. 45). The Constantinople Agreement of 1915

did not promise Russia the northeastern corner of Anatolia (p. 49) but the northwest-ern, from the Sakarya to a point on the Gulf of Izmit. The exchange of Turkish and Greek populations was actually not settled in the Treaty of Lausanne (p. 73), but in a separate convention signed six months earlier. It is questionable whether no non-Muslim born before 1915 grew up speaking Turkish (p. 159), since in the mid-nineteenth century many Greeks and Armenians were ignorant of their own tongues and spoke Turkish, though some of them wrote it in Greek and Armenian characters. The Constitution (as reprinted on p. 197) omits from Article 2 the sixth characteristic of the Turkish republic, "populist".

Such errors do not affect the validity of Dr. Lewis's general presentation. One perhaps does. It is astonishing that he should convert Admiral Limpus, a British officer training the Ottoman navy and acting as Commander-in-Chief until his removal shortly after World War I had started, into a German, and thus make Limpus responsible for the naval attack on Britain's ally Russia (p. 46). Souchon is the man.

Despite these minor drawbacks, Dr. Lewis's *Turkey* is a successful book. It is best on recent Turkey, which he knows at first hand. It gives an accurate picture of a nation on the move, western-oriented, which has faced and still faces important problems. It is very sympathetic to the Turks without spilling over into sentimentality; it is critical when the facts warrant, as in the matter of the *Varlık Vergisi*. It is quite readable, although the somewhat choppy chapters and paragraphing hinder a continuity of treatment. And Dr. Lewis has enlivened the whole with bits of his personal experience and conversations with Turks, as well as quotations from the Turkish press and the speeches of public men.

◆ RODERIC H. DAVISON, professor of history at George Washington University, has been doing research on Turkish history of the 19th and 20th centuries.



## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

## General

- Bibliographies on Southwestern Asia: III*, by Henry Field. Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1956. No page listing: lists 6113 titles. \$6.00.
- Le Culte des Saints dans l'Islam Maghrebin*, by Emile Dermenghem. Paris: Gallimard, 1955. 351 pages. No price indicated.
- Gideon Goes to War*, by Leonard Mosley. New York: Scribner's, 1956. 256 pages. \$3.50. A biography of Gen. Orde C. Wingate, including his exploits in Palestine and Ethiopia.
- The Jordan River Valley*, by Georgiana G. Stevens. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956. 57 pages. 25 cents. The background and current plans for development of the Jordan waters.
- Moyen-Orient, Nouvel Eldorado*, by Gerard Boutelleau. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1955. 233 pages. No price indicated. A travel and social report with emphasis on the oil-regions of the Persian Gulf.
- Les Négociations Anglo-Egyptiennes de 1950-51 sur Suez et le Soudan*, by Farag Moussa. Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1955. 246 pages, annex, bibliography. No price indicated. An historical critique.
- Nuove Costituzioni di Stati del Vicino Oriente e dell' Africa*, by Amadeo Giannini. Milano: A. Giuffrè, 1954. 101 pages. No price indicated. Details of the Constitutions of Syria, Libya, Jordan, Eritrea.
- The Order of Assassins*, by Marshall G. S. Hodgson. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1955. 278 pages; appendices, bibliography, index to 352, maps, charts. No price indicated. A history of the Nizari Isma'ilis.
- Swift Seasons Roll*, by Charles Malik and Philip K. Hitti. New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1955. 14 pages. \$5.00. An address by Dr. Malik honoring Professor Hitti on the occasion of his retirement from Princeton, with a reply by Professor Hitti. Money received from sales of the book is being used to broaden the scholarship funds of the American University of Beirut.
- Training Foreign Nationals in the United States*. Ann Arbor: Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, 1954. 36 pages. \$1.00. Report of seminars conducted at Ann Arbor, Sept. 16-17, and at Arden House, Harriman, N. Y., Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 1954.
- The United States and the Arab World, 1945-52*, by Mohammed Shafi Agwani. Aligarh: Institute of Islamic Studies, Muslim University, 1955. 158 pages; appendices, biblio. to 184. No price indicated. A summary of relations 1820-1945, followed by detailed coverage of more recent events such as the Palestine problem, oil, economic development.
- Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization*, ed. by Gustave E. von Grunebaum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. 360 pages; appendix, index

to 385. \$6.00. Lectures given by a group of international scholars at a conference in Liège and Spa, Belgium, in 1953. The lectures are focussed on the relation between Islamic civilization and the local cultures of the areas included in the Islamic world.

*Visits to Monasteries in the Levant*, by Robert Curzon Jr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956. 351 pages, illus. \$4.00. A reissue of Curzon's travelogue originally published in 1850.

*Who's Who in Egypt and the Near East*, ed. by James E. Blattner. New York: W. S. Heinman, 1955. 663 pages illus. \$14.00. 21st edition of this work.

## Egypt

*Pharaoh to Farouk*, by H. Wood Jarvis. New York: MacMillan, 1955. 299 pages. \$4.50. A survey of Egyptian history from earliest times to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954.

*Reorganization of the Egyptian Village on the Basis of Regional Decentralization*, by Abbas Ammar Sirs-el-Layyan. Menoufia: Arab States Fundamental Education Centre, 1954. 25 pages. No price indicated.

*Value Reconstruction and Egyptian Education: A Projection of A Cultural and Philosophical Foundation with Reference to Secondary Schools*, by Sadek H. Samaan. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1955. 145 pages, biblio. to 157. \$4.50. A study of Egyptian secondary schools with suggested changes in the schools and teacher preparation.

## Ethiopia

*A History of Ethiopia*, by A. H. M. Jones and Elizabeth Monroe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. 183 pages; chronology and index to 196; map. \$2.40. First published in England in 1935 as *A History of Abyssinia*. The chronology brings events up to 1944.

## India

*Amrita*, by R. Prawer Jhabvala. New York: W. W. Norton, 1956. 238 pages. \$3.50. A novel about a well-to-do Indian family in New Delhi.

*At the Feet of Mahatma Gandhi*, by Rajendra Prasad. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. 350 pages. \$6.00. An account of Gandhi's life and works, highly eulogistic, by the present President of India.

*Bugles and a Tiger*, by John Masters. New York: Viking Press, 1956. 312 pages. \$3.95. An autobiography about life in the British Army in India.

*L'Inde Economie et Population*, by Gilbert Etienne. Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1955. 180 pages. Swiss frs. 12.

*Jobs and Workers in India*, by Oscar A. Ornati. Ithaca: Institute of International Industrial and Labor Relations, 1955. 188 pages; appendices, in-

dex to 215. Paper \$3.00; cloth \$4.00. A survey of Indian labor and labor problems.

*Mano Majra*, by Khushwant Singh. New York: Grove Press, 1956. 181 pages. \$1.25. The Grove Press prizewinning novel in a contest for manuscripts from India, it tells the story of religious strife in a Punjabi village during the Hindu-Muslim migrations after partition.

*Population and Planned Parenthood in India*, by S. Chandrasekhar. Introd. by Dr. Julian Huxley. New York: MacMillan, 1956. 120 pages; graphs; charts. \$2.95.

*Some Inner Fury*, by Kamala Markandaya. New York: John Day, 1956. 254 pages. \$3.50. A novel of urban life in India during the struggle for independence, by the author of *Nectar In A Sieve*.

### Iran

*La Structure Economique de l'Iran*, by Hassan Djourabatchi. Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1955. 224 pages. No price indicated. Detailed studies of Iranian resources and methods of economic development other than oil and carpets.

### Israel

*Israel: The Eternal Ideal*, by Irving Miller. Introd. by Abba Eban. New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1955. 160 pages. \$2.75. The history and origins of the idea of a Jewish homeland.

*Israel: Terre Deux Fois Promise*, by Andre Falk. Paris: Seuil, 1954. 210 pages. French frs. 600.

*The Jews: Their History, Culture, and Religion*, ed. by Louis Finkelstein. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. 2 vols. 1471 pages; illus., maps. \$12.00. A second edition with new material on Israel by Ben Zion Dinur, former Minister of Education and Culture.

*Kibbutz: Adventure in Utopia*, by Melford E. Spiro. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. 252 pages; biblio., index to 266. \$4.50. The story of the 'Kiryat Yedidim' kibbutz in Israel.

*Molding Society to Man: Israel's New Venture in Cooperation*, by Esther Tauber. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1956. 151 pages; biblio. \$2.25. The story of Israel's Kibbutzim, their history, leaders, and organizing principles.

*Way of Valor*, by Marie Syrkin. New York: The Jewish Agency, 1955 (?). 312 pages. \$3.75. A biography of Golda Myerson, Israel's Minister of Labor.

### Lebanon

*A Manual of Lebanese Administration*, by George Grassmuck and Kamal Salibi. Beirut: Public Administration Department, American University of Beirut, 1955. 90 pages; biblio. to 101. No price indicated. A description of the organization and functions of Lebanese ministries and their subdivisions.

### North Africa

*Dans l'Aurès sur les Pas des Rebelles*, by Jean Servier. Paris: Editions France Empire, 1955. 301 pages. No price indicated. The observations of a French graduate student living in the Algerian mountains during the nationalist uprisings. (In French)

*Le Probleme Algerien*, by Jean Blanchard. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1955. 79 pages. French frs. 400. (In French). A compact summary of the French record and position in Algeria.

### Pakistan

*Pakistan, 1954-55*. Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1955. 283 pages. illus. Rs. 2/8. A government summary of developments in law, administration, economics, public services, defense, welfare, foreign affairs, and the provinces and states.

*Progress of Economic Development in Pakistan*. Karachi: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1955. 104 pages; tables, charts. No price indicated. A review of the progress made since independence in Pakistan's major development projects.

*The United Nations and Pakistan*, by Mushtaq Ahmad. Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs—distributed in the US by the Institute of Pacific Relations. 140 pages; appendix, biblio., index to 162. \$2.00.

### Sudan

*Le Soudan Dans le Différend Anglo-Égyptien*, by Vera Plasilova. Paris: A. Pédone, 1954. 180 pages. No price indicated.

### Syria

*Syrian Harvest*, by Edwyn Hole. London: Robert Hale, 1956. 211 pages; appendices, index to 222. 18sh. A general informative study of Syria, including considerable material on Arab music, medicine and the nomad life.

### Turkey

*Adult Education in Turkey*, by Turhan Oğuzkan. Paris: UNESCO, 1955. 48 pages; biblio., appendices to 60. 40¢.

*Emergent Turkish Administrators*, prepared by A. T. Matthews. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Başimevi, 1955. 69 pages; appendix. \$2.00. A study of the vocational and social attitudes of junior administrators and students at the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East and at the University of Ankara.

*Milli Mücadele Hatıraları (Memoirs of the National Struggle)*, by General Ali Fuat Cebesoy. Vol. III (Vol. I pub. 1953; Vol. II pub. 1955).

*Trakya'da Milli Mücadele (National Struggle in Thrace)*, by Tefik Bıyıklıoğlu. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Başimevi, 1955. 522 pages; chronology, index to 566. TL 20. This is the first of 6 volumes on the Turkish National Struggle by a

member of the General Staff during the War of Liberation. It covers events in Thrace from 1829 to the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.

### Yemen

*Al-Sulayhiyun wa al-Haraka al-Fatimiya fi al-Yaman* (*The Sulayhids and the Fatimid Movement in the Yemen*), by Husayn F. al-Hamdani. Cairo: Maktaba Misr, 1955. 402 pages; tables, map. No price indicated. A history of the Fatimid movement in Yemen from its introduction to the end of the Ayyubid dynasty.

### Religion

*Life and Philosophy of Haj Mulla Hadi Sabzevari, 1212-1289 A.H.*, by H. Mudarresi Chahardehi. Tehran: Tahuri Bookshop, 1955. 67 pages. No price indicated. (In Persian)

*The Life of Muhammad*, by Ishaq (orig. title *Sirat Rasul Allah*), transl. by Alfred Guillaume. London: Oxford University Press, 1955. 813 pages, index. 63sh. A new translation of the classic *Sira* of Ibn Ishaq, or *Biography of the Prophet Muhammad*.

*Muhammad, the Apostle of God, and his Ascension*, by George Widengren. Uppsala & Wiesbaden: University of Uppsala, 1955. 257 pages. No price indicated and,

*Studies in Arabian Fatalism*, by Helmer Ringgren. Uppsala & Wiesbaden: University of Uppsala, 1955. 224 pages. No price indicated. Two studies in Islamism from the University of Uppsala series.

*The Shaikh and his Sufism*, by Abdul Ali. Hyderabad-Deccan, India. 89 pages. No price indicated. A brief sketch of the life of Shaikh 'Abd al-Qadir Jilani, the revered saint of Islam, as a great reformer.

### Art, Archaeology

*Bibliography of Moslem Numismatics, India Excepted*, by L. A. Mayer. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1954. 283 pages. No price indicated. A second edition.

*The Charm of Indo-Islamic Architecture: An Introduction to the Northern Phase*, by John Terry. Hollywood-by-the-Sea, Fla.: 1955 Transatlantic Arts, 1955. \$3.75. A short essay on the main features and monuments of 13th-18th century Indian architecture as influenced by Muslim rulers.

*Corpus des Inscriptions Arabes de Tunisie*, by Slimane Mostafa Zbiss. Tunis: Imprimerie SAPI, 1955. 97 pages, 50 plates. No price given.

*The Golden Age of Indian Art*, by Pierre Rambach and Vitold de Golish. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1955. 180 pages illus. \$8.50. Photographs of Indian art from the 5th to the 13th century, with a brief guide to the religious symbolism and plans of the temple sites.

*Monuments Musulmans d'Époque Huseynite en Tunisie*, by Slimane Mostafa Zbiss. Tunis: Im-

primerie SAPI, 1955. 101 pages, photos. No price indicated. Identical texts in French and Arabic.

*The Panchatantra*, transl. by Arthur W. Ryder. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. \$5.00. A reissue of this collection of stories.

*Post-Revolution Persian Verse*, by Munibur Rahman. Aligarh: Institute of Islamic Studies, Muslim University, 1955. 188 pages; biblio. index to 210. No price indicated. The author's Ph.D. thesis at the University of London. Covers some of the leading modern poets, their themes, verse forms, and the influences of European literature.

*Scheherezade: Tales from the Thousand and One Nights*, transl. by A. J. Arberry. Illus. by Asgeir Scott. New York: New American Library, 1955. 189 pages. 35¢.

*The Secret of the Hittites*, by C. W. Ceram. Transl. from the German by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. 281 pages; illus. \$5.00. The story of the rediscovery of the Hittites by the author of *Gods, Graves and Scholars*.

### Linguistics

*Arabic-English Lexicon*, by Edward W. Lane. New York: Ungar, 1955. Vols. 1 and 2. 400 pages; 474 pages. \$200.00 for the set of 8 vols. A reprint of the first two volumes of Lane's dictionary.

## FORTHCOMING BOOKS

*As I See India*, by Robert Trumbull. New York: William Sloane. By the former correspondent in India for the *New York Times*.

*At Home in India*, by Cynthia Bowles. New York: Harcourt Brace. The daughter of the former US Ambassador to India writes about her family life there.

*Behind the Modern Sudan*, by H. D. Jackson. New York: St. Martin's Press. An account of Sudanese life and events leading up to independence.

*The Cry of the Kite*, by Maarten Schiemer. New York: Bobbs Merrill. A novel about a young South African journalist in Egypt whose friendship for a group of Egyptian officers involves him in a plot to overthrow the king.

*Iran*, text by Basil Grey; introd. by Andre Godard. Greenwich, Conn.: New York Graphic Society. Another in the UNESCO World Art Series. Includes prints of miniatures from the Imperial library of the Shah at the Gulistan Palace.

*Mid-East, World Center; Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow*, ed. by Ruth Nanda Anshen. New York: Harper & Brothers.

*The Qumran Community*, by Charles T. Fritsch. New York: MacMillan.

*The Recovery of the Holy Land*, by Pierre Dubois. Transl. and ed. by Walther I. Brandt. New York: Columbia University Press.

*The Splendor and the Havoc*, by Maurice Callard. London: Jonathan Cape. A novel about two Englishmen working in modern Jordan.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

*Prepared by* Sidney Glazer, Consultant in Near East Bibliography, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

*With contributions from:* Ernest Dawn, Richard Ettinghausen, Charles A. Ferguson, Sidney Glazer, Louis A. Leopold, Bernard Lewis, M. Perlmann, C. Rabin.

*Note:* It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab World, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Palestine and Zionism*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library, New York.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, The Middle East Journal, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

For list of abbreviations, see page 229. For list of periodicals reviewed, see page 230.

## GEOGRAPHY

*(General, description, travel, natural history, geology)*

- 8561 BOYER, DAVID S. "Rose-red citadel of Biblical Eden." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 108 (D '55) 852-70. Colorfully illustrated description of a recent trip through Petra and surrounding area.
- 8562 BUTCHER, GEORGE. "Unbelievable valley—Bamiyan." *Mid East Forum* (Beirut) 31 (Ja '56) 12-6. Description of a historic beauty spot in Afghanistan. Illust.
- 8563 JACKSON, W. A. DOUGLAS. "The virgin and idle lands of western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan." *Geog. Rev.* 46 (Ja '56) 1-19. Discussion of the difficulties in the current Soviet project to expand grain and wheat production.
- 8564 JUNGFLEISCH, MARCEL. "Pour mieux connaître le Nil." *L'Egypte Contemp.* 46 (Jl '55) 17-53. A summary of basic information drawn chiefly from issues of the *Bull. de l'union des agriculteurs d'Egypte*.
- 8565 PETRÁČEK, K. "Handschriften zur kenntnis Ägyptens und Abessinien im 18. jhdt. aus der Bibliotheca Pragensis in conventu fratrum S. Francisci reformatorem S. Mariae ad nives." *Archiv Orient.* 23, no. 1-2 (1955) 90-8. On the Czech missionaries Vaclav Remedium, Prutzky, and Jakub Rimar, their travels, studies, MSS.
- 8566 SHOR, JEAN and FRANC. "Athens to Istanbul." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 109 (Ja '56) 37-76. An over-

land journey through the heart of the old Ottoman empire.

- 8567 SUKHAREVA, O. A. "On the historical topography of Bukhara in the X-XII centuries." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Ist. Akad. Nauk Tajik SSR* (Stalinabad) 27 (1954) 25-40.

## HISTORY

*(Ancient, medieval)*

- 8568 ATIYA, A. S. "The Crusades: old ideas and new conceptions." *J. World Hist.* 2, no. 2 (1955) 469-75. Summary of two Chicago lectures from the point of view of Islam.
- 8569 AZIMJANOVA, S. A. "Features of the social-economic life of Ferghana at the turn of the 15-16th cent." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Vostok.* (Tashkent) 3 (1954) 25-42. Oppression of the peasantry and their reaction to being treated as slaves.
- 8570 CAHEN, CLAUDE. "Le problème ethnique en Anatolie." *J. World Hist.* 2, no. 2 (1955) 346-63. Traces the various waves of migration that created the basis of Turkification from the 11th cent. on.
- 8571 CAHEN, CLAUDE. "Le régime de la terre et l'occupation turque en Anatolie." *J. World Hist.* 2, no. 3 (1955).
- 8572 ENAN, M. A. "Some facts and contemplations about the 500th anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople." *The Islamic Lit.* 7 (S '55) 521-7. The Ottomans, like the Mongols, but unlike the



- Arabs, had no religious or civilizing mission. Hence, they left no spiritual influence in the areas of conquest.
- 8573 HINZ, W. "Lebensmittelpreise im mittelalterlichen Vorderen Orient." *Welt des Orients* (Göttingen) (1954) 52-70. An amazingly stable price structure characterized the medieval Near East economy.
- 8574 KAWAR, IRFAN. "Arethas, son of Jabalah." *J.A.O.S.* 75 (O-D '55) 205-16. Justinian appointed Arethas (= al-Hārith) king of the Ghassānids around 530 A. D., thereby inaugurating a significant era in the history of Arab-Byzantine relations, particularly as they affected the struggle against Persia.
- 8575 MOSCATI, S. "Per una storia dell'antica Šī'a." *Riv. degli Studi O.* 30, no. 3-4 (1955) 251-67. Among Arabs and non-Arabs, with and without active 'Alid participation, the Šī'a grew.
- 8576 AL-MUNAJJID, SALĀH AL-DĪN. "The settlements of the Arab tribes around Damascus." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* 30, no. 1 (1955) 61-70. South Arabians dominated the situation (in numbers, wealth, and power). Their feud with Qays was an important factor from the early days of Islam down to the 18th century.
- 8577 PALAU, MARIANO ARRIBAS. "Une lettre de Martin l'Humain à Abou Faris de Tunis." *I.B.L.A.* 18, no. 3 (1955) 349-56. A letter written by a Spaniard in 1407 to a Tunisian who received it six years later. The interesting story behind this long delay involves several men detained for ransom.
- 8578 PIGULEVSKAYA, N. V. "From the history of Iran's economic relations between the 4-6th centuries." (in Russian). *Kratkiye Soobshch. Inst. Vostok.* (Moscow) 14 (1955) 46-57. Utilizes the Pahlavi code *Matikan* and the decisions collected by Ishobokht, two sources going back to the Pahlavi book of court decisions *Datastan Namak*.
- 8579 REYCHMAN, JAN. "Znowsy ch badan nad dziejami stosunkow agrarnych na Bliskim Wschodzie." *Rocznik Orient.* (Warsaw) 19 (1954) 192-201. Report on three Russian books of the last decade on agrarian conditions in the Near East.
- 8580 SALIE, M. A. "On elucidating the role of the so-called 'Arab culture' in Central Asia." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Vostok.* (Tashkent) 3 (1954) 5-25. A uniform "medieval Arab culture" in the Near East is a myth created by pan-Arabists and fostered by their American masters "to prove" their racialist tenets and to show that the peoples of the area, particularly Central Asia, are not capable of original cultural creativity.
- 8581 SALIE, M. A. "A little known source for the history of Uzbekistan—the *Mihman-name-i-Bukhara*." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Vostok.* (Tashkent) 3 (1954) 107-18. "The Bokhara guest-book" by Ibn Ruzbehan (d. 937/1521) is preserved in two MSS—one each in Tashkent and Istanbul. The former is apparently the author's copy.
- 8582 SAUNDERS, J. J. "Mohammed in Europe; a note on western interpretations of the life of the Prophet." *History* (London) 39 (Je '54) 14-25. Suggests that data on mass psychology should be drawn upon to explain, for instance, the rapidity of the spread of Islam during the Prophet's last years.
- 8583 SEMIONOV, A. A. "On the origin of the Samanids." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Ist. Akad. Nauk Tajik SSR* (Stalinabad) 27 (1954) 3-11. Draws attention to the age-long tradition, written and oral, of the descent of this dynasty from the Sasanian aristocracy.
- 8584 VILCHEVSKII, D. L. "A new source for the characterization of the outlook of the townspeople of Iran in the 10-11th cent." (in Russian) *Sov. Vostok.* (Moscow) 1, no. 1 (1955) 96-103. A MS dated 584/1188 contains a unique Persian treatise *Kitāb-e ruh-e mo'amelat*, a compendium of law, morals, and mores by a Sufi author.
- 8585 ZAKHODER, B. N. "A Shiraz merchant on the Volga in 1438." (in Russian) *Krat. Soobshch. Inst. Vostok.* (Moscow) 13 (1955) 14-9. Analysis of a passage from the MS *Shams al-siyāq*.
- 8586 ZOTOV, P. D. "On the history of paper manufacturing in the East." (in Russian) *Trudy Inst. Vostok.* (Tashkent) 3 (1954) 155-67. A summary of available data. The rich Tashkent MS collection warrants intensive study.
- See also: 8565, 8567, 8608, 8631, 8638, 8659, 8667.

## HISTORY AND POLITICS

### (Modern)

- 8587 "The French North African crisis." *World Today* 11 (D '55) 509-18. Henceforth Algeria will present the most difficult problem because the country does not have qualified local spokesmen such as Bourguiba in Tunisia and the Sultan of Morocco. Federalism seems to be the inevitable solution and France will probably have to acquiesce, though without the gain in prestige that would have been hers if she had taken the initiative.
- 8588 "The Middle East: background to the Russian intervention." *World Today* 11 (N '55) 463-77. Speculation about the recent Russian manoeuvre. "It must be many decades since there has been a stroke of diplomacy which has had so rapid and profound effect upon the balance of power."
- 8589 "Soviet policy in the Middle East." *World Today* 11 (D '55) 518-29. All signs indicate that the present Soviet offensive will be continued in an effort to undermine Egypt and Syria which countries, in Soviet thinking, "have become the 'weakest link' in the non-Communist chain."
- 8590 ALAN, RAY. "Trouble on the northern tier." *Reporter* (New York) 13 (D 15 '55) 20-2. The author implies that Western policy makers, especially British, grossly underestimate the intensity of intra-Arab tensions and conflicting political philosophies.

- 8591 ARON, RAYMOND. "Crisis in North Africa." *New Leader* (New York) 38 (N 7, 14 '55) 3-6, 20-1. Brilliant formulation of the views of those Frenchmen who, seeing no hope for French rule and no sense in repression, advocate the recognition of nationalism and urge political reform on the basis of association, "a narrow path but the only practical one."
- 8592 AYTUGAN, MUSTAFA. "The Bolshevik's policy of eliminating the Idil-Ural-Turkic language." (in Turkish) *Dergi* (Munich) 1 (S '55) 50-56. Traces the transition from Arabic script to Latin, and from Latin to Cyrillic; lists papers and works published; shows the trend toward flooding the book market with translations—all these reflect a policy of Russification.
- 8593 BARBOUR, NEVILL. "North Africa: does it have a future?" *Mid. East Forum* 30 (D '55) 8-11. Yes, says the author, but not without the strong likelihood of bloodshed. Much will depend on the way the contest between the progressives and reactionaries in France is resolved.
- 8594 CHEKHOVICH, O. D. "On the history of Uzbekistan in the 18th century." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Vostok*. (Tashkent) 3 (1954) 43-82. While the first half of the century was marked by feudal dismemberment and economic decline, the second half saw these tendencies countered by consolidation and some economic growth.
- 8595 DALLIN, DAVID. "Soviet policy in the Middle East." *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (N '55) 337-44. The Egyptian-Czech arms deal and other actions are designed to help the Soviet Union "obtain a place in the African sun and secure a foothold there which it can widen in the future."
- 8596 ÉMERIT, MARCEL. "L'état intellectuel et moral de l'Algérie en 1830." *Rev. d'Hist. Mod. et Contemp.* (Paris) 1 (Jy-S '54) 199-212. We must not be satisfied only with French accounts, but must turn to native sources. We are confronted with a clash between two civilizations ignorant of each other, not a clash between civilization and barbarism.
- 8597 GINIEWSKI, PAUL. "L'Égypte a-t-elle le droit de contrôler le Golfe d'Akaba?" *Polit. Etrangère* 20 (N '55) 594-602. The author fears that owing to the importance to Israel of Elath and the Negev, Israel may well repeat the experience of the Bat Galim, this time using force, which will bring open hostilities into the Gulf of Aqaba.
- 8598 HITTI, PHILIP K. "The impact of the West on Syria and Lebanon in the nineteenth century." *J. World Hist.* 2, no. 3 (1955).
- 8599 ISSAWI, CHARLES. "Economic and social foundations of democracy in the Middle East." *Internat. Aff.* 32 (Ja '56) 27-42. Analysis of such phenomena of undemocratic societies as low level of economic and industrial development, maldistribution of wealth, illiteracy, lack of homogeneity of language and religion, all of which have thus far prevented the development in the Near East of genuine parliamentary governments based on free, popular elections.
- 8600 IVANOV, N. A. "On agrarian relations in Egypt toward the end of the 18th century." (in Russian) *Krat. Soobshch. Inst. Vostok*. (Moscow) 14 (1955) 20-30. There was a protest against feudal oppression and extortion, but it remained unorganized, haphazard, and separated from the parallel efforts of the townsmen. al-Jabarti is a main source of the article.
- 8601 IVANOVA, M. N. "The national liberation movement in Iranian Azerbaijan from 1918-1920." (in Russian) *Krat. Soobshch. Inst. Vostok*. (Moscow) 14 (1955) 3-13. The Khiabani movement.
- 8602 KABRDA, J. "Les documents turcs relatifs aux impôts ecclésiastiques prélevés sur la population bulgare au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle." *Arch. Orient.* 23, no. 1-2 (1955) 136-77. Eleven documents in facsimile and translation, with ample comment and bibliography.
- 8603 KEITH, IRVINE. "The Maghreb seeks unity." *New Leader* (New York) 38 (N 7 '55) 6-7. An account of moves coordinating nationalist activities in the three regions of French North Africa.
- 8604 LEHRMAN, HAL. "Tunisian self-government: 'where is the booty?'" *Reporter* (New York) 13 (D 15 '55) 16-20. While relations between Tunisian government officials and the former French rulers are extremely cordial, relations between the officials and the masses are poor owing largely to the widespread resentment that the "leaders have not yet made liberation pay off."
- 8605 MANUEL, FRANK E. "The Palestine question in Italian diplomacy, 1917-1920." *J. Mod. Hist.* (S '55).
- 8606 MIRAHMEDOV, AZIZ. "The culture of Azerbaijan in the 19th century." (in Azerbaijani, Russian summary) *Trudy, Inst. Ist. i Fil.* 6 (1955) 56-105. Substantial survey of leading personalities of enlightenment and reform.
- 8607 MUHAMEDIAROV, S. F. "On the history of the execution of the division of Central Asia into national states in 1924." (in Russian) *Sov. Vostok*. (Moscow) 1, no. 1 (1955) 44-56.
- 8608 MUKMINOVA, R. G. "On some sources for the history of Uzbekistan at the beginning of the 16th century." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Vostok*. (Tashkent) 3 (1954) 119-37. The rise of the Uzbek Shaybanids upon the ruins of the Timurid empire, as reflected in the sources, both printed and MSS.
- 8609 PERLMANN, M. "Facts versus pacts." *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (D '55) 373-82. Reviewing events of the last quarter of 1955, the author charges that in their preoccupation with concluding pacts, Great Britain and the U. S. are retreating "from reality to paper diplomacy."
- 8610 RASHIDOV, G. "The formation of Turkestan Soviet autonomy." (in Russian) *Trudy, Muzeya Ist. Uzbekskoi S.S.R.* 2 (1954) 3-21. A pious account of theories and operative policies during 1918-19.
- 8611 RAZHABI, Y. "The revolt of al-Qāsim." (in Hebrew, English summary) *Zion* (Jerusalem) 20, no. 1-2 (1955) 32-46. An episode in Yemen's struggle.

gle against Turkish rule during the 1620's is here told and illustrated with special reference to the fate of the Jews. Based on Hebrew and Arabic prose and poetic accounts.

8612 SIASSI, ALI AKBAR. "L'Iran au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle." *J. World Hist.* 2, no. 3 (1955).

8613 SMILANSKAYA, I. M. "The peasants' movement of Kesruan (Lebanon 1859-1860)." (in Russian) *Krat. Soobshch. Inst. Vostok.* (Moscow) 14 (1955) 31-45. The peasants under Tānyūs Shahin were defeated as Yūsūf Karam emerged as the French-supported leader.

8614 STERLING, CLAIRE. "A report from Egypt and Israel." *Reporter* (New York) 13 (D 15 '55) 11-16. Militarily the West is faced with the dilemma of abandoning Israel or losing the Arab states. The author concludes that, since it seems Nasser has gone too far to return to the West and Israel's resistance to being abandoned would drive Egypt even closer to Russia, "the sacrifice, therefore, would be not only tragic but useless."

8615 STREITHORST, TOM. "Hashemite Jordan today." *Mid. East Forum* (Beirut) 31 (Ja '56) 12-20. A copiously-illustrated survey of the country's problems and resources.

8616 SUMBATZADE, A. S. "The development of village economy in Azerbaijan in the late '50's and '60's of the 19th century." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Ist. i Fil.* 6 (1955) 24-51.

8617 WATERFIELD, GORDON. "Trouble in the horn of Africa." *Internat. Aff.* 32. (Ja '56) 52-60. Discusses the tensions between Ethiopians and Somalis. The expansionism of the former is likely to conflict with the nationalism of the latter, thus spelling trouble for Gt. Britain in particular.

See Also: 8580, 8621, 8622.

## ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation and communications)

8618 BARNEA, JOSEPH. "Natural resources in the Middle East." *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (O '55) 293-8. Contrary to the general impression, the area cannot be considered poor in natural resources. Unfortunately in almost all the countries consciousness of the importance of discovering and exploiting resources is absent from the minds of most of the inhabitants.

8619 ROZALIEV, Y. N. "The system of arbitration in cases of collective bargaining and anti-labor activity of arbitration tribunals in Turkey." (in Russian), *Krat. Soobshch. Inst. Vostok.* (Moscow) 14 (1955) 68-78. Generated by Turkish reaction, they are an instrument of class oppression of the workers.

8620 EL SABBAN, GAMIL. "The Aswan high dam." *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (D '55) 383-9. It has been said "every time Egypt has turned to the Nile, she has never been disappointed." The advantages—agricultural, social, industrial—that would result

from construction of this dam make it clear that, this time too, Egypt will not be disappointed when she turns to the Nile.

8621 STEVENS, GEORGIANA G. "The Jordan river valley." *Internat. Conciliation* 506 (Ja '56) 227-83. A detailed survey of the background and current situation with regard to the many plans and problems for the use of the Jordan waters. The question remains whether or not the pressing economic necessity for a settlement will be able to overcome the major political and economic differences before tension increases even more.

See also: 8563, 8564, 8573, 8578, 8586, 8599.

## SOCIAL AFFAIRS

(General, education, population and ethnology, medicine and health, religion, law)

8622 "Hommage à Robert Montagne." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 32, no. 4 (1955). The entire issue of the journal is devoted to the great French specialist on North African and Muslim sociology who died in 1954. Besides articles summarizing the main contributions of Montagne, there are some unedited pages of his writings as well as lectures on the Yemen, the structure of Muslim society, and the future of Berberie.

8623 AMIN, AHMED. "Folklore égyptien." *Rev. du Caire* 17 (O '54) 192-207. A translation of the late scholar's copious notes.

8624 ANAWATI, G. C. "Le Mahmal." *Rev. du Caire* 17 (O '54) 217-28. Report on Jomier's work on the subject.

8625 ANDERSON, J. N. D. "Law reform in the Middle East." *Internat. Aff.* 32 (Ja '56) 43-51. Outlines recent legal changes and predicts the replacement of the *shari'ah* and community courts by unified national courts that will apply a code derived from a synthesis of Western and Islamic concepts.

8626 BERCHER, L. "La censure des mœurs selon al-Ghazali." *I.B.L.A.* 18, no. 3 (1955) 313-21. Translated extracts from the philosopher's *K. al-amr bi-al-ma'rūf wal-nahy 'an il-munkar*.

8627 BERNSTAM, A. "On the problem of the origin of the Kirghiz people." *Sov. Etnografiya* (Moscow) 2 (1955) 16-26. Discerns 6 stages in the ethnogenesis of the people.

8628 BERQUE, J. "Les Mez'ūd'a." *Style historique d'une tribu marocaine. Rev. Hist.* (O-D '55).

8629 BONESCHI, P. "Kasaba et iktasaba: leur acception figurée dans le Qur'ān." *Riv. degli Studi O.* 30, no. 1-2 (1955) 17-53. Lexicological and semantic analysis with reference to standard commentaries and theological controversies hinging on these terms.

8630 BRUK, S. I. "The ethnic composition of the countries of western Asia." (in Russian) *Sov. Etnografiya* 2 (1955) 66-81. General survey and classification.

8631 CHURAKOV, M. V. "Berbers and Arabs in the ethnic history of Algeria." (in Russian) *Sov. Etnografiya* 1 (1955) 72-93. The tribes were mixing



constantly, and by the 19th century the country was ripe for unification.

- 8632 COLLOT, F. "La côte orientale de Cap Bon." *I.B.L.A.* 18, no. 3 (1955) 323-38. Sympathetic study of the diversified peoples occupying this portion of Tunisia.

- 8633 HAIM, SYLVIA G. "Arabic antisemitic literature." *Jewish Soc. Stud.* 17 (O '55) 307-12. Until the Arab world was flooded with Nazi propaganda Arab anti-semitism, as reflected in the literature, was both quantitatively and qualitatively different from that in the West.

- 8634 JOMIER, J. "Quelques positions actuelles de l'exégèse coranique en Egypte révélées par une polémique récente (1947-1951)." *Mélanges, Inst. Domin . . . du Caire* 1 (1954) 39-72. The struggle, academic and journalistic, aroused by the opposition to the acceptance of a new method of exegesis was initiated by M. A. Khalāfallāh, a disciple of al-Khūlī.

- 8635 KISLIAKOV, N. A. "Narshakhi's 'History of Bukhara' as an ethnographic source." (in Russian) *Trudy, Akad. Nauk Tajik S.S.R.* (Stalinabad) 27 (1954) 57-67. Notes especially the various new year's days among the Tajiks as reflections of differences between the solar and lunar calendar, popular festivals, and upper-class holidays.

- 8636 MASSIGNON, L. "Les sept dormants d'Ephèse, en Islam et en Chrétienté." *Rev. d'Etudes Islam.* (Paris) 22 (1954) 59-112. A documentary and iconographic miscellany to which contributions were made by E. Dermenghem, L. Mahfoud, S. Unver, and N. De Witt. The motif, legends, and sanctuaries are traced from Afghanistan to Algeria and France.

- 8637 MEIER, FRITZ. "Der derwischentanz." *Asiat. Studien* (Bern) 8, no. 1-4 (1954) 107-36. On the relation between *dhihr* and *samā'*. There is a development from the former to the latter, and mixed forms arise with some showing *dhihr*, others *samā'*.

- 8638 OSHANIN, L. V. "The ethnogenesis of the Tajiks." *Trudy, Inst. Ist. Akad. Nauk Tajik S. S. R.* (Stalinabad) 27 (1954) 13-24. Tajiks and Uzbeks are both descendants of Bactrians and Soghdians. Some Mongolization and complete Turkification in the plains brought about the formation of the Uzbeks.

- 8639 ROSLIAKOV, A. A. "The Alamans." *Sov. Etnografiya* 2 (1955) 41-53.

- 8640 SERJEANT, R. B. "Forms of plea, a šafi'i manual from al-Sihr." *Riv. degli Stud. O.* 30, no. 1-2 (1955) 1-15. A 15th-16th cent. treatise published.

- 8641 STRELCYN, STEFAN. "Prières magiques éthiopiennes pour délier les charmes." *Rocznik Orient.* (Warsaw) 18 (1955) 1-498. This Paris thesis presents anthropological and philological data. See also: 8570, 8576, 8599, 8738.

## SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

- 8642 ANAWATI, G. C. "Un manuscrit de la *Hikma mashriqiyya* d'Ibn Sina." *Mélanges, Inst. Domin . . . du Caire* 1 (1954) 164-5. An Aya Sofya MS (#2403), probably 13th century.

- 8643 ANAWATI, G. C. "La philosophie politique de l'Islam." *Rev. du Caire* 12 (S '54) 104-14.

- 8644 BEN YAHIA, B. "Constantine l'Africain et l'école de Salerne." *Cah. de Tunisie* 3, no. 1 (1955) 49-59. Notes on the translation technique of this still obscure figure in the history of medicine.

- 8645 DULIEU, L. "L'arabisme médical à Montpellier du XII au XIV siècle." *Cah. de Tunisie* 3, no. 1 (1955) 86-95. Its influence continued into the 15th century. As late as 1537 Rabelais was quoting Hippocrates in Greek.

- 8646 HARANT, HERVÉ and VIDAL, YVONNE. "Les influences de la médecine arabe sur l'école de Montpellier." *Cah. de Tunisie* 3, no. 1 (1955) 60-85. Sketches the contacts with the East, teachers' training, texts, methods in the 12-14th centuries. An extensive bibliography completes the study.

- 8647 HILTY, GEROLD. "El libro conplido en los judizios de las estrellas." *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 1-74. The editor of the book here comments on a recent paper by A. R. Nykl dealing with this 13th cent. translation of an 11th cent. work.

- 8648 JABRE, F. "La biographie et l'oeuvre de Ghazālī reconsidérées à la lumière des *Tabaqāt* de Sobkī." *Mélanges, Inst. Domin . . . du Caire* 1 (1954) 73-102.

- 8649 LITVINSKII, B. A. "Archaeological data on the history of medieval mining technique in Central Asia." (in Russian) *Trudy, Akad. Nauk Tajik S.S.R.* (Stalinabad) 27 (1954) 119-71.

- 8650 MILLÁS VALLICROSA, J. M. "Aportaciones para el estudio de la obra agronomica de Ibn Ḥayyāy y de Abū-l-Jayr." *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 87-105. On 11th century science.

- 8651 ROSENTHAL, ERWIN J. "Ibn Haldūn's attitude to the falāsifa." *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 75-85. Notes of general interest (consistency in the *Muqaddimah*; sources) and analysis of the particular problem. Ibn Khaldūn, empiricist that he was in the study of politics, felt that "the state is built on and maintained by power" . . . while "the philosophers are concerned with the highest good and with individual happiness in the ideal state of philosophical reason."

- 8652 ŠALIBA, JAMIL. "*Hads* and *fikr*." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmi* 30, no. 1 (1955) 18-30. An inquiry into the meaning of these terms in Arabic, and their correct translation.

- 8653 SUBHAN, ABDUS. "An enquiry into the causes of the failure of the Mu'tazilites." *The Islamic Lit.* 7 (O '55) 569-79. The movement declined because of the strong opposition of the orthodox and bitter internal feuds.

- 8654 TŪQĀN, Q. H. "The Arabs and plane geometry." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmi* 30, no. 2 (1955) 202-10.



- 8655 WICKERSHEIMER, E. "Laurent Fries et la querelle de l'arabisme en médecine (1530)." *Cah. de Tunisie* 3, no. 1 (1955) 96-103. "Vivat Avicenna, vivanteque eius imitatores" is the cry of this author of *Defensio medicorum principis Avicennae* against the rising wave of *graeculi* who resorted to classical texts.
- 8656 ZANUIEV, A. K. "The psychological views of Nasireddin Tusi." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Ist. i Fil.* 6 (1955) 212-37. Idealist in general, he displayed materialist tendencies in discussing the souls of plants and animals.
- See also: 8724, 8736, 8739.

## ART

(Archaeology, epigraphy, manuscripts and papyri, minor arts, numismatics and philately, painting and music)

- 8657 "El mihrâb almohade de Mértola (Portugal)." *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 188-195.
- 8658 "La techumbre mudéjar de la iglesia vieja de Godella (Valencia)." *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 196-206.
- 8659 DAVIDOVICH, E. A. "Numismatic materials for the history of feudal relations in Central Asia under the Samanids." (in Russian) *Trudy, Tajik Akad. Nauk* (Stalinabad) 27 (1954) 69-117.
- 8660 DAY, FLORENCE E. "The Mesopotamian style in luster painting." *Artibus Asiae* 18, no. 1 (1955) 75-6. Attributes a figural pottery sherd, hitherto thought to be Fatimid, to Mesopotamia and the post-Fatimid period on the basis of a postulated close relationship with a manuscript attributed to Mesopotamia.
- 8661 DIMAND, MAURICE S. "An exhibition of Islamic and Indian paintings." *Metro. Mus. of Art Bull.* 14 (D '55) 85-102. A short introductory article gives the historical setting for a lavish exhibition of Muslim painting starting with several leaves of the recently found *Andarz-nâmeh* of 1090 A. D. down to 18th cent. painting in India.
- 8662 ERDMANN, KURT. "Notizen zum inneranatolischen karavansaray." *Kunst des Orients* (Wiesbaden) 2 (1955) 5-29. A survey of 21 Central Anatolian caravanserais of the 13th century (Seljuq) which includes an appendix containing 8 additional examples.
- 8663 ETTINGHAUSEN, RICHARD. "An illuminated manuscript of Hâfiz-i-Abrû in Istanbul." *Kunst des Orients* 2 (1955) 30-44. Discussion of a holograph of the court historiographer of Shâh Rukh, written for the ruler and richly illustrated with miniatures. The MS dates from the year 1425 and was most probably written in Herat.
- 8664 GHIRSHMANN, R. "Notes iraniennes, VI: une coupe sassanide à scène de chasse." *Artibus Asiae* 18, no. 1 (1955) 5-19. Discusses a newly found Sasanian silver bowl with a princely cavalier seated backwards on his horse and shooting arrows at two lions. The author assumes the rider to be a son of Shapur II, or possibly the future Shapur III when he was still heir apparent. The vessel is now in the Teheran Museum.
- 8665 GRABAR, OLEG. "The Umayyad palace of Khirbat al-Mafjar." *Archaeology* (Brattleboro, Vt.) 8 (winter '55) 228-35. An analysis of the large ruins near Jericho. A palace that may have been built by the Umayyad Caliph Hishâm (724-43) shows a juxtaposition of eastern and western features. The royal bath, its paintings, and rich mosaics are of Byzantine or Roman origin, while the rich sculptural decorations, especially the many human figures, have their prototypes in finds from Central Asia. The eastern motifs were probably inspired by Sasanian textiles and metal work.
- 8666 JAMME, A. "Inscriptions sud-arabes de la collection Ettore Rossi." *Riv. degli Studi O.* 30, no. 1-2 (1955) 103-30. Twenty pieces collected in 1936. Three are Minaean, the rest Sabaeen.
- 8667 JAMME, A. "Quelques problèmes sud-arabes." *Bibl. O.* 12 (S-D '55) 219-20. Outlines the "Symposium on Ancient Asia" held at the 165th annual meeting of the American Oriental Society in Canada during April 1955.
- 8668 JAMME, A. "South Arabian antiquities in the U.S.A." *Bibl. O.* 12 (S-D '55) 152-4. Describes some hitherto unpublished pieces in various American institutions.
- 8669 KÜHNEL, ERNST. "Die osmanische tughra." *Kunst des Orients* 2 (1955). A survey of the development of the decoratively shaped names of Ottoman sultans, based mostly on examples in the Berlin Museum.
- 8670 LACOUTRE, SIMONE. "La jeune peinture égyptienne à Paris." *Rev. du Caire* 17 (N '54) 321-5.
- 8671 LAMM, CARL JOHAN. "Ein türkischer wapenteppich in schwedischem besitz." *Kunst des Orients* 2 (1955) 59-68. Anatolian carpet with "bird" designs on white background; in a center is a rectangle with the coat of arms and the (corruptly rendered) name of Jan Andrzej Prochnicki, Latin archbishop of Lemberg from 1614-1633.
- 8672 MARZÖK, MUHAMMAD 'ABD AL-'AZIZ. "Four dated tiraz fabrics of the Fatimid Khalif az-Zâhir." *Kunst des Orients* 2 (1955) 45-51. Detailed discussion of four textile fragments with the name of this caliph (1020-35 A.D.) or, in one case, of his vizier, none of them previously illustrated, although the texts of two have already been published.
- 8673 MOSTAFA, MOHAMED. "Anatolian prayer rugs." *Egypt Travel Mag.* (Cairo) 14 (S '55) 20-5. A short text deals with 11 typical examples of Ladik, Kirshehir, Melas, Mudjur, and Touzla types from the late 17th to the mid-19th centuries, all in the Museum of Islamic Art, Cairo.
- 8674 MOSTAFA, MOHAMED. "Mashrabiya." *Egypt Travel Mag.* 11 (Je '55) 20-5. Brief discussion of the turned lattice woodwork that usually covers the projecting balconies of Cairo houses, but which are also used for other purposes.

- 8675 MOSTAFA, MOHAMED. "Mazandaran ceramics." *Egypt Travel Mag.* 13 (Ag '55) 20-5. 12 characteristic examples of two types of medieval pottery, one with polychrome slip decorations from Sari and the other with sgraffito designs and green glaze lines, are described and reproduced in fine illustrations.
- 8676 MOSTAFA, MOHAMED. "Water-jug filters." *Egypt Travel Mag.* 12 (Jl '55) 20-5. The 16 illustrations of this article give outstanding examples from the rich collection of the decorative filters from the Cairo Museum of Islamic Art. These include inscriptions, animals, human caricatures, or ornamental patterns in pierced design.
- 8677 MOUBARAC, Y. "Les noms, titres, et attributs de Dieu dans le Coran et leurs correspondants en épigraphie sud-sémitique." *Muséon* 68, no. 1-2 (1955) 93-135. Part I of a study the idea of which was suggested by D. Nielsen's work. A short introduction is followed by a systematic confrontation of the data in the two categories indicated.
- 8678 RAAFAT, ALY. "Art in Islam." *Internat. House Quart.* 19 (winter '55) 80-2. Formalistic development of Islamic art along abstract rather than representational lines.
- 8679 RICARD, ROBERT. "Recherches sur la 'porte de trahison' dans la fortification hispanique." *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 167-88.
- 8680 SCHEUNEMANN, BRIGITTE. "Das papyrusmotiv auf ägyptischen teppichen mamlukischer zeit." *Kunst des Orients* 2 (1955) 52-8. Identification of a very common motif on the so-called Egyptian carpets as a derivative of the hieroglyph for Lower Egypt consisting of a papyrus plant. Sketch of the development of the papyrus design in Egyptian art. The motif on the carpets is additional proof of their Egyptian origin.
- 8681 SHEPHERD, DOROTHY G. "A dated Persian silk of the Buyid period." *Bull. Cleveland Mus. of Art* 43 (F '56) 19-22. A large well preserved silk with two confronted caprine animals in a roundel, verses by the Arab poet Abū al-'Atāhiyah and, on the reverse, 388 A.H. (998 A.D.). It may well have come from the tomb of the Buwayhid ruler Samṣām al-Dawlah.
- 8682 SPITTLE, S. D. T. "Cufic lettering in Christian art." *Archaeol. J.* (London) 3 (Jl '55) 138-52. Discusses the use of the Kufic script, especially certain letter combinations in the medieval art of Europe. The author is not familiar with another recent study on the same subject by K. Erdmann.
- 8683 TÜRKEKUL, M. H. "The Azerbaijan composer Üzeyir Hacıbeyli and his works." (in Turkish) *Dergi* (Munich) 1 (S '55) 90-7. His oriental operas are considered an important asset and achievement of his people.
- 8684 ULLENDORFF, EDWARD. "The origin of the Ethiopic alphabet." *Bibl. O.* 12 (S-D '55) 217-9. Refutation of an article on this subject published in *Bibl. O.* 12 (Ja '55) by Ryckmans.
- 8685 VORONINA, V. L. "On the characteristics of Central Asian architecture of the Samanid age." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Ist. Akad. Nauk Tajik S.S.R.* (Stalinabad) 27 (1954) 41-55. See also: 8565, 8723, 8737, 8742.

## LANGUAGE

- 8686 AL-'ARABI AL-'AZŪZI, MUHAMMAD. "Ibn al-Tayyib, annotator of the Qāmūs." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi* 30, no. 1 (1955) 87-90. A native of Sharāqa near Fās, Ibn al-Tayyib lived from 1110-1170 A.H., traveled and studied both in the East and the West.
- 8687 ARENDS, A. K. "The Tajik-Persian glossary of Hafiz-i Ubehi." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Vostokov.* (Tashkent) 3 (1954) 83-106. A 16th cent. MS of value for the historical dialectology of Iran. (Facsimiles and extracts).
- 8688 BASKAKOV, N. A. and INKIZHEKOVA-GREKUL, A. J. "The phonetic characteristics of the Hakay language and its dialects." (in Russian) *Trudy, Inst. Yazykovedeniya* (Moscow) 4 (1954) 324-77.
- 8689 DUDA, HERBERT W. "Altaistik und Turkologie." *W.Z.K.M.* 52, no. 3-4 (1955) 326-45. Lively and instructive analysis of J. Benzing's *Einführung*; also a number of methodological notes, especially on the relationship between linguistics and philology.
- 8690 FAZYLOV, M. F. "Certain peculiarities of the literary Tajik language of the Samanid age." (in Russian) *Trudy, Akad. Nauk Tajik S.S.R.* 27 (1954) 173-83. Analysis of the Bal'amī version of Tabarī, based on a 13-14th cent. MS.
- 8691 HÖFNER, M. "Über einige termini in qatabanischen kaufurkunden." *Z.D.M.G.* 105, no. 1 (1955) 74-80.
- 8692 KRAEMER, J. "August Fischer's sammlungen zum arabischen lexicon." *Z.D.M.G.* 105, no. 1 (1955) 81-105.
- 8693 KURDOIEV, K. K. "Critique of fallacious views of Kurdish." (in Russian) *Krat. Soobshch. Inst. Vostok* (Moscow) 12 (1955) 43-61. Inveighs against Marr, B. V. Miller, and O. Vilchevsky.
- 8694 PAREDES, LUIS SECO DE LUCENA. "Un nuevo texto en árabe dialectal grenadino." *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 153-65. A 15th cent. letter.
- 8695 PRITSACK, O. "Die oberstufenzahlung in Tungusischen und Jakutischen." *Z.D.M.G.* 105, no. 1 (1955) 184-91.
- 8696 REDARD, G. "Panorama linguistique de l'Iran." *Asiat. Studien* (Bern) 8, no. 1-4 (1954) 137. A survey for non-specialists of the Iranian language which spread during the past 2700 years over a vast area and is now written in some 30 scripts.
- 8697 RESHETOV, V. V. "On the dialect basis of literary Uzbek." (in Russian) *Voprosy Yazykovedeniya* 1 (1955) 100-8. The speech of Tashkent and Ferghana.
- 8698 STOLZ, KARL. "The Arabic language in Afghanistan." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmi*

- al-'Arabi* 30, no. 3 (1955) 370-9.
- 8699 VYCICHL, WERNER. "Der umlaut in den Berbersprachen Nordafrikas." *W.Z.K.M.* 52, no. 3-4 (1955) 304-25. "Berber is an amalgam in whose creation many elements took part, Hamitic being the most important grammatically. The Hamitic elements in Berber do not show traces of typically Egyptian development." They are pre-historic. Berber research must have a 6000 year scope.
- 8700 ZAJACZKOWSKI, A. "Pomniki pismienistwa trueckiego." (in Polish) *Rocznik Orient.* 19 (1954) 189-92. Survey of recent publications on Turcology by Malov, S. S. Catagay, von Gabain, and Brockelmann.

See also: 8629.

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- 8701 AL-'ABBADI, MUJTAR. "Los móviles económicos en la vida de Ibn al-Jatib." *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 214-21.
- 8702 ALONSO, MANUEL ALONSO. "Coincidencias verbales típicas en las obras y traducciones de Gundisalvo." *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 129-52. The Latin phraseology of translations from the Arabic.
- 8703 ATIYAH, EDWARD. "The novel and the Arabs." *Mid. East Forum* 30 (O-N '55) 13-15. Offers plausible reasons why this form of literature remains comparatively undeveloped and unpopular among the Arabs. However, the underlying factors seem to be changing and in due time one can expect that more and better novels will be written and widely read.
- 8704 BADAWI, 'ABD AL-RAHMÂN. "Autobibliografía de Ibn 'Arabi." *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 107-28. Text of an *ijāza* enumerating 290 works of the mystic poet.
- 8705 BAUSANI, A. "Satana, nell'opera filosofico-poetica di Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938). *Riv. degli Studi O.* 30, no. 1-2 (1955) 55-102. Discerns various elements in the thinker's ideology and usage: oriental strains (Hebrew-Islamic on the one hand, Iranian-Christian-Gnostic on the other) as well as more literary elaborations from Ghazālī to Milton.
- 8706 DE BEAURECUEIL, S. DER LANGIER. "Les références bibliques de l'itinéraire spirituel chez 'Abdallāh Anṣārī." *Mélanges, Inst. Domin. . . du Caire* 1 (1954) 5-38. How they are woven into the views and moods of an 11th cent. Muslim mystic, as reflected in his works, both Arabic and Persian.
- 8707 BERTELS, E. "The Shah-nameh and textual criticism." (in Russian) *Sov. Vostok.* (Moscow) 1 (1955) 88-95. The oldest available MSS and the 19th cent. Arabic translation (by al-Bundarī) will be the basis of this first critical edition to be published in the U.S.S.R.
- 8708 BORISOV, B. "New trends in Arabic literature." (in Russian) *Novyi Mir* (Moscow) 30 (My '54) 266-9. Pays particular attention to G. Hanna's novel *The Priests of the Temple* which depicts the revolt of workers against exploitation and imperialism.
- 8709 DUNLOP, D. M. "Sobre Ḥafṣ ibn Albar al-Qūtī al-Qurṭubī." (in English) *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 211-3. On 9-10th cent. literary figures and a translation of the Psalter.
- 8710 DIETRICH, ALBERT. "The *Kitāb al-jalīs wal-anīs* (of al-Mu'āfi b. Zakaryā al-Nahrawānī." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabi* 30, no. 3 (1955) 380-94. Notes on an anthology by a 4th cent. A.H. scholar, detractor of al-Mubarrad. Much pro-Umayyad material.
- 8711 DUBLER, CÉSAR E. "Alte arabische berichte über den Ferner Osten, insbesondere das *Kitāb 'Aḡā'ib al-Hind*, Buch der wunder Indiens." *Asiat. Studien* (Bern) 8, no. 1-4 (1954) 51-69. Continues a study in "Homenaje a J. M. Millas Vallicrosa." The *Ajā'ib* is a piece of entertainment literature popular on account of its vividness.
- 8712 GILANI, A. C. S. "Persian poetry of Ghalib." *The Islamic Lit.* 7 (S '55) 537-58. Detailed critique of this prolific 19th cent. poet's poet.
- 8713 GOTTSCHALK, W. "Über den dritten teil der indices zur Berliner Ibn Saad ausgabe." *Z.D.M.G.* 105, no. 1 (1955) 106-14.
- 8714 AL-ḤIMSI, NU'AYM. "History of the idea of *I'jāz al-Qur'ān*." *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabi* 30, no. 1, 2 (1955) 106-13, 299-311.
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- 8716 IBN 'ASHŪR, MUḤAMMAD AL-ṬĀHIR. "Al-Marzūqī's introduction to his commentary on the *Ḥamāsa* of Abū Tammām." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabi* 30, no. 1-2 (1955) 71-82, 281-7, 411-26.
- 8717 IRVING, T. B. "Arab tales in medieval Spanish." *The Islamic Lit.* 7 (S '55) 509-14. Traces them back to their Indian and Greek origin.
- 8718 AL-MAGHRIBI, 'ABD AL-QĀDIR. "A linguistic survey of Abū Hanīfa al-Dinawarī's *K. al-Nabāt*." *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabi* 30, no. 1 (1955) 42-50.
- 8719 AL-MAQDISI, ANIS. "The mental basis of rhetoric forms." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabi* 30, no. 1 (1955) 31-41.
- 8720 AL-MA'ŠŪMI, MUḤAMMAD SAGHIR ḤASAN. "The *risāla* of Ḥayy b. Yaqzān with the commentary of Ibn Sīna." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabi* 30, no. 1-2 (1955) 91-105, 288-98, 427-39.
- 8721 MERAD, ALI. "Mohammad Iqbal." *I.B.L.A.* 18, no. 3 (1955) 339-47. A résumé of the principal ideas of this Pakistani poet-philosopher who wrote extensively in Persian and is regarded as "l'un des meilleurs témoins de l'Islam en ce XX<sup>e</sup> siècle troublé."
- 8722 MONTEIL, V. "Neuf gazal de Hafez." *Rev. des Etudes Islam.* 22 (1954) 21-58. Transliterated, translated, annotated.



- 8723 FIGULEVSKAYA, N. V. "A Greek-Syriac-Arabic MS of the 9th century," (in Russian) *Palest. Sbornik* (Moscow) 1 (63) (1954) 59-90. Contains the Book of Psalms.
- 8724 PINES, S. "La longue recension de la théologie d'Aristote dans ses rapports avec la doctrine ismaélienne." *Rev. des Etudes Islam.* 22 (1954) 7-20.
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- 8726 ROBIN, PIERRE. "Djéjal-eddin el Roumi, poète et danseur mystique." *Cah. du Sud* 42 (1955) 171-205.
- 8727 SALLŪM, DĀ'ŪD. "The new schools of Iraqi poetry." (in Arabic) *al-Adib* (Beirut) 14 (N '55) 16-9. Brief sketch of the history, distinguishing characteristics, and major personalities associated with the lyrico-political, social, and independent schools of contemporary Iraqi poetry.
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- See also: 8633.

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- 8754 STRELCYN, S. "Na marginesie XIII zjazdu orientalistow polskich." (in Polish) *Przegląd Orient.* 1 (13) (1954) 43-57. Account of an orientalist conference held in June 1954.
- 8766 CARMODY, F. J., ed. *De motibus celorum* (of al-Bitruji). *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 229-30. (J. Vernet). A critical edition of the Latin translation of Michael Scot.
- 8767 CASSEL, WERNER. *Lihyan und Lihyanisch.* *Riv. degli Studi O.* 30 no. 3-4 (1955) 321-2. (S. Moscati). "A work of primary importance . . . indispensable for the historical and cultural study of ancient Arabia."
- 8768 COON, CARLETON S. *Caravan.* *Cah. de Tunisie* 3, no. 1 (1955) 125-7. (R. Le Tourneau).
- 8769 CORDERO TORRES, JOSE MARIA. *Relaciones exteriores de España.* *Mid. East J.* 10 (winter '56) 85-6. (John D. Harbron). Free from the "propaganda associated with Falangist books of a decade ago."

### BOOK REVIEWS

- 8755 *Economic developments in the Middle East, 1945-54.* *Mid. East J.* 10 (winter '56) 81-2. (Peter G. Franck). "The best available survey of a decade of Middle East economic developments."
- 8756 'ABD AL-JAWWAD, MUHAMMAD. *Taqwim Dar al-'Ulum* (1872-1947). *Mélanges Inst. Domin . . . du Caire* 1 (1954) 160-2. (J. Jomier). This volume of over 900 pages (published in 1952) is important for the intellectual history of modern Egypt, as is a 160 page study by the same author on al-Marsafi, the first professor of literary studies at the Dar al-'Ulum.
- 8757 ADAMIYAT, FEREYDOUN. *Bahrein Islands.* *Mid. East J.* 10 (winter '56) 87-9. (Majid Khaduri). A historical and legal survey in which "the writer could not completely suppress his national bias."
- 8758 ARMITAGE, FLORA. *The desert and the stars.* *Mid. East J.* 10 (winter '56) 89-90. (William Yale). On T. A. Lawrence.
- 8759 ATIYAH, EDWARD. *The Arabs.* *Mid. East Forum* 30 (D '55) 30-1. (Nabih A. Faris). "More in the nature of an apologia than of a study."
- 8760 ACHENA, M. and MASSÉ, HENRI, trs. *Le livre de science* (of Avicenna). *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 228-9. (M. Alonso Alonso).
- 8761 BALDWIN, MARSHALL W., ed. *A history of the crusades, I.* *Mid. East J.* 10 (winter '56) 84-5. (Robert W. Crawford). "An excellent, well-rounded addition to crusading literature."
- 8762 BARTHÉLÉMY, A. *Dictionnaire arabe-français.* *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 241-2. (E. Perpiña Rodriguez).
- 8763 BENOIST MÉCHIN. *Le loup et le léopard: Mustapha Kémal.* *Mid. East J.* 10 (Winter '56) 96-8. (Jean Deny). "Although it contains errors, the overall impression is true to historical reality."
- 8764 BIEGEL, L. C. *Die arabische liga.* *Internat. Aff.* 32 (Ja '56) 111. A popular account of the struggle for Arab unity in the establishment of the Arab League.
- 8765 BONNÉ, ALFRED. *State and economics in the Middle East, 2nd ed.* *Internat. Aff.* 32 (Ja '56) 111. "Comprehensive study of the economic and social history of the Middle East."
- 8770 CRESWELL, K.A.C. "The Muslim architecture of Egypt, I. Ikshids and Fatimids (A.D. 939-1171)." *Kunst des Orients* 2 (1955) 83-4. (E. Kühnel). "An indispensable standard work for the history of Muslim architecture."
- 8771 DAYDI, M. OLIVAR. *La cerámica trecentista en los países de la corona de Aragón.* *Kunst des Orients* 2 (1955) 84-5. (E. Kühnel).
- 8772 DAYF, SHAWQI, ed. *Al-Mughrib fi hulā al-maghrib.* *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* 30, no. 1 (1955) 167-70. (Al-Tanūkhī).
- 8773 DERMENGHEM, E. *Le culte des saints dans l'Islam maghreb.* *Cah. de Tunisie* 3, no. 1 (1955) 121-3. The book carefully preserves the atmosphere of cult, sanctuary, and worship. The material is chiefly Algerian.
- 8774 DUNLOP, D. M. *The history of the Jewish Khazars.* *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 235-7. (E. Garcia Gomez).
- 8775 ELWELL-SUTTON, L. P. *Persian oil: a study in power politics.* *Mid. East J.* 10 (winter '56) 94-5. (Harvey P. Hall). "A lively account from start to finish, with full appreciation of the personalities," but the author "at times comes close to being carried away by his indignation" against British policy.
- 8776 ERDMANN, KURT. *Orientalische Teppiche aus vier Jahrhunderten.* *Kunst des Orients* 2 (1955) 86-7. (E. Kühnel).
- 8777 FAHMI, MANŞUR. *Mayy Ziyādah.* *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* 30, no. 2 (1955) 318-9. (M. Shihābī). A course on early Arab feminism given in the Arab League's Institute of Higher Arab Studies.
- 8778 FARIS, NABIH A. and HUSAYN, MOHAMMED T. *Crescent in crisis.* *Mid. East Forum* 30 (D '55) 28-9. (R. H. Nolte). "As a dispassionate and scholarly attempt to analyse contemporary Arab society, *Crescent in crisis* is a first-rate critical survey."
- 8779 AL-FĀSĪ, 'ALĀL. *The independence movement in Arab North Africa.* *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (D '55) 399-400. (Nevill Barbour). The author's "account of the development of the nationalist movement in Morocco can . . . be taken as entirely authentic within the limits of his personality and environment."

- 8780 FATEMI, NASROLLAH SAIFPOUR. *Oil diplomacy: powder keg in Iran*. *Internat. Aff.* 32 (Ja '56) 112-3. (R. W. Bullard).
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- 8783 GABRIELI, F. *Dal mondo dell' Islam*. *Arch. Orient.* 23, no. 1-2 (1955) 271. (I. Hrbek).
- 8784 GOITEIN, S. D. *Jews and Arabs: their contacts through the ages*. *Mid. East J.* 10 (winter '56) 82-3. (Walter J. Fischel). "He shows throughout his clear and readable presentation a balanced judgment and deep insight into the very nature and essence of the Arab-Jewish symbiosis."
- 8785 GOLVIN, L. *Les arts populaires en Algérie, II. Les tapis algériens*. *Cah. de Tunisie* 3, no. 1 (1955) 117-8. (G. Marçais).
- 8786 GULICK, JOHN. *Social structure and culture change in a Lebanese village*. *Mid. East J.* 10 (winter '56) 86-7. (William D. Schorger). A detailed study of a small Greek orthodox community.
- 8787 HALL, HARVEY P., ed. *Middle East resources: problems and prospects*. *Geog. Rev.* 46 (Ja '56) 133-4. (Alexander Melamid.)
- 8788 HAZARD, H. W. *The numismatic history of late medieval North Africa*. *W.Z.K.M.* 52, no. 3-4 (1955) 420-1. (G. Zoppoth).
- 8789 HEUSER-SEVKET. *Türkisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch*. *W.Z.K.M.* 52, no. 3-4 (1955) 422-4. (H. W. Duda).
- 8790 HEYD, U. *Language reform in modern Turkey*. *W.Z.K.M.* 52, no. 3-4 (1955) 421-2. (H. W. Duda).
- 8791 HILTY, GEROLD. *El libro conplido de los iudicios de las estrellas* (of Aly Aben Ragel). *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 230-1. (J. Vernet).
- 8792 HOENERBACH, W. *Cervantes und der orient*. *Arch. Orient.* 23, no. 1-2 (1955) 271-2. (I. Hrbek). The book is valuable for the light it throws on some dark pages of North African history as well as on the mind and work of the great Spaniard.
- 8793 HOENERBACH, W. *Waṭima's Kitāb ar-Ridda*. *Orientalia* 24, no. 3 (1955) 331-6. (A. Schall). Numerous corrections suggested.
- 8794 HOSKINS, HALFORD L. *The Middle East: problem area in world politics*. *Geog. Rev.* 46 (Ja '56) 133-5. (Alexander Melamid).
- 8795 HUREWITZ, J. *Middle East dilemmas*. *Sov. Vostok*. (Moscow) 1, no. 1 (1955) 167-73. (G. G. Drambianz). "An excellent example of how reactionary American historians try to justify and whitewash the expansionist policy of the U. S. in the interests of monopolist circles."
- 8796 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. *The economic development of Iraq*. *Krat. Soobshch. Inst. Vostok*. (Moscow) 14 (1955) 85-90. (M. F. Gataulin).
- 8797 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. *The economic development of Syria*. *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (D '55) 396-9. (Alfred Michaelis). "An informed, up-to-date and comprehensive appraisal of the country's economic status and development potentialities."
- 8798 KARAHAN, A. *Islam-Türk edebiyatında kırk hadis toplama, tercüme ve şerhleri*. *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* 30, no. 1-2 (1955) 161-2. (E. Rossi).
- 8799 KHADDURI, MAJID and LIEBESNY, H. J. *Law in the Middle East*. *Internat. Aff.* 32 (Ja '56) 111-2. (Norman Bentwich). "The first volume of what is designed to be a complete study of law in the Middle East, and particularly of the Islamic Law;" *Mid. East Forum* 30 (O-N '55) 29-30. (Elie Salem). "Conceived by its editors as a necessary study for a deeper western understanding of the fundamental laws and traditions that govern the life of the Middle Eastern peoples."
- 8800 AL-KHĀLIDĪ, MUṢṬAFĀ and FARRŪKH, 'UMAR. *Missions and imperialism* (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* 30, no. 1 (1955) 119-21. (A. al-Shukrī).
- 8801 KHAYYĀT, JA 'FAR. *The Iraqi village* (in Arabic). *Krat. Soobshch. Inst. Vostok*. (Moscow) 14 (1955) 82-4. (Z. I. Levin).
- 8802 AL-KHOLĪ, AL-BAHĪ. *Woman between home and society*. (in Arabic) *Melanges, Inst. Domin . . . du Caire* 1 (1954) 150-9. (J. Jomier).
- 8803 KHŪRĪ, IBRAHĪM. *Palestine between two fires* (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* 30, no. 1 (1955) 122-3. (S. Jabri). The crossfire launched by Churchill and Truman.
- 8804 KIRK, GEORGE E. *A short history of the Middle East from the rise of Islam to modern times*. *Bibl. O.* 12 (S-D '55) 162. (A. A. Kampman).
- 8805 KISTER, M. J. ed. *K. ādāb as-ṣuḥba* (of al-Sulamī). *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* 30, no. 3-4 (1955) 331-2. (F. Gabrieli).
- 8806 KRAEMER, J. *Der sturz des königreichs Jerusalem (538/1187) in der darstellung des 'Imad ad-Dīn al-Kātib al-Isfahānī*. *W.Z.K.M.* 52 no. 3-4 (1955) 416-9. (H. L. Gottschalk).
- 8807 KRAEMER, JÖRG. *Theodor Nöldeke's belegwörterbuch zur klassischen arabischen sprache*. *J.A.O.S.* 75 (Jl-S '55) 201. (Franz Rosenthal).
- 8808 LAMBTON, A.K.S. *Persian grammar*. *Bibl. O.* 12 (S-N '55) 201-3. (Fritz Meier).
- 8809 LANDAU, JACOB M. *Parliaments and parties in Egypt*. *Mid. East Forum* 30 (D '55) 32-3. (Nabih A. Faris). Although based on source materials, the book suffers from the limitations inherent in concentrating on the written tradition while failing "to take into consideration the more valuable and indeed indispensable one, namely the oral or unwritten tradition."

- 8810 LEKIASHVILI, A. S. "Paradigms of verbal forms of literary Arabic. (in Georgian and Russian) *Krat. Soobshch. Inst. Vostok* (Moscow) 12 (1955) 126-8. (V. P. Starinin). "Tbilisi has now become the first semitistic center in the Soviet Union." The volume, excellently produced, appeared in 1953.
- 8811 LENCZOWSKI, G. *The Middle East in world affairs*. *Jewish Soc. Stud.* 17 (O '55) 339-42. Ignores North Africa and Pakistan.
- 8812 LONGRIGG, STEVEN HEMSLEY. *Oil in the Middle East*. *Geog. Rev.* 46 (Ja '56) 133-4. (Alexander Melamid); *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (D '55) 391-5. (Benjamin Shwadran). "In spite of these . . . criticisms (dullness, lack of objectivity) *Oil in the Middle East* is, as regards factual data, indispensable for the student of the area."
- 8813 LWOW, N. *Kirgizskii teatr. Przegląd Orient.* 1 (13) (1955) 121-5. (S. Plaskowicka-Rymkiewicz).
- 8814 MALOV, S. E. *Yeniseiskaya pismennost' tiurkov*. *Arch. Orient.* 23, no. 1-2 (1955) 292-4. (P. Poucha).
- 8815 MARCAIS, PHILIPPE. *Textes arabes de Djidjelli*. *Cah. de Tunisie* 3 no. 1 (1955) 114-5. (L. Brunot). An important study in North African Arab dialectology.
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- 8818 MCCARTHY, R. J., ed. *The theology of al-Ash'ari*. *W.Z.K.M.* 52, no. 3-4 (1955) 419-20. (E. Bannerth).
- 8819 MILES, GEORGE C. *Coins of the Spanish Mulūk al-ṭawā'if*. *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 244-7. (J. M. de Navascuas).
- 8820 MOSTAFA, MOHAMED. *Turkish prayer rugs*. *Kunst des Orients* 2 (1955) 87. (E. Kuhnelt).
- 8821 AL-NADVI, ABŪ AL-ḤASAN 'ALĪ AL-HUSAYNĪ. *Memoirs of a traveler in the Arab East*. (in Arabic). *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* 30, no. 1 (1955) 124-9. The author is a Pakistani Azharite.
- 8822 NÖLDEKE, T. *Belegwörterbuch*. *Bibl. O.* 12 (S-D '55) 209. (J. Schacht).
- 8823 PAREJA, F. M. *Islamologia*. *al-Andalus* 20, no. 1 (1955) 225-7.
- 8824 PHILBY, H. ST. JOHN. *Saudi Arabia*. *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (N '55) 350-1. (Gerald De Gaury). "A reasoned survey of the achievement of the dynasty of Ibn Su'ūd from its romantic debut just over two hundred years ago to our own times."
- 8825 POPPER, WILLIAM, ed. *History of Egypt* (of Taghri-Birdi). *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* 30, no. 1 (1955) 150-2. (G. Haddād).
- 8826 RAMSTEDT, G. J. Einführung in die al-taische sprachwissenschaft. *Arch. Orient.* 23, no. 1-2 (1955) 294-5. (P. Poucha).
- 8827 RATHJENS, CARL. *Sabaeica*. *Bibl. O.* 12 (S-N '55) 207-9. (J. Ryckmans). Report on several archaeological expeditions to the Yemen between 1931-8.
- 8828 RITTER, H. *Karagös*. *Z.D.M.G.* 105, no. 1 (1955) 230-1. (A. Von Gabain).
- 8829 RONDOT, PIERRE. *Les Chrétiens d'Orient*. *Mid. East J.* 10 (winter '56) 83-4. (Edward Jurji). "The book lays no claim to erudition and nowhere pretends to be exhaustive," but it "succeeds unusually well in setting the carefully garnered materials in bold relief."
- 8830 ROSENTHAL, FRANZ. *A history of Muslim historiography*. *J.A.O.S.* 75 (Jl-S '55) 202-3. (Walter J. Fischel). "Opens so many new horizons of research that it will be of inestimable help to the Islamist and Arabist, as well as to the general historian."
- 8831 ROSSI, E. *Elenco dei manoscritti turchi della Biblioteca Vaticana*. *Riv. degli Studi O.* 30, no. 1-2 (1955) 164-6. (E. Jemma).
- 8832 SANGER, RICHARD. *The Arabian peninsula*. *Mid. East. Aff.* 6 (O '55) 322-3. (R. Bayly Winder).
- 8833 SMIRNOV, N. A. *Studies in the history of Islamic studies in the U.S.S.R.* (in Russian). *Przegląd Orient.* 1 (13) (1955) 109-12. (J. Reyehman).
- 8834 AL-SHIHĀBĪ, MUSTAFA. *Scientific terms in Arabic* (in Arabic). *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* 30, no. 2 (1955) 312-3. A careful and extremely valuable survey of Arabic scientific terminology, medieval and modern.
- 8835 STROTHMANN, R. *Morgenländische geheimsekten in abendländischer forschung und die handschrift Keil Arab 19*. *Arch. Orient.* 23, no. 1-2 (1955) 273. (I. Hrbek).
- 8836 STURMINGER, WALTER. *Bibliographie und ikonographie der Turkenbelagerungen Wiens 1529 und 1683*. *W.Z.K.M.* 52, no. 3-4 (1955) 427-29. (R. F. Kreutel).
- 8837 THOMAS, L. V. and FRYE, R. N. *The United States and Turkey and Iran*. *W.Z.K.M.* 52, no. 3-4 (1955) 424-6. (H. W. Duda). Thomas is a good reporter of surface facts. "We should have expected more from Thomas the Orientalist." Frye's account of Iran "is interesting and welcome."
- 8838 TYAN, E. *Le califat*. *Orientalia* 24, no. 3 (1955) 336-9. (F. Rosenthal).
- 8839 UNESCO. *Report of the mission to Afghanistan*. *Krat. Soobshch. Inst. Vostok*. 14 (1955) 91-5. (R. T. Akhramovich).
- 8840 VAUGHAN, DOROTHY M. *Europe and the Turk*. *Bibl. O.* 12 (S-D '55) 154-7. (A. A. Kampman).
- 8841 WEULLERSSE, J. *Les paysans du Proche Orient*. *Sov. Etnografiya* (Moscow) 2 (1955) 179-82. (A. Pershitz). On the 1952 Russian translation of this standard work.

## ABBREVIATIONS

A., Asian, Asiatic, asiatique	Mag., Magazine	Univ., University, université
Acad., Academy	Mid., Middle	Z., Zeitschrift, Zeitung
Aff., Affairs, affaires	Mod., Modern, moderno, etc.	
Afr., African, Afrique, etc.	Mus., Museum, musée	<i>Arabic</i>
Amer., American	Natl., National	K., Kitab, etc.
Archeol., Archaeological, archéologique	Nr., Near	Maj., Majallah, etc.
B., Bulletin	Numis., Numismatic, numismatique	<i>Russian, Polish, etc.</i>
C., Central	O., Oriental, oriente, etc.	Akad., Akademii
Cent., Century	Pal., Palestine	Fil., Filosofi
Contemp., Contemporary, etc.	Phil., Philosophical	Inst., Institut
Cult., Culture	Philol., Philological, Philologique	Ist., Istoriî
D., Deutsch	Polit., Political, Politique	Izvest., Izvestia
Dept., Department	Proceed., Proceedings	Lit., Literaturi
East., Eastern	Quart., Quarterly	Orient., Orientalni
Econ., Economic, économique	R., Royal	Ser., Seriya
For., Foreign	Res., Research	Sov., Sovetskoye
G., Gesellschaft	Rev., Review, revue	Uchon., Uchoniye
Geog., Geographical, géographique, etc.	Riv., Rivista	Vostok., Vostokovedeniâ
Gt. Brit., Great Britain	S., School	Yaz., Yazika
Hist., Historical, historique, etc.	Soc., Society, société	Zap., Zapiski
Illust., Illustrated	Stud., Studies	
Inst., Institute	Trans., Transactions	<i>Turkish</i>
Internat., International	U. S., United States	Coğ., Coğrafya
J., Journal	USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist	Fak., Fakülte
L., Literature, etc.	Republics	Univ., Üniversite
M., Morgenländisch, etc.		



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- Acta Orientalia.** 60 forint. *irreg* Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Orientalisztikai Közleményei, 2 V. Alkotmány-utca 21, Budapest, Hungary.
- Acta Orientalia.** Kr. 30; single issue kr. 10. *irreg* Associates Orientales Batava Danica Norwegica, c/o Ejnar Munksgaard, Ltd., Nørregade 6, Copenhagen K, Denmark.
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- African Studies.** £1; single issue 5s. *q* Dept. of Bantu Studies, Univ. of the Witwatersrand, Milner Park, Johannesburg, S. Africa; agent: Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner & Co., 43 Gr. Russell St., London, W.C.1.
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- American Anthropologist.** Institutions, \$9.00; individuals, \$8.50; single issue \$2.25. *bi-m* Dept. of Anthropology, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
- American Historical Review.** \$7.50; single issue \$2. *q* American Historical Association, Study Room 274, Library of Congress Annex, Washington 25, D. C.; single issues available from The Macmillan Co., 60 Fifth Ave., New York 11, N. Y.
- American Journal of Archaeology.** \$7.50; foreign \$8; single issue \$2. *q* Archaeological Institute of America, 608 Univ. of Cincinnati Library, Cincinnati, Ohio.
- Anadolu.** E. de Boccard, 1 rue de Medici, Paris.
- Anatolian Studies.** UK, £1 10s; foreign, \$4.50; single issue £1 12s 6d. *ann* British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara, 56 Queen Anne St., London, W.1.
- al-Andalus.** 60 pes.; single issue 30 pes. *semi-ann* Secretaria, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Cambio Internacional Serrano 117, Madrid, Spain.
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- Arabica.** Fl. 26; fr. 2400. 3 issues per ann E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands; Librairie Orientale et Americaine G.P. Maisonneuve, 198, Blvd. St.-Germain, Paris 7e.
- Archiv Orientální.** Kčs.100; single issue Kčs.25. *q* Československá akademie věd Orientální ústav, Lázeňská 4, Praha III, Czechoslovakia.
- Armenian Review.** \$6; single issue \$1.75. *q* Hairenik Association, Inc., 212 Stuart St., Boston 16, Mass.
- Ars Orientalis** (formerly *Ars Islamica*). *irreg* Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington 25, D. C.
- Art Institute of Chicago Quarterly.** \$1. *q* The Art Institute, Adams St. at Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill.
- Artibus Asiae.** Sw. fr. 50, \$12; single issue \$3.50. *q* Prof. Alfred Salmony, Institute of Fine Arts, New York Univ., 17 E. 80th St., New York, N. Y.
- Asian Review.** £1; single issue 5s. *q* East & West Ltd., 3 Victoria St., London, S.W.1.
- Asiatische Studien.** Sw.fr. 18. *q* A. Francke, A. G. Verlag, Bern, Switzerland.
- Belleten.** *q* Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, Turkey.
- Biblioteca Orientalis.** \$9.50; single issue \$2. *bi-m* Dr. A. A. Kampman, ed., Noordeindeplein 4a, Leiden, The Netherlands.
- British Museum Quarterly.** £1; single issue 5s 3d. *q* Trustees of the British Museum, Gt. Russell St., London, W.C.1.
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## Readers' Commentary

*The Journal welcomes comment from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in this column, preference being given to those which correct errors of fact, offer constructive criticism of an opinion expressed, or provide additional information on a topic discussed in the Journal's pages.*

Dear Sir:

In the Winter, 1956, issue of the Middle East Journal, the islands of Bahrayn are referred to on two occasions, both of which call for further comment.

1. Dr. Herbert Liebesny in his instructive article on "Administration and Legal Development in Arabia" remarks that Bahrayn has had the most extended and orderly development toward modernization of all the principalities of the Persian Gulf. In his concluding remarks the author looks forward to a further development of the administrative and legal structure of the states of the area on a synthesis of the traditional foundations of their culture and modern trends in administration and law.

Very recently the Government of Bahrayn approached the eminent Egyptian jurist Prof. Abderrazzaq as-Sanhouri in view of elaborating new laws for the country. Four new codes are contemplated: Civil, penal, commercial and procedure. It is most likely that Prof. Sanhouri will accept the offer of the Government of Bahrayn, and thus the country may in the near future have the modern legislation predicted by Dr. Liebesny. It hardly needs mention that Prof. Sanhouri has already elaborated legislation and particularly civil codes for many Arab States. In a personal interview with the author of these lines, Prof. Sanhouri stated that in view of the particular social conditions of Bahrayn, its legislation should be drafted with an emphasis on simplification of procedure, and should contain a greater proportion of substantive provisions derived from Islamic law and local custom, than is the case with

other Arab countries who felt more intensely and for a longer time the impact of the West. In this way, the new laws of Bahrayn, while still bearing fundamental resemblances to those of Egypt, Syria, or Iraq, will be adapted to the particular conditions prevailing in the country.

2. In his review of F. Adamiyat's book *Bahrein Islands*, Dr. Majid Khadduri justly remarks that the author did not completely suppress his national bias when dealing with the Iranian claim to sovereignty over Bahrayn. The pretensions of Iran have been often refuted both historically and from the legal point of view. A good account of this controversy over Bahrayn is given by Dr. Khadduri in an article referred to in his review (*The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 45, 1951, pp. 631-647). The historical claim of Iran is based on its domination of the islands for about one and one-half centuries (1622-1783). It has already been demonstrated (Khadduri, *op. cit.*, p. 639) that the Iranian rule during that period was interrupted in 1717 and 1720 by Arab chiefs from Muscat, who wrested the islands from Iran and retained them to 1737. I should like to add here to these already generally-known interruptions of Iranian rule another one little known but fortunately recorded by an unbiased contemporary source. In 1765 a Danish scientist, M. Neibuhr, undertook one of the earliest voyages by Westerners in Arabia, a voyage that resulted, among other scientific results, in the publication of a two-volume work entitled *Description de l'Arabie* (Paris, 1779). About Bahrayn the author states that at the time of his voyage

the islands were under the rule of Shaykh Nasr of Abu Shahr, an Arab dominion on the *eastern* (i.e. Iranian) side of the Gulf (see vol. 2, pp. 169 and 188). Elsewhere he remarks that although the inhabitants of Bahrayn are of the Shi'i sect, their language is Arabic (vol. 2, p. 189). As to the independent Arab shaykhdoms and principalities on the Iranian side of the Gulf, Neibuhr deals with them in detail and gives their history and the names of their rulers and mentions the Arab tribes constituting their inhabitants. It is beyond the possibilities of this letter to give even some of the exceedingly interesting information contained in Neibuhr's work about these Arab dominions on the Iranian side of the Gulf, but it will suffice to quote from what the author says about these Arabs in general and how far their independence went *vis-à-vis* the Government of Iran:

"Les Arabes qui sont sur la côte de Perse vivent presque tous de la même manière. Ils ne subsistent pour la plupart que par le commerce maritime, par la pêche des perles et par celle des poissons. . . . Elles (les tribus) parlent encore toutes la langue Arabe. La plupart sont Sunnites et par là déjà ennemis nés des Persans, avec lesquels ils ne s'allient jamais. . . . Nadir Schah même, dont le nom seul était si formidable à ses voisins les plus puissants, ne put pas tout à fait dompter les Arabes qui habitent sur la côte de Perse." (vol. 2, pp. 162-164).

It is not difficult to conceive then that if Iran insists on her alleged rights in Bahrayn on the ground of an often interrupted military occupation during a period of about one and one-half centuries, then a strong Arab case could be formulated about the eastern shores of the Persian Gulf, which for centuries had been the home of independent Arab tribes under the organized rule of their shaykhs and amirs. The last of these Arab principalities, Muhammarah, was not annexed by Iran, as is well known, until 1924.

DR. GAMAL MOURSI BADR  
Avocat à la Cour  
Alexandria, Egypt

Dear Sir:

You reviewed this book (*Persian Oil*, by Elwell-Sutton; reviewed by Harvey P. Hall) in your last issue. Mr. Elwell-Sutton has made the most penetrating analysis of past faults and failures yet attempted but his unrelenting attack has not always been discriminating.

I was recently recalled to advisory service in the Persian Government's oil interests, and I challenge the author's condemnation of the present agreement with the Oil Consortium. His description of it as the abandonment of nationalization (and other principles) was in such terms as to suggest that all right-minded Persians saw in it the death knell of their hopes for fair treatment and a reasonably prosperous future. This does far less than justice to those Persians who had laboured hard against great odds to get this settlement. It was well for Persia that there were those with skill, courage and a practical outlook, as well as high principles, who were ready to face the inevitable criticism for not achieving the ideal agreement.

What they did achieve was (that which Mr. Elwell-Sutton advocates) to "establish relations on an entirely new footing that benefited both sides." On the Persian side it was at any rate many times more favorable than ever before, and on terms that recognized explicitly Persian ownership, not only of the oil won, but also of the means of winning it, leaving to the technically trained the job of management on behalf of the National Iranian Oil Company. While few in Persia believe that the settlement terms were generous to Persia, to assert that the "last opportunity is gone" to secure fair terms emphasises the author's determined pessimism—or cynicism.

This seems no more realistic than his saying that, with the incorporation of a particular clause in the Consortium Agreement, "Persia threw away the last vestiges of security for the future of her oil industry, whose entire existence would *now* (italics mine) be at the whim of the international oil cartel." Obviously this lack of effective access to overseas markets has always been

crucial, and for the foreseeable future is likely to remain so. This is a fact that has to be grappled with. In doing so tenaciously, and by providing such safeguards as were possible, the Persian negotiators endeavored (and many will think did not fail) to serve their country as well as any other of her patriots.

I hope that Mr. Elwell-Sutton will take the opportunity to repudiate any impres-

sion to the contrary that his book may have given. We all wish, with him, that future relationships will be illumined as much by the spirit of the agreement, and the "principles of fair dealing", as by the sanctity of the written contract.

W. H. ROBERTS

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